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INTRODUCTION

\As a student of finance during the greatest prosperity-
era that this country has witnessed, the writer became inter-
ested in the investment trust movement and, more particularly,
in its relation to the bull market of 1924-19 29. To narrow
the scope of a study of the recent trends in this field and,
at the same time, consider the investment trust in connection
with the "new-era" theories regarding common stocks, the sub-
ject "Specializing Investment Trusts" was selected for the
reasons which follow.
First, for the most part, specializing investment trusts
concentrate on common stocks. The fixed type takes common
stocks out of the market for the length of the life of the
trust; the managed list, as a rule, buys common stocks to
.hold, at least as long as their outlook is promising. Invest-
ment trusts dealing in the stocks of financial institutions
emphasize common stocks as neither commercial banks nor in-
surance companies issue bonds or preferred stock. The single
industry trusts, for example, the trusts which deal primarily
in the securities of public utility corporations, usually in-
clude both junior and senior securities in their portfolios.
During the last year or two, however, they too have turned
their attention primarily to common stocks.
Second, the specializing trusts, although comparatively
-i-

few in number, cover practically every type of investment
trust as far as capital structure and management policies are
concerned. This, the writer felt, would permit of a more com-
prehensive treatment of the subject than if the field of in-
vestigation were narrowed either to fixed or, on the other
hand, to general trusts,
—
particularly as a number of the
specializing trusts may also be classified as general in that
they are organized as corporations and follow a program of
wide diversification with broad powers granted to managers.
Third, with the rapid increase during 1928 in the crea-
tion of investment trusts of the general management type, the
writer desired to investigate as to whether the public had
lost interest in the specializing trusts because of certain
inherent weaknesses in this type or whether the sponsors of
new trusts had not adopted the general management type in
order to speculate freely on a rising market.
Fourth, the writer was unable to discover that any
authorities had made detailed analysis of the specializing
trusts individually and collectively.
In October, 1929, while this thesis was in the process of
preparation, the overdue market break occurred. According to
the Chase Economic Bulletin of November 22, 1929, "The average
prices of 50 active stocks, half rails and half industrials.
(
fell from a high point of $311.90 on September 19, to ,164.43
on November 13, a break of 47.3 per cent." "With more pros-
perity, more money and more assumed confidence than any coun-
try on earth, we allowed ourselves to be stampeded into the
greatest stock market crash of history", said John Moody ac-
cording to the Boston Transcript of October 26, 1929.
Queries were ansv/ered and theories proven or upset by
the break. Unquestionably the investment trusts failed to
manifest the strength that so many had predicted for them.
Very likely the better managed trusts sensed the approaching
storm and, as they later claimed, sold heavily in the late
summer or early fall at top prices. Thus they gave an initial
impulse to the subsequent reaction. Less judicious trusts
made the mistake of purchasing after the first break, ex-
hausting all their capital so that they were unable to take
advantage of the major decline. Some trusts tried to support
their own issues by repurchasing them.
To review this situation and to bring together some of
the various opinions expressed during the market break, the
writer has included a chapter on recent trends. As the in-
vestment trust is in its development stage, it is constantly
necessary to bring the subject down to date. In making this
study of the specializing investment trust, the writer has
-iii-

endeavored to hold this as a complementary aim.
To give the uninitiated a better understanding of the in-
vestment trust movement, the first chapter of this study con-
tains a summary of the historical development, comparing the
British trust with the American. A brief resume of the econ-
omic factors favoring the American growth of these financial
institutions follows. Several methods of classifying invest-
ment trusts are considered in the third chapter. An analysis
of over twenty representative types of specializing trusts
constitutes chapter four. The next chapter deals with the
latest trends—merging, requirements for listing on the New
York Stock Exchange, and the pros and cons of regulation.
The last chapter endeavors to present some conclusions as
to the future of the specializing investment ' trusts.
-iv-

CHAPTER I
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE INVESTMENT TRUST MOVEMENT

The terra "investment trust" has been used for over a
half century to designate a type of financial institution
which originated in Great Britain during a period when
money was plentiful, when the market for capital was satura-
ted, and when there was a rapid growth of new ventures, par-
ticularly in the United States and later in South America,
Although in Holland, Switzerland, and Belgium* this type
of institution in a somewhat different form has existed for
nearly a century, it has been in Great Britain and the
United States that the movement has had the greatest signifi-
cance, the trusts of the latter country now outstripping all
others in variety, in numbers, and in resources. The estimate
as to the number of these organizations in the United States
varies, some authorities saying that there are practically
five hundred companies that can be classified as investment
trusts, while others, eliminating those concerns which border
on the type of financing or holding companies and do not deal
exclusively with investments, place the number around three
hundred with invested capital estimated at over two billion
dollars.
In England and Scotland, the investment trust is some-
times called a "financial trust" or a "trust company". To-
day it is necessary, as it is in this country, to examine
*The first investment trust is supposed to have originated
in Belgium. This was the Societe General de Belgique.
(Fed. Res. Bulletin, llov. 1920 and Jan. 1921)
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the nature of each company's business to determine whether
it should "be included as an investment trust in the more
accurate use of the term. In Scotland and England, the
early investment trusts represented what the name implies
and were, properly speaking, trusts as the funds were man-
aged by unincorporated trustees. Today, however, both in
Great Britain and in the United States, these organizations
generally operate as corporations. Although in this country
they may operate as joint-stock associations or common lav/
associations or even as partnerships or under the direction
of one individual, in Great Britain they are required to
incorporate under the Companies Act.
Since the term investment trust is now used so freely,
it is necessary to distinguish between financing and hold-
ing companies. All three types of these organizations are
alike in that they may raise capital by issuing their own
shares and bonds and reinvest this capital in the securities
of other enterprises. The holding and financing companies
buy the securities of these other corporations with the
intention of gaining control of them or of promoting them.
The former thus acquire their profits from a great variety
of sources as issuing and underwriting securities and parti-
cipating in a share of the business profits of the enterprises
-2-
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which they promote. The true investment trust, on the other
hand, avoids the idea of securing controlling interests and
the responsibilities involved and deals with investments
rather for the purpose of acquiring a profit from the interest
and dividends collected on the securities owned and from their
turnover and appreciation.
To the uninitiated it is also necessary to explain that
the investment trust has no connection with those large "busi-
ness consolidations in the form of monopolies at which the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act aimed—those big combinations regarded
as being in restraint of trade arid commonly known as "sugar
trusts" and "steel trusts". It is furthermore important to
draw a distinction between what we know in this country as
"trust companies", those "department stores of finance" which
render a variety of services including banking, agency, issu-
ing, and investment.
In answering the question, "tfhat is an investment trust?"
the following definition, set forth by Curtis W. Ghilds in a
thesis, is particularly comprehensive.*
"'In defining an investment trust it is necessary to
give some consideration to the meaning attached to the term
in England and Scotland where the principal prototypes are
found. The investment trust 'is a financial institution
For other definitions see Appendix, pages le,-3a
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dealing professionally in the investment of securities with
due regard to diversification. It is generally in the form
of a corporation or voluntary association issuing shares
based upon holdings of various kinds of securities so as to
afford the investor a high degree of safety through diver-
sification. 1 In other words, four special characteristics
stand out: 1 (l) it is an organization which secures capital
"by the sale of certificates, shares, or stocks and "bonds; (2)
it invests the funds so obtained in a wide variety of securi-
ties so that the lav/ of averages may operate in protecting
the portfolio; (3) it avoids controlling interests, and so
limits its participation in any one security that directive
and managerial control is avoided; and (4) it undertakes con-
tinuing supervision of the investment fund, on much the same
principles as those which any conscientious trustee enjoying
discretionary power should apply in caring for estates. 1 " *
The principle underlying the idea of the investment
trust is attributed to the thrifty Seotcht The story is
told of a young clerk in a jute mill who, in about the year
1860, was preparing to visit the United States. His friends,
having heard of the opportunities for getting rich by invest-
ing money in this country, asked him to use his judgment and
find a good bargain for them. As a number of folks made this
*Harvard Business Review, Vol. V, p. 207
investment Trusts", pamphlet by Edgar Higgins, page 3;
reprinted from Bankers 1 Monthly, June, 1927.
-4-

same request, it occurred to the young adventurer that he
might "buy several different bargains and thereby spread the
risk. It is, moreover, claimed that the Scotch solicitors
were the first to adopt this idea as a method to avoid the
splitting up of an estate in its transfer to the heirs.
These solicitors also cooperated with bankers and financiers
in accumulating the funds of the small investors. Although
the movement began in Scotland, the English were quick to
grasp the idea, and the development in both countries has
been along practically the same lines.
During the early part of the nineteenth century, the
British people had most of their money invested in govern-
ment obligations, particularly the so-called "consols", and
in real estate and mortgages.* When the national debt was
converted, many of these bonds were replaced by like bonds
but they bore considerably lower rates of interest. The
result was that the investing public began to speculate in
order to obtain higher yields. The middle class investors,
with no information or skill in investing, suffered severe-
ly. Foreign governments recovering from the results of the
Napoleonic Wars offered attractive rates in the London mar-
ket. Within a period of three years, 1823 to 1826, loans
to the extent of $50,000,000 were floated in London, but
* See Appendix, page 6a
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many of these obligations were never paid.* This type of
speculation was followed by investments in railway securities,
"but the panic of 1847, as a result of the railway boom, brought
financial ruin to a great many.
Although many of the enterprises launched during this
period seem to resemble investment trusts, on close examination,
they prove to be different in some respects. In England, the
International Financial Society, Ltd., established in London
in 1865, was the first public enterprise of an investment trust
character in the modern use of the term. In 186 5, the Foreign
and Colonial Trust was founded "to give the investor of moderate
means the same advantages as the large capitalist in diminishing
the risk of investing in Foreign and Colonial Government Stocks"**
At that time the interest rate on the consols was 2-|> to 3%,
and as they were selling from 103 to 113, the yield was far
from attractive, ./ith British oversea trade increasing and the
new world countries, particularly the United States and South
America ready for industrial development, foreign government
bonds and more speculative ventures with better returns lured
the investor. As there was little known about such securities,
the more informed and experienced persons cooperated with the
individuals who had the funds on hand. Since it was possible
to borrow money in England and Scotland for 5-jy-o to 4-g>». those
*"Investment Trusts", Lawrence M. Speaker, page 9
**See Appendix, page
_6_

organizing the movement obtained cheap working capital at home
and invested it decidedly to their advantage in other countries
which were handicapped by a scarcity of investment capital.
The development of the trusts was gradual, hut in 1890,
the year of the failure of Baring Brothers, there were 55 Brit-
ish investment trusts in existence. During this period many of
the less desirable types were wiped out and most of the com-
panies suffered severely. The next few years marked the crisis
in the movement, and many of the trusts learned from experience
the consequences of non-diversification of risk, of buying
questionable securities, and of other poor policies which were
the results of an over zealous attempt to make big profits.
From 19QQ to 1910, the expansion was rapid and the trusts,
particularly the older companies which secured their working
capital when interest rates were low, prospered to such an ex-
tent that during the V/orld ./ar they were prepared to play an
important part in assisting the British government to finance
it. Foreign securities before the ./ar aggregated about five
billion dollars. During the V/ar, these securities were mobilized
by aid of the investment trusts and sent to the United States
to be liquidated. By means of their American security holdings,
the trusts were able to obtain large credits on short notice
and so subscribe liberally to the v/ar loans.
-7-
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As a class, the British trusts withstood the strain of the
,Var remarkably well, many of them, during this period, profit-
ing "by the differences in exchange. They sold their securities
in Hew York at a premium and purchased British and European se-
curities at very low prices. The most conservatively managed
trusts fared best and paid dividends in many instances as high
as 8$, the average of forty-eight representative trusts showing
during the entire War period.*
Since the '.far there have been many new trusts formed, and
in 1924, about the time of the impetus to the movement in America,
there was an active development in Great Britain. Although pre-
vious to 1924 these trusts withdrew considerable of their hold-
ings in American securities and increased their interests in
Latin America, during the recent prosperity period here, British
trusts have again favored American securities, particularly the
better grade investment stocks. It is said, nevertheless, that
during the advance in 1929, they sold heavily. At the close of
1926 there were 107 investment or financial trusts listed on the
London Stock Exchange and 150 on the Stock Exchange of Great
Britain, besides a great number of unlisted trusts***
After the V/ar, America was quick to see the benefits to be
derived from the investment trust idea. At first it was be-
lieved that the trusts in this country would follow the same
*"The Investment Trust"
—
pamphlet prepared by Bosworth,
Ghanute, Loughbridge & Co., page 2
*"'What Is an Investment Trust"
—
pamphlet prepared by
Blyth, ,/itter & Co.

course as the British institutions and "become a media for
foreign investment and assist in extending financial aid to
Aurope. In December 1919, Congress passed the Adge Act which,
in part, provided for the formation of corporations, chartered
by the Federal Reserve Board, that in some respects resembled
the British investment trusts. As the Adge Act required an
initial stock of $Q ,000 ,000 at least, with one -fourth or more
paid in cash before the corporation commenced business, only-
one or two concerns have chosen to operate under it.* The
few trusts which did invest in European bonds and in foreign
business soon found that European credit was doubtful and
that there was greater opportunity to make a profit in do-
mestic securities. One of these companies which had the
greater part of its capital invested in foreign securities
was the Overseas Securities Corporation, organized in 1920
and claiming to be the first American investment trust. Its
different holdings reached the hundred mark, representing
investments well diversified among some twelve to fifteen
countries.
After 1920 there was a pause in the investment trust move
ment in this country as there was a decided change in business
conditions. Post-war prosperity suffered a collapse, so it
was 1924 before the real growth started. In January, 1924
*Accordi ng to Jilliam H. Steiner this Act has been used for
long term purposes only once. In May, 1926, the First Federal
Foreign Investment Trust was chartered by F. J. Lisman & Co.,
L'nd this firm "has interested itself in financing as well as
in investment operations." "Investment Trusts", Steiner, p. 49
-9-

there were probably not more than fifteen investment trusts
in existence with assets estimated around ^14 ,000,000. oince
that time companies have "been organized in great numbers and
varieties to meet American needs and conditions.
As the British investment trusts had proved successful
over a long period of operation, many sponsors of the early
trusts in America expressed their intention of pursuing the
same sound, conservative policies which had proven so satis-
factory abroad. The investment trust in America has, notwith-
standing, developed along its own lines, and, in many respects,
methods of organization and of operation depart widely from the
British practices. There is a more or less superficial resem-
blance. The principle of pooling the funds of a number of
individuals, the idea of diversification of holdings, the ex-
tablishment of a central organization to manage the purchase
and sale of securi tie s, exists modified and revised, but the
five hundred or more so-called investment trusts in this country
differ greatly from the original British conception.
There has been considerable discussion as to whether the
conservative British type of trust is not more desirable than
the newer varieties adopted in America. British investment
trusts have long advocated broad diversification of capital in
high grade issues which will insure safety of principal and
-10-

return a reasonable amount on the investment.
Their plan of capitalization is usually such that it offers
two types of securities to the investor; senior securities,
bonds and debentures representing the investment side of the
picture, and junior securities, consisting generally of com-
mon and preferred stock. The theory is that large amounts of
senior capital can be secured at fairly low rates, while part
of the excess earnings may be ploughed back in the form of re-
serves and part may be applied to the equity stock.
The average of twenty-one representative British invest-
ment trusts stands as follows: debentures, 48.1/o; preferred
stock, 28.6,0; common stock, 23.3$.* Some of the corporate trusts
in this country have similar capital structures. American
Pounders group shows an average for its four affiliated invest-
ment companies closely approximating the above. At the other
extreme , a number of the American fixed trusts have one hun-
dred per cent common shares outstanding. For instance, Incor-
porated Investors had 671,178 shares of common stock outstand-
ing in June, 1929.
In the case of the corporate type trust, the principle of
trading on the equity is applied. This in itself is not to be
condemned. It may, nevertheless, foster illegitimate practices.
Vhile the British trust manager pays the same price for his
Address of the President, American Pounders Corporation,
April 8, 1929--page 24.
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common stock as the general public a.nd, as William oteiner*
expresses it, "merely trades on the equity with his fellow
stockholders against the bondholder", the American manager is
inclined to be more ambitious or even greedy. The compensation
paid the iinglish director is in the form of a small fee or a
salary. Moreover, he usually holds a considerable investment
in common shares from which, over a period of time, lie derives
some advantage through their increase in value. The latter
practice is considered advisable in that it tends to create a
personal interest in the successful operation of the trust.
Aa his salary is not based on the income of the trust, the
iinglish manager does not have the incentive to take undue risks.
In contrast, the corporate type of American trusts sell
their senior securities to the public, while the managers or
organizers take the junior securities. Sometimes it is the
custom to offer the public a unit of preferred and common or
the public may buy bonds with bonus or purchase warrants for
common stock or else convertible bonds, or there may be several
other alternatives. Generally this gives the managers an undue
share of the profits. Again, when the public and the managers
buy the same kind of securities, the managers buy at a better
price than the public. In the case of fixed trusts, the man-
agers, of course, cannot derive their compensation from trading
"""Investment Trusts", William Howard Steiner, page 75

on the equity; accordingly, they are paid a stipulated fee for
their services.
//hether the American method is a stimulus to greater ef-
fort or whether a regular salary basis is to be preferred pro-
bably depends, after all, upon the character of the management,
although unquestionably there is more opportunity to deceive the
public in the case of the American method.
Most British trusts do not regard profits acquired from
trading as income to be paid out in the form of dividends. In-
stead, they treat this as reserve and surplus so that they may
be able to pay dividends during depressions and in periods when
business conditions do not warrant it. Many American trusts
follow the same practice. American .Founders group, for instance,
maintains a policy of accumulating substantial reserves. It
offers the following reasons for so doing: "Profits cannot
always be taken to particular advantage to accord with the quar-
terly dividend dates, and earnings must be figured over a longer
period. These substantial reserves and surplus are devised to
take care of interest and dividend requirements during any com-
paratively lean periods and their accumulation in turn increases
the earnings applicable to the common stock."*
./hen a trust has a considerable amount of bonds and pre-
ferred stock outstanding, unquestionably it should set up
*"American Founders Group of Companies"
—
pamphlet published by
Harris, Forbes & Co., page 12.
-13-

reserves to protect the bondholders and preferred stockholders.
The fact that it has a substantial reserve may also aid it in
attracting additional capital on more favorable terms. On the
other hand, trusts specializing in one class of stock or cer-
tificates outstanding argue that a reserve is unnecessary be-
cause the purpose of the trust is not to establish a fixed in-
come but rather a fluctuating one which varies with the pur-
chasing power of the dollar. Most of the latter type, however,
are now retaining a part of their earnings for a reserve fund.
H'or instance, Colonial Investors Shares, a common stock invest-
ment trust, states in its prospectus that a substantial surplus
has been accumulated through stock dividends, rights, and in
other ways. American Basic -Bus in ess Shares Corporation in its
Trust Agreement provides "that the Reserve Fund ( sil,000 per
unit initially) shall be built up to a maximum of #1,500 per
unit, but only out of distributable earnings in excess of the
minimum semi-annual dividend provided for in ^ixed Trust Shares."
In several instances, however, the fact that the investor
will receive his pro rata share of the earnings is emphasized
as a decided attraction. The Amalgamated Investors, Inc., a
corporation owned and controlled by the Amalgamated Clothing
iVorkers of America, stipulates in its prospectus that "all
earnings (less the stipulated fees received by the corporation
-14-

as management charges) accrue to the holders of the certificates,
i. e., the investors."
Owing to their conservative practices, the British trusts
show only a moderate rate of earnings on invested capital, but
the foreign investor is use to low yields. On the other hand,
the test types of trusts often return as high as 15,o to 25/o on
their original capitalization because, as these trusts develop
and grow in size, the original stock is frequently sold at sev-
eral times its cost or par value.
In this country few trusts have "been in existence long
enough to judge their earning power, particularly as they have
not yet weathered a period of declining security prices. Then,
too, different methods of calculating earnings render it diffi-
cult to make comparisons. Some show earnings on their average
capital investment of from 10yo to 20,0. In a pamphlet entitled
"Four Year Analysis of the Financial Investing Go. of New
York, Ltd.," the company states that its earnings were 10.70;b
gross on its average total assets, but that after making all
deductions, the rate of net earnings on the v 10. par value
shares was 18.42/0. Guardian Investors Corporation announced
earnings for the calendar year 1928 as approximately 12.2;o on
the average amount of assets invested and available for in-
vestment during the year. General American Investors Co.
.
Inc..
-15-

managed by Lazard Freres and Lehman Brothers, the original
sponsors of the company, showed unusually large earning power,
the net income, including profits on sale of securities, being
equal to about S0;o on the average amount of capital invested."
As 1927 and 1928 were years of exceptionally favorable security
markets, it is doubtful if the results, in any of these cases,
would be equally as good under more normal conditions.
Llore than one-half of the American investment trusts, it
is estimated, are under the control of investment banking
houses. Investment bankers are equipped to conduct the sale of
investment trust securities with little extra sales effort.
Some of them have formed trusts as subsidiaries, while others
have cooperated with other banking houses. For instance,
Prudential Investors, Inc. is sponsored by Tucker, Anthony & Co.;
J. H. Schroder Banking Corp.; and Laird, Bissell & Meeds.
Selected Industries, Inc. is under the sponsorship of Stone &
./ebster & Blodget; C. D. Barney & Co.; Kidder, Peabody & Co.
t
Lehman Bros.;and Brown Bros. & Co. Kidder, Peabody & Co. has
a subsidiary of its own, Kidder Participations, Inc.
Some of the larger trusts are affiliated with banks and
trust companies. Old Colony Trust Associates, a Massachusetts
Trust organized in May, 1928, has as its directors at the
present time twelve members of the Old Colony Trust Company.
*Earnings for 1928
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A small, but important group, such as American Founders Group,
are controlled by companies or individuals which act in the
capacity of consultants or managers and constitute a new pro-
fession, the investment counsel, For example, United States
Fiscal Corporation sponsors and manages Financial Investing Go.
of New York, Ltd., Domestic and Overseas Investing Co., Ltd.,
Alexander Hamilton Investment Corporation , and Fiscal Bond and
Share Corporation.
In Great Britain, trusts are not affiliated with banks or
with investment houses or brokers. It is claimed that skillful
and disinterested management give the foreign trusts the advan-
tage over the American in that they are independent in making
the selection of their securities and free to think in terms
of profit for the organization before considering the interests
of the house with which they are affiliated. In America, never'
theless, the association with an investment banking house or
with a managing corporation has certain distinct advantages.
Practically all of these houses or firms have established them-
selves very firmly in the good graces of the public. They af-
ford specialized knowledge in the field of investment, prevent
duplication of effort and expense, and many not only assist in
organizing the trust on the most practical basis, but lend
financial aid as well*
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In general, the same fundamental conditions have caused
the development of the trust in this country as they did in
Great Britain. The great difference in the development in
America has "been the rapidity of growth. "In less than a
five-year period", says Arthur V/inston writing in Forbes for
October 15, 1929, "the total resources of investment trusts
have grown from less than $10 ,000,000 to over $3,000,000,000.
Of this ^1,50 0,000, 000 has been raised during 1929 alone."
The British movement was decidedly much more gradual,
and, as a result, more stable than the American. The great
variety of American trusts reflects the versatile, progressive
character of the American people f ;/ith the sharp break in
the stock market (October, 1929) the enthusiasm of the public
for purchasing investment trust securities has been dampened.
The American investment trust which previous to this time has
had no trial period is now about to be tested under bear mar-
ket conditions. The problem presents many phases still to be
solved, and it yet remains to be seen what type or types of
trusts will emerge as best suited to American practices.
-18-

CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC FACTORS FAVORING THE AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT

A combination of factors are responsible for the American
investment trust development. Until the World War the United
States was a debtor nation, and the investor found ample mar-
kets at home which were ready to absorb his idle capital. As
a country we were primarily interested in developing our own
natural resources and in fostering domestic industries, so for-
eign investments offered small attraction. New issues of
securities usually were placed with insurance companies or
with a few wealthy financiers. With low wages, the working
classes were little concerned as to investment possibilities.
Those who did speculate in railroads or on the Stock Exchange
in many instances found themselves the prey of powerful, mag-
nates. The some score of men who dominated the railroads and
controlled the banking facilities were able to manipulate af-
fairs with little regard for the public. It was practically
impossible to secure financial information or statistical data
before investing, so it was only the man with the gambling
instinct who could squelch the fear of a panic every seven
years and take a chance.
The War changed the entire situation. A shortage in the
supply of labor with an abnormal expansion in industry forced
wages up. Corporations earned enormous profits and rewarded
their employees with bonuses. People who had never considered
putting their money into any institution exce-ot the bank or
-19-

life insurance companies, bought Liberty Bonds for patriotic
reasons and also for investment.
The War left the United States a creditor nation with an
excess supply of capital. A period of "big business" followed
and consolidations and mergers appeared on every hand. Indus-
try was revolutionized and the worker was introduced to em-
ployee-ownership and customer-ownership. Naturally, the
American people became investment minded. As the demand for
sound securities increased, investment houses, particularly
the smaller ones, were unable to meet the requirements of
their customers. There were plenty of securities, but it was
difficult to regulate the supply. Prices became high, yields
low, and the risks greater.
Unscrupulous promoters took money out of the investment
market and put it into worthless securities and, in many in-
stances, placed the security dealer in an unfavorable position
in the eyes of his client. Secretary Mellon estimated that
$1,000,000,000. a year was lost owing to the amateur investor
buying worthless securities to say nothing of losses incurred
by marginal speculation in legitimate securities.* To protect
these individuals, the various commonwealths passed Blue-Sky
Laws, while Better Business Bureaus advertised, "Before You
Invest, Investigate", the latter fostering vigorous campaigns
to educate the public to the need of exercising due precautions
*World f s Work, November, 1927, pages 90a to 95a
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before parting with hard-earned savings.
The investment trust offered a solution to the investor's
and the dealer's problem, and investment bankers, trust com-
panies, and other organizations dealing in securities, stood
ready to push the movement. The fact that the public was more
or less familiar with the basic principles incorporated in the
investment trust idea accelerated the development. Savings
banks and trust companies, as well as insurance companies, had
taught their clients to save and were able to reward them with
a small increase above their investment as a result of the
diversification of risk. Mortgage companies, financing com-
panies, and public utility companies, possessing many of the
features embodied in the investment trust, were already well
known to the small investor to say nothing of the man with
plenty of capital.
From the beginning, all kinds and varieties of investment
trusts were organized to meet the needs and fancies of the
American public. The fact that there were so many to choose
from was, in itself, a reason for their growth since there was
a type of trust to satisfy everyone. Then, too, these trusts
were practically free from supervision and regulation which
greatly was in their favor, particularly at the time of their
inception.
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The factor of greatest consequence in stimulating the
rapid expansion which took place in this field was "Coolidge
prosperity" which commenced a reign of optimism and an un-
interrupted bull market. The stock exchanges moved upv/ard
and securities continued to advance with but one or two brief
interruptions. Advertisements and literature of every descrip-
tion appeared to demonstrate to the public that the profits of
industry belong to the common stockholder after the bondholder
and the owner of the preferred stock have received their limited
share. Conservative people who had regarded bonds as the only
safe and sane proposition for the employment of their surplus
funds became enthusiastic over common stocks, particularly in
view of the declining prices in bonds and preferred stocks.
The sponsors of the investment trust found themselves in an
excellent position to take advantage of this situation.
The fact that the principles underlying the investment
trust idea are economically sound is still another reason for
the favorable attitude the public assumed toward this type of
financial institution. The arguments in its favor are as
follows: (1) It offers the investor a chance to pool his
capital and participlate in the profits of a large number of
securities. (2) Instead of acting single-handed and owning a
few securities, he obtains a greater degree of safety by the
principle of diversification which the trust employs.
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(3) By means of its large resources and managerial skill,
i
the trust can purchase many of the world's best securities
which the ordinary investor hesitates to buy because the
unit price is too high, particularly when it comes to pur-
chasing in large lots. (4) While the individual investor
is more likely to buy in large lumps when prices are high,
the investment trust purchases securities over a period of
time and thus tends to average out the cost of these. This
is decidedly to the investor's advantage. (5) With the
responsibility of selecting securities transferred to the
investment trust, the investor is saved time, expense, and
money. The individual lias not the means or the facilities
to make proper investigations; accordingly, he is often a
speculator instead of an investor. Because the investment
trust buys in large quantities while the individual makes
small purchases in comparison, the premiums and commissions
are reduced both in buying and in selling. (6) Aside from
the costs of management, the investment trust places the
small investor on the same basis as the large buyer.
Different types of investment trusts advertise
numerous other economic advantages, particularly those
afforded by their individual trust or by those trusts adher-
ing to similar practices. Some of these vail be considered in
the following chapters.
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CHAPTER III
CLASSIFICATION OF INVESTMETTT TRUSTS

Investment trusts may be classified in a variety of ways,
the various classifications overlapping one another because
there have emerged such a great number of trusts adopting various
principles and practices that no clear-cut lines can be drawn.
Based on the management factor, that is the investment poli-
cy of the trust in respect to the purchase and sale of securities
there are, broadly speaking, two kinds of trusts « --those which
buy for the "long pull" and are known as fixed trusts or limited
management trusts, and those which operate for a "quick turn"
and are more popularly termed the management type. The former,
sometimes compared to a mutual investment club, usually publish
a list of their holdings— "gilt-edged" securities—and operate
with a closed portfolio. The latter may pursue the other ex-
treme and operate as a "blind pool", asking the investor to
place his confidence in the management.
The management type of trust, in some respects, more close-
ly resembles the European trusts as capital is usually raised
by the sale of preferred and common stock and bonds or debentures
This type of trust owns outright the securities which it buys
with the capital thus raised, and it stands responsible to the
stockholders who hold its stocks and bonds in the same degree
that any corporation does. The stockholder may sell these
shares of the investment trust which he has purchased in the
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market just as he would dispose of the securities of any cor-
poration.
From the standpoint of structure, as a general rule, the
management type of trust, according to John Francis Fowler, is
a "Statutory" trust. This writer thus defines his term: "A
statutory trust buys securities for its own account and issues
its own stock or bonds to investors. It is called statutory be-
cause the investment trust relationship exists by virtue of
legislative act. Unincorporated investment trusts operating
along similar lines are not strictly statutory, but they are to
all intents and purposes the same and are for that reason in-
cluded under this definition."*
Unlimited discretion naturally gives the management type
of trust an opportunity to speculate more, the opinion being
that with strong, farsighted managers profits will be greater.
iVhile the British follow this practice of giving their managers
the broadest powers, it is the custom here, in order to create
public confidence and facilitate the sale of securities, to set
up certain, specific management restrictions. These pertain to
the kind and quality of securities which may be purchased for
the investment fund, to the maximum proportion of any one secu-
rity or class of securities which may be held, and to the geo-
graphioal distribution of these securities. Some authorities
*American Investment Trusts", John Francis Fowler, Jr., page 31
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contend that such restrictions hamper the managers in making
the most of favorable situations and that they afford no great
protection to the shareholders in that dishonest executives can
easily evade almost any regulations. On the other hand, there
is a possibility that they may restrain the reckless and less
capable who have been known to dissipate funds with less regard
for the investor than those interested in their own personal
enrichment.'''
following the customary British practice, the management
type of trust generally holds to a program of wide diversifica-
tion. As yet, American trusts have not specialized in foreign
investments, although there are certain exceptions such as the
American founders Group and the Guardian Investors Corporation.
The latter company in its prospectus states: "The portfolio in-
cludes a wide diversity of bank, industrial, rail, public utili-
ty, municipal and Government issues carefully selected in various
markets of the world.
Trusts which operate internationally feel that they can
take advantage of difference in the prices of securities in both
domestic and foreign markets. When times are unfavorable for
investing at home, they can place a larger proportion of their
funds abroad. Trusts practicing the policy of broad diversi-
fication must employ men of exceptionally high calibre and
*For provisions as to standards of value and diversification,
See Appendix, page 8a
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unusual intelligence, bince the market decline several companies
have emphasized the fact that their portfolio contains bonds of
foreign governments and corporations. Others have advertised
that the companies behind their holdings have international in-
terests, i'or instance, Incorporated Investors states that the
thirty great American corporations in which it invests have
under their control 183 separate organizations in 34 different
countries.*
The advantages of broad diversification are (1J as stated,
the opportunity to buy in security markets when prices are de-
pressed; (2) greater safety owing to the wide spread of risk;
(3) the fact that in case of mis judgment on the part of the
management not as much harm can be done as with limited diversi-
fication, because with investments widely diversified, the hold-
ings in each issue are relatively small. The disadvantages are
(1) the possibility of an unbalanced distribution; (2) the ex-
pense of management and research; (3) the tendency towards
average results because there are so many representations* (4)
the possibility that managers will squeeze in "pet issues".
*'or the most part, trusts which are classified as "fixed"
and "managed list" and are frequently referred to as the
"American" in order to distinguish them from the British corporate
type, adhere strictly to the theory that diversification should
*The Incorporated Investor, Vo. II, #10
-27-

be limited in order to permit of effective supervision. Ameri-
can Basic-Business Shares Corporation, a fixed trust, after a
"thorough-going research covering a long period", and after
studying, analyzing, and comparing 1,105 corporations selected
30 companies to "represent a balanced partnership in America's
prosperity." Irving Investors Management Company, Inc., a
managed list trust, restricts the investment of its funds, to
"such extent as it may be invested in common stocks", to those
of 40 or less corporations.
The fixed trust is created, as a rule, at the initiation
of a banking house from which the trust is often indistinguish-
able, several people, for the most part persons closely affili
ated with the banking house, form a corporation to manage the
trust fund under indenture with a trust company (usually the
same banking house or trust company creating the corporation).
The corporation is essential to provide an initial ex-
pense fund in order that the trust may carry on the necessary
details of organization and. sales promotion before commencing
business. This managing concern usually makes no permanent
contribution to the fund and receives a stipulated fee for its
services, rather than depending on profits derived from trad-
ing on the equity. As the trusts are not organized as corpora-
t ions, no new security is created and there is but one class
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Of participation, namely, trustee's shares.
The majority of fixed trusts, in reference to their legal
form, fall into a class which John Francis jfowler, Jr. terms
"contractual" in contrast to the management type or "statutory".
"A contractual trust", according to this authority, "is one
v/herein the securities are purchased not for the account of a
company or association, but for the account of an investment
fund, deposited for the benefit of investors. The securities
issued in this case are neither stock nor bonds but are evi-
dence of participating interests in the fund. The name con-
tractual is given to this form of investment trust because it
exists by virtue of a legal agreement to which the participants
are parties. **
Trusts which are strictly of the fixed rigid type prac-
tically eliminate the management factor. The directors are con-
cerned primarily with the selection of the original securities
which go into the fixed portfolio. These securities, generally
the common stock of a number of well-known corporations,--".,
fixed investment in America's prosperity" as American Basic-
Business Shares Corporation advertises— are assigned as col-
lateral to a trustee.
Against this assignment, certificates, called trustee's
shares are sold to the public. These, in the case of a fixed
*American Investment Trusts", John Francis Fowler, Jr. t page 31
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trust, are more frequently issued by the bank or by the invest-
ment house than by the corporation, For instance, the prospec-
tus of the American Industries participation Shares reads,
"Certificates issued by fidelity Trust Company, Detroit, Deposi-
tary", and then the statement follows that the Industrial Securi-
ties Corporation is the depositor. The certificate is the re-
ceipt for each shareholders pro rata participation in the under-
lying stocks.
In some cases the portfolio comprises all forms of American
securities covering the stocks of railroads, oil companies, utili-
ties and quasi-utilities , as well as industrials. These are
frequently treated as a "unit" and against each group a specified
number of shares is issued, usually one thousand with no par
value. To quote again from American Industries Participation
Shares: "Each American Industries Participation Share repre-
sents a 1/1000 ownership in a unit of one hundred and seventy
shares of stock of fifty railroad, public utility, and indus-
trial corporations, deposited with and held by the Fidelity
Trust Company".
After the original selection of securities is made, it is
usually provided that additional stock of the same kind may be
added if the trust wishes to make further investment, but, in
most cases, only under certain specified conditions. Also.
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in the case of recapitalization or reorganization of any of the
companies whose securities make up the portfolio, the holdings
may be reduced and substitutions made. For example, the agree-
ment of the Automotive Participation Shares reads, "Additional
blocks of one thousand Automotive Participation Shares are issued
only whenever the Depositor deposits, with the Fidelity Trust
Company, additional shares of stock of the above (referring to
list of twelve companies represented) automobile and truck com-
panies, identical in character and proportion, plus cash to
equal the accumulated earnings held by the Depositary as secu-
rity for each of the outstanding one thousand Automotive
Participation Shares."
Regarding substitution privileges the following considera-
tions are set forth: "No substitution may be made in the stocks
or in the number of shares constituting a unit deposited as se-
curity for each 1,000 Automotive Participation Shares issued,
except in case of recapitalization or split-up of shares of any
of the companies or an exchange of stock, occurring by reason
of merger, consolidation or sale of property of any of the com-
panies, or stock dividends in excess of 20'jb, In any such case,
the stock unit held by the Depositary as security for 1,000
Automotive Participation Shares, is simply changed, under the
terms of the Depositary Agreement, to take account of the
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split-up or exchange of the particular company."*
It is the opinion of those who advocate the fixed trust
that with high grade securities constituting the portfolio any
small losses which might occur in the event that some of the
securities depreciated would not be as serious as the manipula-
tion of the funds by unscrupulous promoters. It is conceded
that with good management the profits are generally greater,
but that since the speculative element is also greater, the
fixed trust has the advantage.
Aside from the management factor, the fixed trust, it is
claimed, offers several distinct advantages. J?irst, the sim-
plicity of its financial set-up makes it easier to explain its
principles to the public who buy the shares, second, shares
are usually offered at a low price. Third, the securities in
back of the trust are, as a rule, the best known stocks, being
listed on the New York Exchange and rated highly by one of
the large financial services, fourth, in most cases share-
holders who have purchased one unit, usually 1,000 shares, may
have the privilege of conversion. In other words, they may
present their shares to the trustee and receive all the securi-
ties underlying the unit as well as any accumulated dividends
and their proportionate interest in any of the earnings and in
the cash and reserve assets. Or, should the holders prefer
""Quotations taken from the prospectus of. the Trust
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cash, it is customary to arrange for cash redemption based on
the market value of the deposited securities. A small fee is
necessarily charged the shareholder who exercises the conver-
sion or cash redemption privilege. Fifth, the purchaser of
fixed trust shares knows exactly what he holds and they are
easier to evaluate. Banks, according to a survey made by the
Bureau of Business Research of New York university, favored the
fixed type as collateral.
*
Nevertheless, the rigid type of trust is not popular today,
although as prominent an economist as John Moody expresses the
view that it is "the best type of investment trust, without
any question." The decided tendency is to permit the managers
to make substitutions of the underlying securities, v/illiam
Howard Steiner calls this "offshoot of the fixed type", the
managed list trust.**
In the latter instance, fixed trust methods are departed
from in varying degrees. The corporation organizing the trust
which in the case of the rigid type acted as depositor and
was of little managerial importance, often assumes control.
Frequently, however, a separate management organization is
created. i?'or instance, Colonial Investors Shares, a common
stock investment truat, is managed by Colonial Investors Oor-
poration of Baltimore
,
deposits being made with the Union Trust Co.
*For figures, see "Investment Trusts" by jVilliam Howard oteiner,
page 255
Page 260, ibid.
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of Maryland, Trustee, The company in its trust indenture
directs TTthe trustee to sell any one or any of the underlying
stocks whenever it may be deemed necessary or advisable to do
so in order to avert a capital loss, or a cessation or substan-
tial deorease in dividends, or to protect a capital gain."
United States Shares Corporation, the only trust of this
type which has constructed a group of trusts under one manage-
ment, according to its prospectus has "ten separate investment
funds, eight of which are indenture trusts of the limited manage-
ment type and two of which are funds subject to unrestricted
management." The managment organization is" independent from
control or domination by any bank, investment banking house, or
other outside interest." It constantly supervises the portfolio
and authorizes the trustee to sell over-valued holdings and
substitute others of more promise.
In the case of the managed list trusts it is necessary
that the corporation have competent directors as the restric-
tions placed on investment are fewer and the powers of substi-
tutionbroader than those allowed by fixed trust indentures.
Since the managed list trust, as a rule, is independent of the
depositor corporation, that is the bank or the investment bank-
ing house, it has to devote more attention to sales promotion.
In some instances, the custom is for the trust to set up its
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own sales subsidiary. For the most part, however, the general
structure of the managed list trust and the underlying principles
closely resemble the fixed trust.
There are numerous variations of both the managed and fixed
types. Somewhat similar to the fixed trust in that a fund is
created and in that the device of an approved list of stocks is
used, is the Massachusetts Investors Trust. This, however, is
in its legal form of the corporate type in that it is a common
law trust, incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts as a
voluntary association. In this State, investment trusts fall un-
der the General Laws Relating to Corporations of the Commonwealth.
Chapter 18E, Section 1, provides, "The following words, as used
in this chapter, shall have the following meanings: 'Associa-
tion 1
,
a voluntary association under a written instrument or
declaration of trust, the beneficial interest under which is
divided into transferable certificates of participation or shares."
A few other investment trusts have chosen to adopt this form
as the Aldred Investment Trust and the Old Colony Investment
Trust. The former trust is peculiar in that each ^1,000
shareholders' debenture is accompanied by ten common shares in
the Trust. Uanagenient is vested in five members who control
and manage the Trust property. All of these trusts emphasize
the importance of management.
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Old Colony Investment Trust makes the following provisions
respecting the powers and duties of trustees: "The Trustees
shall hold title to, and have the absolute control and manage-
ment of all the property at any time belonging to this Trust,
subject only to the specific limitations contained in the Trust
Agreement. They may invest and reinvest the Trust Ji1und in their
uncontrolled discretion, it being the intention to give them the
utmost freedom in the choice of investments, in accordance with
the terms of the Trust Indenture."*
Nevertheless, although these trusts are of the management
type and are of corporate form, they issue shares against a fund
in a manner similar to the fixed trusts. The advantage claimed
for the common law trust is that it is not required to file a
report as the ordinary corporation is obliged to do and it is
free from a number of other statutory requirements which are
made of corporations. On the other hand, the public is not as
familiar with the common law trust as it is with the corpora-
tion. Moreover, the life of the trust is limited, usually for
the term of twenty-one years after the death of the last sur-
viving trustee while the corporation has no limit as to time.
As corporation law is more standardized, most trusts have
avoided the common law form.
Another modification of the fixed type are trusts like the
*" Investment Trusts", pamphlet published by Old Colony Corporation,
page 12.
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State Street Investment Corporation, the Irving Investors
Management Company, Inc., and the Inland Investors, Inc. They
are of corporate type and organized as corporations, but they
offer the investor shares in a fund and issue only one class of
security, usually common stock, although in one or two cases
"bonds or trust certificates are issued.
There remains still another method of classifying the in-
vestment trusts and this is in reference to the securities
which go to make up the contents of the portfolio. If the in-
vestment fund consists of all kinds of securities—sometimes
internationally and often inter- industrially diversified—it
may he termed a "general" trust. This type of trust, in most
cases, operates as a "statutory" trust, issuing its own stocks
and bonds and buying bonds as well as stocks of various de-
scriptions. As John Francis bowler expresses it: "The theory
of the general trust is that all kinds of securities have a
proper place at one time or another in the investment fund." *
It is necessary, too, that the general trust be of the
management type so that changes in the portfolio may be made
without delay as favorable opportunities arise. A few of the
outstanding trusts of the general type are American Capital
Corporation; ceneral American Investors Co. ( Inc; British Type
Investors. Inc.; second International Securities Corporation;
*"American Investment Trusts", bowler, page 94
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.United States foreign securities Corporation! standard
Investing Corporation.
In contrast with the general trust is the type which
places emphasis on common stocks, bonds, the stocks of one
particular field of industry, or the securities of banks or
other financial institutions. These investment trusts may
be termed "specializing", 'Their structure is usually "con-
tractual", and they are likely to operate with closed port-
folios or a limited list of stocks from which the management
may make selections.
Among the different kinds of specializing trusts, those
dealing in bonds are the fev/est in number and of comparative-
ly the least weight. Appeal is made to the conservative in-
vestor looking for a steady, cash income. These trusts are
generally organized as common law trusts, issuing certifi-
cates of "beneficial interest" or "bondshares"
.
The portfolio is usually represented by both domestic
and foreign securities of a high-grade nature as in the case
of the Bond Investment Trust, controlled by Harris, i'orbes &
Company, Inc., Boston, Massachusetts, or it may be limited
to one class of bonds as is foreign Government Bond Trust
Certificates which was created by the financial Investing
Company. Ltd., a general management investment trust
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incorporated in 19 24. As illustrated, "bond investment trusts
usually are conducted in connection with a "bank or a large
investment trust of the general type.
The reasons why financial stocks have been given prefer-
ence by certain sponsors of investment trusts is aptly summa-
rized by John Francis bowler, Jr. Most of the prospectuses of
the various trusts of this kind offer practically the same
arguments.*
"(a) Banks and insurance companies are themselves quasi-
investment trusts, since their assets in large part are com-
prised of securities. Insurance companies, except in the field
of life insurance, buy stocks as well as bonds and are thus in
a position to take advantage of the gains to be derived from
common stocks.
"(b) The management problem is simplified for the finan-
cial stock trust, since the real work of investment is carried
on by highly competent executives of banks and insurance com-
panies .
"(c) In addition to their income from investments, banks
and insurance companies can count upon a substantial profit
from their banking operations, on the one hand, and their in-
surance activities, on the other. These operations are un-
usually safe because credit and insurance risks have been re-
duced to a scientific basis.
"(d) Bank and insurance stocks show steady and enormous
gains in value over the past decade or two, and are counted
upon to show further increases by reason of the stable and
necessary character of their business.
"(e) Being usually priced at several hundred dollars
apiece, bank and insurance stocks are out of reach of the or-
dinary investor unless made available to him through the me-
dium of the investment trust.
"(f) Banks and insurance companies are all under some
*For complete discussion see "American Investment Trusts",
John Francis Fowler, Jr.
,
page 103-104
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form of public supervision, which promotes their stability."
Financial trusts became popular before the market break
as a result of the spectacular rise in bank stocks and because
of the attractiveness of insurance stocks for investment* Most
of the trusts adopted the contractual form, issuing partici-
pation shares. For instance, Century Shares Trust, a Massa-
chusetts trust created under a declaration and agreement of
trust, is typical of the majority of these institutions, while,
on the other hand, a few, such as the Eastern Bankers Corpora-
tion, are organized as corporations and issue both common and
preferred stock.
Portfolios, in many cases, are limited to the securities
of the banks of one city or district, as for instance, Detroit
Participation Shares which embraces the leading banks and trust
companies of the city of Detroit, Bank Stock Trust Shares,
Series C-3, an investment trust established and managed by the
United States Shares Corporation, consists of units made up
entirely of the shares of New York banks. The portfolios of
the investment trusts dealing in insurance stocks center
largely about the older, established insurance companies, in-
vestments being made in common stocks for the most part.
Insuranshares Corporation and Old Line Insurance Shares are
typical illustrations.
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Some trusts deal exclusively or primarily with the issues
of a certain field of industry. Many of these single industry
trusts concentrate on the securities of public utility corpora-
tions. Illustrative of this group is the Power & Light Securi-
ties Trust of Massachusetts, created in January, 1926 under a
declaration of trust. Most of the specializing trusts, however,
are organized as corporations and issue several classes of their
own securities. They are similar in structure and in policies
to the American European Securities Company and the General
Public Service Corporation,
The usual familiar arguments are offered for specializing
in public utilities, namely, (1) important and essential ser-
vice rendered the public and sometimes the government by these
corporations; (2) operation under monopolistic, rather than
competitive, conditions; (3) special legal and franchise
privileges; (4) wide diversification of risk; (5) rapid ex-
pansion in many of these enterprises such as the gas and
electric industries; (6) cash business; (7j municipal, state,
or federal supervision.
For the most part, investment trusts specializing in
public utilities distribute their investments so as to include
bonds and preferred stocks as well as common stocks. This is
done to take care of marke t depressions. During the early
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part of 1929, the prices of public utility stocks soared to
unheard of heights. In the market crash which followed, they
were the hardest hit and many of the investment trusts dealing
in these securities suffered likewise,
A few specializing trusts invest primarily in the stocks
of one particular industry. Illustrations of these are
Standard Oil Shares Incorporated, Chain store Investment Cor-
poration, and Metal and Mining Shares, Incorporated. Like in-
vestment trusts specializing in public utilities, they do not
have the advantages of interindustry trusts. Although they
claim wide diversification, naturally their field of operation
is limited. They do not have nearly as many factors in their
favor as the trusts \nhich specialize in common stocks or bonds
or financial stocks.
By far the most important group of specializing trusts
are those which invest primarily in common stock. During the
period when the investment trusts were developing, this coun-
try was in a so-called prosperity era. The prices of bonds
and preferred stocks tended to decline, while common stocks
showed unusual appreciation. Many investment trusts came
into being with the intent of benefiting from this situation
The trusts took the most optimistic side of the picture
and painted the future in glowing colors. Analytical and
-43-

statistical studies covering the past performance of the under-
lying securities constituting the portfolio were presented to
persuade the public of the profits to be derived from the com-
mon stock trust. This literature, together with the advertis-
ing which supplemented it, accomplished its purpose, and the
investor was ready to buy almost any new issue.
Dwight Rose of Scudder , Stevens & Clark, Investment Goun-
sle , in an address before the joint meeting of the American
Statistical Association and the American Economic Association
in December, 1928, expressed the situation thus: "The great
army of American investors, influenced by the able arguments
in defense of the common stock, have had a taste of large pro-
fits and their appetities have been whetted for more. The
courageous ones have realized profits during the last four
years ranging anywhere from 100 per cent to several thousand
per cent. The imagination of American investors has been
awakened to tremendous possibilities in the future and there
has developed a sort of hero worship for the common stock."*
On this same occasion, Mr. Rose cautioned that it was time for
a "temporary application of the brakes."
The evidence Mr. Rose presented against the common stock
theory, particularly with the stocks at the levels of Decem-
jjfffij, 1928, probably did not have much weight at that time with
""Reprinted in pamphlet form by Harper Brothers, December 16,1929
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many of the sponsors of the investment trusts. To deal in
common stocks, new trusts continued to be organized as gen-
eral management, limited management, fixed, and, in fact, as
of every type and description, tfor the most part, they were
set up as contractual trusts. Investments were made primari-
ly in securities listed on the New York stock Exchange with
portfolios exceptionally well diversified and "balanced.
The arguments expressed for specializing in a portfolio
composed exclusively of common stocks are almost too well
known to bear repeating. Briefly summarized they are as
follows: (1) A diversified group of well selected common
stocks is not only more profitable but as safe as a similar
group of bonds; (£) An investment in common stocks gives
the investor an opportunity to share in the growth and pros-
perity of the United States; (3) Common stocks keep in step
with the purchasing power of the dollar while bonds do not.
Typical of the common stock trust are American Basic-
Business Shares Corporation, American Trustee Share Corpora-
tion, North American Trust Shares, all of the fixed type;
American Securities Shares, Incorporated Investors, Irving
Investors Management Company, representing the limited manage
ment type; General Public Service Corporation of the general
management type.
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It is impossible to set up any strict classifications.
i<'or instance, the General Public Service Corporation deals in
the common stocks of public utility corporations and may be
considered as a single industry trust. Since it is organized
as a corporation, it is also a statutory trust. American
Securities Shares is a contractual trust. Its portfolio is
widely diversified, consisting of common stocks "selected from
the leading industrial, public utility and railroad companies
of America."* Provision, however, is made for investing in
high-grade bonds and collateral loans at the discretion of
the managers. Accordingly, it is not a trust of the fixed,
rigid type, but rather of the managed list.
Each investment trust has a theory all its own. The
reason usually given for adhering to certain principles is
that the greatest profits are to be secured by operating in
the manner advocated. Then again, the American investor,
with his independent ideas, is likely to have his own prefer-
ences. The variety presented gives him an opportunity to pick
and chose
•
The chapter following will discuss in detail the outstand-
ing characteristics of a number of the specializing trusts.
^Prospectus of the Trust, page 1
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CHAPTER IV
SPECIALIZING INVESTMENT TRUSTS

Public Utilities

AMERICAN EUROPEAN SECURITIES COMPANY
American European Securities Company, a statutory trust
dealing in public utilities, was organized in 1925, under the
laws of the State of Delaware, to take over the assets and
liabilities of a Swiss corporation, Societe Financiere pour
Enterprises Electriques aux Etats Unis (Investment Company for
Electrical Enterprises in the United States).
A summary of the manner in which the common and preferred
stock has been authorized and issued is given by the Company as
follows:
Authority for and Purpose of Issue
Common Stock
Summary
Date of
Authoriz-
ation
Authorized
for
Issuance
Issue
Issued Price Purpose of Issue
Oct. 20, 1925 15,000
Oct. 20, 1925 20,000
Feb. 26, 1926 85,000
April 27,1928 30,000
lay 15, 19 29 150,000
June 21, 1929 25,000
15,000 ^00.20 To organizers for cash.
Reserved against Option
Warrants.
85,000 28.86 Eor Property.
50,000 50.00 Cash for working capital.
130,000 Split-up (20,000 shares
reserved against
Option Warrants)
25,000 63.722 Cash for working capital.
325,000 285,000
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Preferred Stock
Summary
Date of
Authoriz-
ation
Oct. 19,1925
Feb. 26,1926
Jan, 7,1929
May 15,1929
Authorized Issued
60,000
• • • • •
40,000
30,000
20,000
• • • • •
Issue
Price
$100
96
Purpose of Issue
For Property.
Gash for working
capital
.
100,000 50,000
Date of
Author iz-
ation
Dec. 22, 1927
April 27,1928
Funded Debt
Collateral Trust 5$ 1958
Summary
Authorized Series Issued
Purpose of
Issue
^2, 000, 000 Series "A"
due Jan. 1,19 58 $2,000,000 Gash for work-
ing capital
2,000,000 Series "B"
due Bfey 1,19 58 2,000,000 Gash for work-
ing capital
As noted above, certain organizers of the Company purchased
15,000 shares of common stock at 20^ per share. They furthermore
were sold option warrants for $1,200, entitling each holder to
purchase, as he might wish, any number of the 20,000 shares of
common stock set aside for the purpose at $25.00 per share. In
view of a split up of the outstanding Common Stock and pursuant
to the terms of the original warrants, in June, 1929, the number
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of shares of common stock subject to option warrants was in-
creased to 40,000 shares at $12.00 each. During the latter
half of the year, rights were exercised on 19,500 option war-
rants at this price; at the same time, 75,000 additional shares
of common stock were sold to bankers, making the amount out-
standing 354,000 shares.
The present Board of Directors consisting of twelve mem-
bers has representatives from both Swiss and American invest-
ment houses and public utility corporations. The management
of the Company is entirely in the hands of this Board, each
Director receiving $1,000 a year compensation. In the event
that the common stock dividends should be more than $1.00 a
share, this compensation is to be increased to (;2,000 a year.
Although according to its charter the Company has broad
powers M to acquire, hold and to deal in securities of all kinds
and to take part in financial transactions permitted by law", it
has for the most part invested primarily in the common and pre-
ferred stocks of the leading po?/er and light companies of the
United States, and, in addition, in a few industrials and mis-
cellaneous stocks. In May, 1929, the book value of all common
and preferred stocks in the portfolio was $15,579,429.97
against a market value of $24,861,508.75. December 31, 1929,
the book value stood 021,064,858.26 with the market value at
$25,182,559.15. This falling off was due to the October break
.
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From Fay to December, 1929, there have been some changes in
the underlying securities, and several companies having been
added to the list and a few, particularly among the public
utilities, dropped.
The investment in bonds, as of Hay 31, 1929, showed a par
value of §824,000.00 with a book value of §761,851.67 and a
market value of $712,620.00. As of December 31, 1929, the par
value was §838,000.00; book value, §761,100.48; market value,
§685, 230.00. One Company was dropped and §39,000 worth of
Amsrican Telephone and Telegraph Company, 4 1/2$ convertible
gold debentures, due 1938, added.
Until the recent decline, the progress of the Company was
particularly gratifying. In December, 1926, cash on hand was
§124,093.40; in 1927, §17,728.62; in 1928, §10,046.37. These
figures seem to indicate that the company had most of its avail-
able funds invested previous to the market break in order to
take advantage of the opportunities afforded by the spectacular
rise in public utility stocks. As of December 30, 1929, the
cash on hand was in excess of that of December, 1926, amounting
to §317,817.92.
While for 1928 the sale of securities netted a profit of
§1,647,005.80, 1929 showed only §240,185.65. However, cash
dividends and interest on bonds received and accrued amounted
to §753,116.09 in 1929, while in 1928 this figure was but
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$471,929.67. The fact that investment securities in stocks
and bonds was increased from .;14,447,828.66 as of December 31,
1928 to 020,825,958.74 as of December 31, 1929 must, of course,
be taken into consideration. It is apparent, nevertheless,
that the trust today is depending more upon yield than upon
market appreciation.
The net income over the four-year life of the trust is as
follows: December, 1926, $249,526.30; December, 1927,
$289,474.11; December, 1928, $1,715,393.45; December, 1929,
$707,022.51. The latter figure, it is to be noted, is over one
million dollars less than that of the preceding year.
Dividends have been declared regularly on the preferred
stock. This stock is cumulative but non-convertible and in
January, 19 30, had a liquidating value of $100. The preferred
stock can be redeemed at the option of the Company, as it may
desire, at $110. per share. As yet, the common stock has not
participated in any of the earnings, although in 1928 the earn-
ings per share of common stock amounted to 5.90^. In order to
retire annually $20,000 of the funded debt to provide for the
preferred stock dividends, a sinking fund and a reserve fund
have been established. The practice is to set up reserves equal
to two years* dividends on outstanding preferred stock. Invest-
ment stocks having a market value equal to 125$ or more of the
funded debt are deposited with the trustee as collateral.
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The common stock was offered to the public at $54o00.
In June, 1929, it was split up two for one, without any change
in either the capital account or the surplus, a stock dividend
of one share for each share held being given to all common
stockholders. The high and low range for 1929 was 98 1/2 and
23 respectively. During January, 1930, the stock fluctuated
around 35. In November, 1929, 21,500 shares of common stock
were sold which looks as though the public had faith in its
speculative possibilities.
The American European Securities Company was one of the
first trusts to conform to all the regulations for listing on
the New York Stock Exchange.
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CONNECTICUT INVESTMENT TRUST
The Connecticut Investment Trust, a common law trust
commencing business in May, 1927, deals primarily in the se-
curities of electrical companies, for the most part those in
the public utility field. Securities representing broad diver-
sification and covering practically every state in the Union
are purchased "only at their intrinsic worth".
Three kinds of shares are issued, preferred trustee
shares, Class A shares, and Class B shares. Provision is made
that there shall be no more preferred trustee shares outstand-
ing than there are Class A shares. Preferred trustee shares
pay a dividend of 7$. They are assured both as to principal
and dividends by a deposit of some of the investment securities
with the Riverside Trust Company of Hartford.
Class A shares have preference in the earnings up to 250
per share per year over Class B shares, after which extra
earnings are divided, two-thirds going to Class A and one-
third to Class B shares. In the event of liquidation preferred
trustee shares come first. Class A shares have preference over
Class B up to $7.50 per share, and the remaining assets are
divided in the same manner in respect to earnings, two-thirds
going to Class A shares and one-third to Class B shares.
Class B common shares are reserved for the organizers. Pro-
vision is made that the Pounders shall have the privilege
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of purchasing Class B common shares to the extent of one
hundred for every two hundred Class A shares which are sold to
the public. These options are granted to the Founders to
recompense them for bearing all expenses incident to organiza-
tion.
In reviewing the policy of the management over the year
preceding the market break, it is noticeable that it seemed to
be alert to economic and financial trends. Even before the
close of 1928, the President of the Trust reported that con-
stant management had been essential during the year owing to
the character of the security market. Early in 1929, he an-
nounced that owing to the warnings issued by the Federal Re-
serve Board regarding the credit situation, the Trust had
entered upon a policy of purchasing fewer stocks and selling
several so as to increase its cash balance.
The Trust seems to be particularly conservative. It
claims that it does not concern itself with minor ups and downs
of the market, although it endeavors to sell in an advanced
market and take actual profit. Since the underlying securities
are purchased at as near the right price as possible, it is
contended that it is unnecessary to sell them during a bear
market because their income is continuous regardless of minor
fluctuations or a real "Bear raid". In this respect it adheres
to what should be typical investment trust practices, that is,
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buying and selling of good stocks regardless of intermediate
fluctuations. A substantial surplus has been built up, and
paper profits are disregarded in figuring both dividends and
assets
.
The Connecticut Investment Trust made steady progress
until the recent market break. On May 1, 1927, the offering
price per share was $5.00. Since that time it advanced to
$7.37 1/2 as of July, 19 29. Earnings for the second quarter
of 1929 were better than 26 1/2^ a share. About half of this
amount, 130 per share, was paid in dividends, the remainder
being carried to surplus.
Apparently no financial statements are published, but
quarterly reports of progress showing dividends and earnings
are distributed to shareholders. Also, no publication is
made of the underlying securities which constitute the port-
folio. Possibly the list is available at the offices of the
Trust where, according to the prospectus, an active market in
shares is maintained. The lack of informative data is a
drawback to the broad selling of securities, although it
appears that the Trust aims to attract local investors primar
ily.
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GENERAL PUBLIC SERVICE CQBPORATION
General Public Service Corporation, organized in December,
1925, represents a general management investment trust dealing
primarily in the common stocks of public utility companies.
The Corporation regards itself as an investment company, defin-
ing an "investment trust" as an organization in \7hich the share-
holders have a beneficial interest in a group of securities held
by a trustee in contrast with an "investment company" in which
the stockholders own a proportionate interest in all the assets
of the corporation.
The capitalization of the company is as follows;*
Authorized Outstanding
Gold Debentures
% Convertible Series due 1953 * $4,972,000
5hfo " " 1939 * 9,999,000
Preferred Stock (no par value) 175,000 shares
|6 Dividend Series 24,629 shares|5.50 " " 280 "
Junior Preferred Stock
(no par value) 100,000 shares None
Common Stock (no par value) 1,000,000 " 627,256 shares
Each share of common stock carries with it one vote. Pre-
ferred stock is cumulative and carries no voting privilege ex-
cept under certain conditions as in the case of default of
dividend payments. Gold debentures are redeemable on thirty
*Fourth Annual Report, 1929, General Public Service Corpora-
tion, page 13
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days* notice at 104 up to January 1, 1933; thereafter, at 103,
and so on, the price falling in direct proportion to the length
of time the bonds are outstanding.
The practice of the Corporation is to issue new convertible
debentures when the senior securities and junior securities are
not well balanced. For instance, in June, 1929, partly due to
the appreciation of the market value of securities, 80$ of the
Corporation's assets were represented by common stocks. In
July, after the issue of $10,000,000 worth of ten-year 5 1/2$
convertible debentures, this ratio was reduced to 63.6$ of the
total.* At the close of the year the ratio was 50.3$. The
shares of common stock were 36,252.72 as of December 31, 1929,
while there were 40,445.12 shares as of December 31, 1928.
The portfolio of the Trust is well diversified containing
the securities of the larger, well-known corporation from all
different sections of the United States. Over 43.6$ of the
total investment is in securities which the Trust states have
had unbroken dividend records for at least fifteen years;
50.2$ is in other stocks which pay dividends; the remainder
4.3$ is in non-income investments. Included in the list are
the stocks of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company,
Electric Bond and Share Company, Niagara Hudson Power Corpora-
tion, Consolidated Gas Company of New York, and other equally
popular utilities. One investment trust, Insuranshares
*Compare page 4, Fourth Annual Report, 1929, Public Service
Corporation.
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Certificates Incorporated, is also represented with 27,490
shares of common stock having a market value of (;384,860 as
of December 31, 1929.
A comparison of the securities represented as of Decem-
ber 31, 1928 with those of December 31, 1929 illustrates the
manner in which the portfolio of the management type of
investment trust may vary from time to time.
Total Companies Represented December 31, 1928 58
Dropped during the year 20
Added during the year 25
Total Companies Represented December 31, 1929 63
An analysis of the investments of the Corporation as of
December 31, 1929, is as follows: *
Percentage of
Market Total Market
Value Value
Common Stocks and Option
Warrants
Utilities (Holding) $12,166,146 34.39$
Utilities (Operating) 10,542,173 29.80$
Industrials 4,575,924 12.93°$
Banks 2,466,842 6.97$
Investment Companies 4,061,417 11.48$
Foreign Stocks 517,650 1.46$
Bonds, Notes and Preferred
Stocks 592,969 1.
Total Investments $34,923,121
Cash 456,482 1.29$
Total $35,379,603 100.00$
*Fourth Annual Report, 1929, General Public Service Corpora-
tion, page 9
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At the close of the financial year just passed, the asset
value of each share of the common stock was $29,97 or 46.2$
in excess of the book value. The Corporation states that after
the stock market break in October and November, 19 29, the
market value of all investments held was 11$ below their cost
or book value. At the close of 19 29, many of the underlying
securities had recovered sufficiently so that their market
value was 19% above cost or book value.
A semi-annual 3$ dividend of common stock was paid, making
a total of 6^> stock dividends during 1929. For 1928, &fo was
paid in stock dividends. During 1929 the number of stock-
holders increased from 3,360 to 4,879. The price of the common
stock rose to 98 previous to the market collapse. Its high and
low for January, 1930 were respectively 32 2/8 and 36 3/4. The
stock was listed on the New York Stock Exchange in June, 19 29.
As the greater part of income was derived from the sale of
securities, with the falling off in public utilities, prospects
for the junior sharesare not at present particularly favorable.
For the long pull, however, the Trust has excellent possibili-
ties at present prices.
-58-

THE GUARDIAN IlWESTl.QiINT GROUP
To meet the requirements of the investor who prefers
public utilities or rail shares, The Guardian Investment Trust,
sponsored by F. E. Kingston & Co., Hartford, Connecticut, has
provided as specializing trusts The Guardian Public Utilities
Investment Trust and The Guardian Rail Shc.res Investment Trust,
The Guardian Investment Trust operates under the laws of
the State of Connecticut in accordance with a trust agreement.
It is, however, of the general management type rather than of
the limited or fixed type as are most investment trusts created
under a declaration of trust. Its prospectus states that it
aims to follow the best British practices, "investing and re-
investing its funds in a widely diversified field of domestic
and international securities as dictated by a constantly in-
formed, alert management
The capitalization of this management Trust, limited to
.,.50,000,000. outstanding, is unusual in that it does not con-
sist of one class of participations as do most trusts created
under a trust agreement, Inst sad, there are preferred bene-
ficial ownership certificates, convertible preferred beneficial
ownership certificates, and common beneficial ownership cer-
tificates. One hundred thousand shares of the latter are re-
served for the convertible preferred and 150,000 shares for
the exercise of warrants in the interest of the preferred
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certificate holders. For managerial services, The Guardian
Investment Trust is paid every year "1% on the average capital
employed by the Trust in its business as determined monthly." *
It is claimed that no shares are distributed gratuitously for
any services rendered.
Like the management Trust, The Guardian Rail Shares
Investment Trust and The Guardian Public Utilities Investment
Trust both have preferred beneficial ownership certificates
as well as common. They, too, are organized under trust agree-
ments rather than as corporations or associations.
The Guardian Public Utilities Investment Trust states
that its purpose is "to provide a medium whereby the investor
may avail himself of the profitable opportunities in the public
utility field," The advantages that the Trust claims for
specializing in this field are that (1) public utility com-
panies are the very foundation of the industrial life of busi-
ness; (2) public utility companies operate on a franchise basis
and are practically without competition; (3) the average in-
crease in the earnings of public utility companies is from
10fo to 12% annually.
The Trust does not operate with a closed portfolio but
has a selected list of securities from which the managers may
chose. This list covers one hundred gas, electric light,
power, and telephone and telegraph companies in this country
*A11 quotations are taken from the prospectuses of the Trusts
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and about the same number in England, Germany, France, Austria,
Belgium, and several other foreign countries.
The purpose of the Guardian Rail Shares Investment Trust
as stated in the prospectus is "to provide a medium whereby the
investor may avail himself of the most profitable opportunities
in the transportation field." The reasons for investing in
railroad securities as set forth by the Trust may be enumerated
as follows: (1) possibilities of favorable developments, such
as electrification and higher operating efficiency, which should
benefit the investor; (2) possibilities that airplane service
will supplement rail; (3) consolidations.
As in the case of The Guardian Public Utilities Invest-
ment Trust, the management is left to determine what securities
shall go into the portfolio of The Guardian Rail Shares.
There is nothing very definite in regard to the approved list
as the statement is made that it is a partial one and that the
management is expected to, not must, include the securities of
the various companies represented. However, securities other
than railroad can be purchased only with the unanimous approval
of the trustees.
For the investor satisfied with a low, steady rate of
return, this Trust may have some appeal. With an average yield
on railroad stock of only a little over 4$, diversification of
risk seems to offer little advantage. The indiv i dual investor
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by selecting the best railroad securities could do better for
himself.
At the present time neither of the Trusts have been in
operation long enough to demonstrate their earning power. As
Series I preferred beneficial ownership certificates carry
option warrants which give the holder the privilege of purchas-
ing an equal number of common shares over a period of four
years at prices ranging from $10.00 to $25.00, the common stock
is particularly speculative.
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Particular Industries

CHAIN STORE IW/ISSTI/^NT CORPORATION
This trust, claiming to nave originated the idea of the
chain store investment trust, is of the specializing type.
The intent of the Corporation is to invest in chain store
companies of the smaller kind which are, as the President,
Paul Dudley Childs, says in his report of January 25, 1929,
"somewhat more speculative than the average, but also more
lucrative." The managers, Childs, Jeffries & Co., Inc., have
the privilege of buying 5,000 shares of the common stock at
$25 #00 per share for a period of five years. They are further-
more entitled to receive one-half of one per cent based on the
liquidating value of all the outstanding capital stock as deter-
mined by the directors for furnishing space, clerical, statis-
tical, and other services to the Chain Store Investment Corpora-
tion.
Regarding the option warrants the statement is made that
they become worthless unless there is a "continuous appreciation
the value of the securities." In November, 1927, the stock was
offered at $26.00 per share with liquidating value of $25.00.
In January, 1929, the price was $92.00 bid with a liquidating
value of $61.54. It was claimed at this time that had the Cor-
poration invested in the larger Chain Store companies, the liquid-
ating value per share in January, 1929, would have been but $37.00
or $58.00 and lower than the general industrial average. The
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better average obtained by the Corporation was attributed to
constant and vigilant management. Previous to August, 1929
the stock was split five for one. The 1929 range was high 20
and low 13. It is now currently quoted "over the counter" at
13, with the par value of each share being $5.00.
The securities owned by the Company as of December 13, 1927
included a number of the smaller chains and a few of the better
known such as The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company (325
shares); First National Stores, Inc. (1300 shares); United Drug
Co. (300 shares). The total cost of investment was $1,008,661.94
with a market value of $1,168,545. As the Company was organized
in November, 1927, this shows an appreciation in one month of
nearly $60,000, or a yield equivalent to $3. on the 20,000 common
shares outstanding at $25.00 per share.
By December 31, 1928, the list of securities owned had
changed considerably. Only 8 of the 26 companies as represented
December 31, 1927, appear on the list in December 31, 1928,
which, however, still covered 26 companies. Whether this was
due to a change in policy on the part of the management in order
to include smaller chains or whether a few leaders were placed
in the original list to attract the investor is a question. As
of December 31, 1928, the value of investments at cost, or the
market value, if the latter is less than cost, was $1,157,257.97,
and the market value, $1.721.225.75.
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Reasons why the chain store offers such unusual opportun-
ities for the investor are most ably set forth by the trust in
a pamphlet which states that the average percentage earned on
the book value of 9 chains is shown to be 27.7$. However, as
of December 31, 1927, only one of these companies showing-
unusual earnings, The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company of
America, was included among the securities owned by the Chain
Store Investment Corporation. As of December 31, 1928, there
were but two, the Kroger Grocery Co. and the J". J*. Newberry Co.
The statistics, while apparently true, do not tie up as well
as they might in relation to the securities held by the trust,
notwithstanding that there seems to have been considerable sell-
ing and shifting of these investments during the life of the
trust.
Host authorities seem to be of the opinion that the chain
store, with merger prospects in view, will continue to show a
favorable development. The problem now is that of chain against
chain rather than chain against the independent retailer. Chain
Store Investment Corporation has diversified its securities over
a number of different lines, as grocery, general merchandise,
drug, shoe, candy, and auto supply chains. In this way it be-
lieves it is able to iron out seasonal influences, because, for
instance, in the case of the general merchandise chain, the
greater part of the sales are concentrated in the months of
-65-

November and December. The list of securities is published
annually, and an up-to-date list is kept on file in the office
of Childs, Jeffries & Company and may be seen at any time on
request
.
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METAL AMD MIKING SHARES INCORPORATED
Metal and Mining Shares, Incorporated illustrates the re-
search type of investment trust. Connected with it is Mineral
Research Corporation, an auxiliary organization which is con-
stantly analyzing information and making investigations. The
idea of an investment trust dealing exclusively in mining in-
terests is not altogether new for several of the British hold-
ing-company type of investment trusts have followed this prac-
tice, namely the Rand Mines, Ltd; the Central Mining and Invest-
ment Trust of London, and the African-European Investment Trust.
The Mineral Research Corporation is retained, in the words
of the Metal and Mining Shares, Incorporated, to act in an ad-
visory capacity because it is able (1) "to get the facts about
developments in the metal and mining industry all over the
world; (2) to get these facts promptly; (3) to forecast the
trend of metal markets." A great amount of very convincing
advertising literature has been prepared by the Research Corpora-
tion to demonstrate how important metal is in industry. For
instance, in 1927, according to its reports, "the railroads
used 6,000,000 tons of metal; the public utilities, 203,000
tons of copper; the telephone and telegraph companies required
103,000 tons of copper and 100,000 tons of lead; 4,000,000 tons
of steel were used in buildings in 1927. Automobile manufao-
turers for the same period consumed 5,000,000 tons of steel
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aluminum, copper, tin, lead, zinc, and nickel," *
Until after a dividend of $1.50 per share is distributed
to all stockholders, only the operating expenses are paid by
the Metal and Mining Shares, Incorporated to the Research Cor-
poration, Then extra dividends are divided, two thirds going
to the common stockholders, and one-third to the Research
Corporation. The latter, in turn, awards the engineers and
the mining experts who are kept in the field doing research
their share of the profits. No definite statement is made,
nevertheless, as to what is included in operating expenses
and as to whether the consulting engineers and other research
employees receive a stipulated salary besides.
Although investments are made primarily in the securities
of one industry only, wide diversification is claimed in that
nearly one hundred different companies are represented and
twenty different countries, with securities listed on every
recognized stock exchange. Moreover, shares are owned in com-
panies operating in fifteen different metals. Some of the
companies represented are not only miners but fabricators of
metal, so this gives additional diversification.
With an unusually well-equipped research organization, it
is only natural that the management factor should play an impor-
tant part. Managers are given power to purchase and sell se-
burities whenever it is advisable or in order to take advantage
*Compare with pamphlet, "The Mineral Industry is a Basic
Industry", page 24, published by Metal and Mining Shares,
Incorporated.
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of market profits. Up to July, 1929, however, restrictions
were made as to the kind and the amount of securities the man-
agement could deal in, 70$ of the capital being limited to Class
A securities, and the remaining 30$ to Class B securities. The
former represent listed securities which pay dividends, while
the latter are the securities of metal companies which are not
developed to their full power but have "possibilities for ex-
ceptional earnings." In the summer of 1929, investment restric-
tions were removed, and in November, the Trust stated that it
had liquidated over 50$ of its holdings, reinvesting funds thus
realized primarily in the stocks of metal and mining companies
which had had no spectacular rise. It furthermore informed
stockholders that it was investing in bonds with an assured re-
turn of 6$.
Previous to the market decline, the Trust claimed unusual
advantages in that unlike the other industrial groups and the
public utilities, the metal and mining securities had not had
their bull market. According to statistics the Corporation
presents, industrial stocks as a whole (Dow Jones 20 industrial
stocks) rose from 105 to 290 (as of December 4, 1928), a 185
point rise, while seventeen representative mining stocks ad-
vanced from 43 to 107, a 64 point rise. In an estimate pre-
pared by the Boston News Bureau, the average net profit for all
American industries for 1927 was 6.67^ while the average for
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metal and mining companies was 7.94$,
The Trust, at the present time, has accumulated an earned
surplus sufficient to pay more than the next three quarterly-
dividend payments, approximately $90,000. The range for 1929,
according to quotations on the New York Curb Exchange ,were high,
23 7/8; low, 5. On January 6, 1930, its high and low price
were 9 3/4 and 8 1/2 respectively.
The earnings per share of common stock, as set forth in
a letter to the writer, were as follows;
(a) First six months of 1929--based on average
No. shares outstanding 2,44
(b) First eight months, 1929—based on average
No. shares outstanding 3.12
(c) July and August, 1929--based on actual
shares outstanding August 31st 4,14
(d) August, 1929—based on actual shares
outstanding August 31st 5.43
As of November 23, 1929, the President informed stock-
holders that the breakdown value of a share was over §22.
The Trust at this time had an earned surplus of approximately
$275,000. Although reporting that the break in stock prices
did not affect the Company to any serious extent, the shift to
a large investment in bonds and the change in policies would
indicate disturbing internal conditions. For the investor
interested in mining stocks, however, shares at the present
price offer posibilities. With excellent Research facilities.
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and the P. H. Whiting & Co., Inc. handling the sale of the
securities, Metal and Mining Shares, Incorporated should, over
a period of years, show a satisfactory growth. It must be con-
sidered, however, that such services are paid for indirectly by
the investor and that his yield is thereby diminished.
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Financial Investment Trusts

CENTURY SHARES TRUST
19 29 Recent Decline uecLine m
High Low in Points Percentage
Air Investors, Inc. 20 1/3 rzO 1 / 1/8 oD
Alleghany Corp. DO 1/ 2 J. / 1/ *
American Founders Corp. TOO122 7/8 66
1/2
56 7/8
American Int. Corp. 96 3/4 29 67 1/4 6V
Blue Ridge Corp. D/8 rzO 1/8 2d 1/2 90
Continental Shares 78 43 DO
Financial Investing 30 4 7/8 25 1/8 Q rz80
General Amer. Inv. 30 T //I1/4 7/8 21 rz /o3/
8
/u
General Capital Corp. /—v r"783
l/4
20 63
1 1
A
V/t
76
Goldman baclis iraamg corp. 121 32
7/8
89 17 rz/O
Kaygart Corp. o o82 3/8 54 1 2 66
Incorporated Investors 89 1/2 39 50 $ 56Interstate Equities 20 1/ 2 12 3/8 T rz13 1/8 pr n51
Lehman Corp. 136 63 n rz73 54
Karine Midland YD 28 47 62
J.'lass. Investors Trust CL A64 rzo38 26 41
I.lohawk Investment Corp, 89 1/2 50
3/8
39 1/2 44
National Investors 84 3/4 10 54 3/8 O A84
Old Colony Inv. Trust 32 15 17 53
Pov/er & Light Sec. Trust 100 45
JL/ <C/
55
±/ 2
55
Public Utility Holding Corp . JO ±D 60
Shawmut Inv. Assoc. 35 15 20 60
onenancoan 39 3/8 6 7/8 32 1/2 00
Spencer Trask Fund 50 1/4 30
1/2
20 1/4 40
State St. Invest. Corp. 143 1/2 61 82
3/4
57
Sterling Securities Corp. 38 8 1/4 29 78
Third Nat. Investors 85 27 58 70
Transamerica Corp. 67 3/8 35 3/8 32 47
Tri-Cont. Corp. 57 11 1/8 45 7/8 81
United Founders 75 1/2 25 50 1/2 67
Average Decline 64
Century Shares Trust 67 40 27 40

CENTURY SHARES TRUST
Century Shares, a Massachusetts Trust with Brown Brothers
& Co. depositary, sets forth in its offering circular that its
principal purpose is "to make available to investors shares of
moderate price which will be readily marketable and which will
represent an investment in a diversified list of Insurance
Company and Bank stocks ordinarily available only in high price
units."
Instead of the usual common stock share, there are two
classes of no par value termed "Participating" and "Ordinary".
Participating shares somewhat resemble preferred stock in that
they receive dividends of |2.00 payable semi-annually from the
annual net profits before any distributions are made to Ordin-
ary shares. In case of liquidation, they also have preference
of $50.00 a share. Any additional earnings are distributed on
a basis of 85% to Participating shares and 15$ to Ordinary
shares. This may be in cash or in the form of new shares. In
case of liquidation, additional distribution of assets may be
apportioned in the same manner.
By the agreement and declaration of trust, amended No-
vember 26, 1928 and May 22, 1929, the six Trustees, four of whom
are connected with Brown Brothers & Co., are given exceptionally
broad pov/ers. They may invest and reinvest the property of the
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trust "in the capital stock of any insurance company, "dank or
trust company of the United states of America or of any state
therein or of any foreign country, in shares of any subsidiary
of the same", as well as in the bonds and notes of almost any
organization or individual. i*urthermore , "no investment or re-
investment shall be deemed improper because of its speculative
character or because a greater proportion of the trust is in-
vested therein than is usual for trustees, or by reason of any
interest, direct or indirect, which any Trustee or Shareholder
or Depositary or Brown Brothers & Co. either individually or in
any representative or fiduciary capacity may have therein, or
by reason of any profit which they or any of them may make there-
from." *
The Trustees, with the written consent of two-thirds of
the holders of both kinds of shares, may alter the provisions
pertaining to Participating and Ordinary shares. They may
issue from time to time such other shares having any rights of
priority or otherwise. They may also buy in and retire shares
under certain restrictions. Brown Brothers & Co., Depositary,
may acquire shares of the trust by purchasing at the liquidat-
ing value of the outstanding shares units made up of one
Participating and one Ordinary share. Participating shares
are sold to the public, while it appears that the Ordinary
*Century Shares Trust: Agreement and Declaration of Trust,
March 1, 1928, page 2
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shares have the rights and privileges and are held by the
Trustees.
Trustees who are members of Brown & Co. receive no compen-
sation, while those who are not partners or employees of this
company, receive a "reasonable fee" for attendance at meetings.
Trustees are required to render to shareholders an account only
once a year and they are not "required to keep accounts showing
separation of the trust property as between principal and in-
come." Furthermore, as of November 7, 1928, instead of making
"distributions out of the receipts from or accretions to the
trust property among the Shareholders',' etc., a certain part
of the receipts from the sale of each Participating share (not
to exceed ^2.00) will be set aside as "receipts from or accre-
tions to the trust property".*
Trustees may vary in number from a minimum of five to a
maximum of fifteen. Appointment of Trustees is made by a two-
thirds vote of the holders of the Ordinary shares.
It is evident that the investor who buys shares in this
type of trust places great confidence in the management. If
it is well-managed, he may benefit in that trusts of this kind
are able to keep expenses at a minimum and in that the trustees
may themselves be large shareholders of the Ordinary shares or
Class B shares. Provided they are honest, they will do their
*Century Shares Trust: Agreement and Declaration of Trust.
March 1, 1928, page 3
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.best to make profits. On the other hand, they may have but a
small investment in the trust themselves and play "big" with
the funds of the investors who are likely to lose heavily while
the managers suffer but little.
Century Shares Trust seems to have fared well during its
short career of less than two years. The accompanying chart
prepared by the organization, illustrates its percentage of de-
cline in comparison with several other trusts. It must be remem-
bered in using any average of this kind that only a limited
number of trusts are included. The figures for the representa-
tive trusts given herein, however, check closely with those of
other authorities. The Trust is fair in presenting not merely
the' 1929 low but the recent low which, in its own case ^s well
as that of a number of other trusts, is less than its 19£9 low.
The fact that Century Shares Trust showed only a 40$ de-
cline as compared with an average decline of 64><i by the 30
trusts listed indicates that sound management policies prevail.
The Trust attributes its satisfactory showing partly to dispos-
ing of some of its holdings prior to the break and having cash
on hand instead of stocks. As of January 6, 1930, the bid price
was 48, asked price 50, being comparatively a good recovery.
In a letter to the writer dated January 9, 1930, Secretary
./ H. Davies expressed the following opinion in reference to
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the future of investment trusts specializing primarily in
insurance and bank stocks.
"We can see no reason to expect any change, and, there-
fore, can state that it is our opinion that the future of a
well-managed investment trust specializing in insurance and
"bank stocks will be as bright as is the future of the best
managed insurance companies and banks."
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DETROIT BANK PARTICIPATION SHAKES
and
CHICAGO BANK PARTICIPATION SHARES
Detroit Bank Participation Shares, a fixed trust of the
unit type, organized in July, 1929, illustrates limited diver-
sification in that included in its investments are nothing hut
the bank stocks and trust companies of the leading banks in
Detroit together with their branches. Certificates are issued
by the Fidelity Trust Company, depositary. Industrial Securi-
ties Corporation is the Depositor. Each Detroit Bank Partici-
pation Share, according to the prospectus of the trust, repre-
sents a 1/1000 ownership in a unit of fifty-three shares of
stock. Additional units of one thousand may be issued to
correspond with the demand, and, as is the custom with the unit
type of trust, the stocks must first be deposited by the
Depositor with the Depositary sufficient to make a new unit
together with cash "to equal the accumulated earnings held by
the Depositary as security for each then outstanding one
thousand Detroit Bank Participation Shares."
The reasons for investing in bank stocks only are given as
follows
:
"(1) The rapid growth of American industrial enterprises
has placed the banking institutions of our larger cities in an
enviable position.
" (2) Supplying an essential service to all industries and
demonstrating their ability to consistently expand their
activities in both times of prosperity and depression, their
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stocks are regarded today as one of the choicest of investments.
"(3) Shrewd investors are realizing that bank stocks not
only conform to the requirements of the most conservative
investor but also possess unusual earning and enhancement
possibilities."*
No substitution of underlying securities is permitted,
except in case of split-up of shares or recapitalization of the
companies represented by the underlying securities. Further-
more, management is eliminated, the officers and the directors
of the various banks having representative participation in
directing the activities of the trust*
According to the trust, during 1929, the shares have
appreciated 45$ in value and have earned $1*10 per share. As
of December 1, 19 29, holders of the shares were, on surrender
of coupons attached, to receive "distributable dividend" equal
to $9.16 for 10 shares; $22.90 for 25 shares; 545.80 for 50
shares; $91.61 for 100 shares.
Operating in practically the same way and with the same
depositary and depositor as Detroit Bank Participation Shares,
is Chicago Bank Participation Shares, created in October, 1929.
This issue consists of 50,000 convertible participation
certificates divided into fifty units made up of 1,000 shares
each. Certificates are issued in bearer form with coupons
attached, in denominations of 10, 25, 50, 100, 500 and 1,000
shares. Like the Detroit Bank Participation Shares, the holder
*A11 quotations taken from prospectus of the Trust.
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of a unit may, if he so desires, withdraw, receiving for his
1,000 shares the actual stocks themselves together with any
earnings as well as the part of the reserve fund represented.
In the case of the Detroit Bank Participation Shares
there seems, however, to "be no reserve fund, while the Chicago
Bank Participation Shares provides for a maximum reserve of
$1,000 in cash to each unit in order to equalize the dividend
payments and maintain a &fo minimum rate. Dividends comprise:
"all regular and extra cash dividends; proceeds from' the sale
of stock dividends and stock purchase warrants; interest on
reserve fund, which is the prevailing rate paid on certificates
of deposit; and sale of fractional share of stock received from
consolidations of any of the companies." Like many fixed
trusts, therefore, the intent expressed is to give the share-
holder all of the earnings, with the possible exception of the
amount set aside for reserves. This is, to a certain extent,
in keeping with the theory of permitting income to vary with
the purchasing power of the dollar.
The objection to both of these types of companies seems
to be limited diversification and the fact that the yield,
over a period of years, is usually not much greater than 5 1/2$
at a maximum. Stock dividends and rights, it is claimed equal
as great a return as cash dividends, to say nothing of
appreciation on the underlying stock. However, the two latter
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items cannot be depended upon with any degree of certainty.
While shares of this trust may appeal to the local investor
in the vicinity of Detroit or of Chicago, there would not
he as good a market for them elsewhere.
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EASTERN BANKERS CORPORATION
A type of investment trust which places stocks of
financial institution above all others as long-term invest-
ments is the Eastern Bankers Corporation of Jersey City,
New Jersey, organized under the laws of Delaware in 1922 and
claiming to be the oldest investment trust in America which
operates exclusively in the stocks of financial institutions.
According to its recent prospectus, the Eastern Bankers Cor-
poration invests the major portion of its funds in stocks of
leading national banks, state banks, and trust companies,
although it is permitted to invest funds in any "strong, suc-
cessful financial institution," It aims, furthermore, to
invest only a small part of its authorized capital in any one
particular security, so that in the event of liquidation, the
loss of capital would be diminished. Although it deals exclu-
sively in one kind of stock, it claims wide diversification of
risk on the basis that banks, in turn, widely diversify their
resources, supplying business with credit and thereby investing
in practically every type of enterprise. "Bank stocks", this
Trust advertises, "are an investment backed by the industries
of a nation."
The Eastern Bankers Corporation aims to follow the pattern
of the best British Financial Trusts or Investment Companies,
first, as has been pointed out, in respect to diversification
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of risk; second, as regards expert management and constant
supervision of the portfolio; third, in the matter of low
operating costs.
Bankers Financial Trust, New York, a holding company
controls Eastern Bankers Corporation, an investment trust;
Bankers Capital Corporation, New York and New Jersey, a trading
company dealing in hank, trust, title and insurance stocks; and
American Fiduciary Corporation, Bridgeport, Conn., functioning
as a trust company. There is a considerable interlocking of
directors, the advantage claimed being that it enables the
Eastern Bankers Corporation to keep in closer touch with the
investment market. As Bankers Financial Trust owns a majority
of the outstanding voting stock and derives a considerable por-
tion of its income from the earnings of the latter, it would
appear that the operating costs of these institutions would be
enhanced by this association. Eastern Bankers Corporation
states, however, that its average operating cost, exclusive of
taxes, is exceedingly low,—1/2 of 1$ of its authorized capital
—
and that it compares very favorably with the best types of
British and Scottish Trusts in this respect.
The capital structure of the Company is as follows:
Authorized Outstanding
Common Stock..... 250,000 shares varies 'from time
(par value $10.00) to time due to
additional shares
ifo Cumulative Pref.. 25,000 shares being sold.
(par value $100.00)
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The Trust has built up a substantial reserve and has paid
dividends each year. The following individends have been
declared on the coronon stock, prices of the latter shares
being quoted daily in the New York City papers.
1923 1 1/2$
1924 3$
1925 6$
1926 6% plus 2$
1927 6<fo " 4$
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INSURANSIIARi.IS CORPORATION AND ITS AFFILIATED INVESTMENT
TRUST ACTIVITIES
In March, 1927, a few men pooled their capital to the extent
of $500,000. and organized Insuranshares Corporation New York
with the intention of creating a revolving fund to invest in
a selected list of insurance and bank stocks. They deposited
their securities with the City Bank Farmers Trust Company as
trustees. Finding this idea a profitable one, they issued
shares under the name of Insuranshares Trust Certificates and
sold them to the public in order to secure more money in which
to invest again in stocks similar to their first venture.
As the duties of Insuranshares Corporation increased, the
supervision of the investment policies and all research and
analytical work was transferred to Insuranshares l&nagement
Company which was formed simultaneously with the Corporation
to assume this work. The parent organization now handles the
sale of certificates and acts as an underwriting agent.
Insuranshares Corporation New York and Insuranshares
Management Company constitute a "dual hubn as the Trust expresses
it. About them, at the present time, revolve the activities
of the three investment companies, Insuranshares Trust Certifi-
cates, now succeeded by Insuranshares Certificates Incorporated,
Insuranshares Corporation of Delaware, and the Sterling Securi-
ties Corporation. The latter organization, which deals with
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general market items, is managed by its own Board of
Directors, but as all the activities of these groups are
interlocking, Sterling Securities Corporation depends to
a considerable extent upon Insuranshares Management
Company for its statistical information and research.*
A few of the reasons offered as to why Insuranshares
Corporation favors insurance stocks and bank stocks for
investment summarized are as follows:
(1) The practical certainty of the continuance of
insurance companies and banks as a permanent part of our
business structure. These companies prosper and grow
even during periods of depression.
(2) The steady growth of the assets of both types of
institutions. (Elaborate charts to demonstrate the re-
markable record of the companies underlying Insuranshares
have been prepared by the Insuranshares lanagement Company.
According to the figures shown, "assets of insurance com-
panies generally have increased 14 times faster than the
population of the United States. In the period 1900 to
1927, life insurance assets alone increased 786$.*)**
(3) Efficiency, competency, and honesty of the manage-
ment of insurance companies is particularly apparent.
(4) Returns to stockholders of both banks and insurance
companies have increased steadily.
(5) Both insurance and bank stocks are readily market-
able
.
(6) Banks and insurance companies set up reserves and
invest reserves and surplus in a way which enhances the
value of their securities.
Insuranshares Trust Certificates were first offered to
the public in April, 1927. From that date until February 15
,
*For a detailed discussion of Sterling Securities Corpora-
tion, see page 125
**Sales I'janual, Insuranshares Corporation of Delaware, page 1
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1928, five series known respectively as A-27, C-27, F-27,
H-27, and B-28 were issued by Insuranshares Corporation of
New York. The underlying stocks in the five different
portfolios represented, on an average, 52 insurance companies
and seven banks. The combined initial value of the five series
amounted to $12,450,000.00. By June 30, 1929, the amount had
increased 46$ due to profits and accrued appreciation.
In September, 1929, the Insuranshares Certificates Incor-
porated was organized under the laws of Maryland with an author-
ized capitalization of 1,180,000 shares of no par value common
stock. The corporation was created for the purpose of combin-
ing the five series of investments into a single organization.
The idea of consolidating the certificates was to gain the
advantage of a corporate form. The trust certificates were not
eligible for listing on the Exchange, so the new corporation
was formed to facilitate the marketing of securities and to
secure listing privileges.
In effecting the exchange of Certificates, the liquidating
value of October 31, 1929 was taken as a basis. This was $18.42
against $20 par value of the original shares. The stock of the
new corporation was issued at $20. per share. Insuranshares
Certificates Incorporated commenced business with $18,000,000.00
of insurance and bank stocks in its portfolio as a result of the
exchange. Although the usual policy of the new concern ?/ill be
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to invest in insurance and bank stocks, one change has been
made, namely, that the Board of Directors, at its discretion,
may invest funds in the general security market if it considers
such an action temporarily profitable.
The high and low for 1929 of Insuranshares was 16 and 12
respectively. In January, 1930 it was priced around 15.
Insuranshares Corporation of Delaware, organized in March
of 1929, by its charter grants similar discretion to the manage-
ment in the matter of investing in securities other than bank
stocks when conditions would indicate it wise to do so. The
authorized capitalization of the Corporation consists of two
classes of common stock, both having no par value. Class A is
retained by the management, and Class B is available to the
public. The Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation purchased for its
own account one-third of all the Class A common stock initially
issued with the privilege of purchasing one-third of any future
offerings. As the Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation is repre-
sented on the Board of Directors of both the Corporation and the
I.knagement Company, it is apparent that there is considerable
interlocking of directorates.
Both classes of stock have voting rights, but Class B, in
the election of Directors, has 3 votes for each share held,
thereby giving the management control. Class A stock is
entitled to 45gf per share in 19 29 and 60^ per share annually
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thereafter, with the right to 85% of all additional dividends.
Class B stock receives the remaining 15%. Annual dividends
need not be declared only to the extent of one-fifth of the
earnings in excess of 60^ per share on the Class A Common
Stock. The offering price per share was $21 7/8. In case of
dissolution, Class A stock is to receive $20 per share together
with unpaid non-cumulative dividends for the year then current
and 85% of all additional assets.
Insuranshares Management Company receives as compensation
for its services only the earnings obtained from its ownership
of the Class B common stock. The Trust offers as reasons for
issuing two classes of stock, first, that the management is
forced to prove its ability if it is to receive any compensa-
tion for itself; second, that the holdings of the public are
thus assured of greater earnings. The practice is not looked
upon with favor by some authorities because it is possible for
the management to contribute but little to the enterprise, and,
having nothing to lose, it may "play big," hoping to win. In
the event of a loss, the investor stands the consequences. In
this case, however, the shares were paid for in cash by the
Management Company.
By the articles of Incorporation, the investment of the
Assets is limited as follows:
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1. "Not more than 10% in the stock of any insurance
company, domestic or foreign.
2. "Not more than 20% in the stocks of foreign insurance
companies not licensed to do business in at least five states
of the United States or in Canada.
3. "Not more than 10% in the stock of any bank or trust
company, domestic or foreign, which must have at least
$500,000 paid in capital and equal or greater surplus and un-
divided profits.
4. "Not more than 20% in the securities of any corpora-
tion, syndicate, association or trust engaged in a type of
business similar to this corporation, except Insuranshares
Trust Certificates.
5. "Not more than 20% in any one foreign country and no
investment in securities involving unlimited liability,"
The following is a summary as of September 50, 1929
of the percentage of the investment in each type of security
to the total amount invested at cost: *
Group Percentage
Banks and Trust Companies 17.8%
Life Insurance Companies 15.6%
Casualty Insurance Companies 25.2%
Fire Insurance Companies 36.9%
Foreign Insurance Companies .4%
Railroads .3%
Miscellaneous 3.8%
Well-balanced diversification is claimed in that
insurance companies are themselves quasi -investment trusts,
frequently having hundredsof investments distributed among
all kinds of industries, national and international, and
including government, state, county, and municipal bonds.
The fact that these various insurance companies write
Report to stockholders, October 8, 1929
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policies for a great many different people in all kinds of
business and all over the country relieves them of being
dependent on any one type of industry or any one section
of the country. As to bank stocks, they, too, depend upon
the prosperity of the country as a whole rather than upon
any particular type of industry.
As the corporation was organized in March 1929, it has
paid no dividends to date. In a letter sent to stockholders
October 8, 1929, the net earnings on Class A stock for the
first five months was given as ,38 or ,91 on an annual basis,
and ,58 on September 30, 1929, or 1,16 on an annual basis.
Unrealized appreciation on the portfolio at the same time
amounted to $1,244,000,00 approximately. After all deductions
and provisions for taxes were made, the letter stated that
this would amount to an additional $1,24 for the half year
period on each share of the Class A common stock of which
there are 750,000 shares outstanding.
Provision is made that dividends will be paid, only
provided that they are earned, at a fair rate of return to
stockholders. The Corporation, moreover, follows the prac-
tice of setting up reserves and surplus. An initial paid-in
surplus of $5. per share was required at the time of organ-
ization. Provision is also made that an amount up to four-
fifths of earned profits may be set aside to be invested and
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reinvested in the interest of the stockholders.
In conclusion, it appears that all of the affiliated in-
vestment trust activities of the Insuranshares Corporation
are well organized and managed. The drawback undoubtedly is
that the cost of management and the expense of statistical
and research work will probably leave but a small amount to
be distributed among the stockholders. In the case of Insur-
an shares Certificates Incorporated, the Management Company
is to receive "15$ of all net earnings after payment of all
charges and after payment or setting aside for payment of
v)150,000. quarterly on the common stock of the corporation."*
As the stock is now listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change, it will be obliged to conform to the best practices.
The outlook for both Trusts is promising. They offer a
satisfactory investment which should not fluctuate greatly
with changing economic conditions.
*Insuranshares Corporation and its Affiliated Investment
Trust Activities, pamphlet, page 21
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THE PHILADELPHIA JOINT STOCK TRUST
The Philadelphia Joint Stock Trust was organised by
Brooke, Stokes & Co., bankers, members of the Philadelphia
Stock Exchange, with the Girard Trust Company as trustee. The
investment trust agreement of Lay 1, 1926 permits of investment
primarily in the shares of stock of Joint Stock Land Banks,
although for a temporary period funds may be invested in bonds
of Joint Stock Land Banks and bonds of the United States
Government. In so far as can be ascertained, this is the only
investment trust specializing in the securities of Joint Stock
Land Banks.
Certificates of a par value of §100.00 may be issued in
any quantity. A unique provision is made, however, that in the
event that the Trust is not able to invest all of its funds and
has too much cash on hand, certificates are callable for redemp
tion to the extent of the amount of the uninvested cash in the
hands of the Trustee. Thirty days' notice, however, specifying
the redemption price, must be given shareholders.
Many estates trusts exist for twenty-one years after the
death of the last survivor, or until a year stipulated, but
this trust may be liquidated at any time that the managers,
Brooke, Stokes & Co. deem it for the best interest of all con-
cerned.
The managers are given broad powers and may select the
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stocks constituting the portfolio and at their discretion
direct the Trustee to sell or exchange any securities. They
may sell back to the trust estate, at the market value,
securities which they own individually. For services rendered
to the Trust, the managers are entitled to a commission not to
exceed 5$ of the net income. The latter item is held to in-
clude both interest and dividends received by the Trust as well
as all profits—minus losses—incurred by selling securities.
In addition, a commission of Vfo is charged for selling and
purchasing securities.
The Trust claims an advantage in that it is able to pur-
chase blocks of stock at a price below the open market by deal-
ing direct with the Joint Stock Land Banks. The yield obtain-
able, it states, is better than that which can be secured on
the stocks of national banks and trust companies.
The investor must consider that double liability is
attached to Joint Stock Land Banks, as to all other bank stocks.
The Trust would be responsible for any assessment on stock up
to the par value of the shares. While some Joint Stock Land
Banks have been conservatively managed, a number of the smaller
ones, with unusual overhead expenses, have had a poor record.
Evidently this Trust is one of the few that has made no
appeal to the American public. In a letter to the writer dated
January 15, 1950, the statement is made that "only a comparatively.
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few shares of the Philadelphia Joint Stock Trust certificates
have been distributed and there is little or no market for them."
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UNITED STATES SHARES GROUP
The United States Shares Group, under management of the
United States Shares Corporation, consists of ten separate in-
vestment trusts of the limited management type. The object of
the founders was to attract all classes of investors by means of
these different units representing several types of holdings.
Certificates may be purchased in denominations of five shares
and multiples thereof. Series A and Series A-l are made up of
common stocks; Series C-l, C-2, and C-3 and Series D consist of
Bank Stock Shares; Series F, Insurance Stock Shares, Series II,
mostly of Standard Oil Stocks. These were offered to the public
as follows:
Series Initial '
Offering
Price
Offered
Initially
Price
Sept. 1,
1928
Bid
Jan. 6, 1930
A May. 1927 12 1/2 15 3/4 13 1/2
A-l Jan. ,1928 12 16 13 5/8
C-l May, 1927 22 38 3/8 35 3/4
C-2 May, 19 27 22 39 3/8 37
C-3 I ar. ,1928 20 5/8 34 3/4
( June
)
20 3/4
F Mar*. 1929 25 26 16 1/4
H lay, 1929 15 15 5/8 not listed
In the case of Series A and A-l, the trust claims that it
sold many of the underlying securities that had appreciated in
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value and held the profits obtained in the form of cash. As
a result of this conservative practice, the prices of Series A,
according to figures prepared by the Management, dropped 9.3%,
while Series A-l dropped only 4.6% from October 1 to Novem-
ber 15, 1929. This was in contrast with a decline of 33.4% as
shown by the Dow-Jones average of 20 industrial stocks. Accord-
ing to the above chart, the investor who bought at the initial
offering price and held until Jan. 6, 1930 broke about even.
Not as good results were shown for Series C-l, C-2, 0-3,
Bank Stock Trust Shares, which declined on an average about 34%
against an average drop of 45#9$ for 25 leading New York Bank
stocks which were used by the United States Shares Corporation
for daily comparison purposes. Nevertheless, according to the
above chart only Unit 0-2 fell any below the offering price, and
that but 11/4 points.
Series F, Insurance Stock Trust Shares, fell 28.6% as
against an average decline of 36.8;' of 52 leading insurance com-
panies the data for the later being kept by the United States
Shares Corporation for the purpose of making daily comparisons.
This Series did fall off considerably from asking price, however,
according to the above chart.
Series H, Key Industry Trust Shares, did exceptionally well,
it is claimed, dropping 10.2% against a decline of 26.1% of 16
selected oil stocks, the latter decline being that given by
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Standard Statistic Corporations Index.
Recently, Series A-2 has been added to the group. It is
intended to embody a new idea in the unit type of investment
trust. There is nothing particularly unusual about the plan
except that it attempts to combine the features of both specu-
lation and investment. Series A-2 will be made up of three
funds, "unit", "collateral", and "reserve". The unit idea is
similar to that employed in the case of Series A-l, except that
instead of 100 common stocks, only 50 are included.
About one-half of the entire fund will, as a rule, be in-
vested in common stocks, .although provision is made in the in-
denture that as little as 15$ of the entire value of the trust
may be so invested. Cash or variable amounts of junior or senior
securities "in which each shareholder has a direct proportionate
interest" constitute the collateral fund. The market profits
from these two funds will make up the reserve fund. The idea is
to stablize the minimum income and maintain dividends during
periods when market conditions may not be favorable. Of course,
to do this it is necessary that the management be alert to take
advantage of every situation.
Accordingly, the management is given full power to sell and
substitute one stock for another as it deems advisable. Compen-
sation is payable semi-annually to the Corporation "limited to
1/10 of the appreciation, payable only out of 1.10 of the market
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profits realized during the preceding six months but not less
than 1/4 of 1?j of the capital value as defined by the indenture."
It is the policy of the trust to keep the owners of shares
informed by means of reports and through "The Shareholder", a
pamphlet published regularly by the United States Shares Corpora-
tion. The underlying securities representing each unit are
published together with the number of shares.
Provided the trust is able to maintain a staff of investment
specialists capable of taking care of so many different types of
stocks, the plan of the United States Shares Corporation is sat-
isfactory. The company has met with some adverse criticism, but
changes in its policy have already placed it in a more favorable
light. The usual conversion and cash redemption privileges are
granted, and the market for the shares is quoted daily in the
metropolitan papers under the heading "Investment Trusts".
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Bond Investment Trusts
i
BOND INVESTMENT TRUST
The purpose of the Bond Investment Trust is "to provide
a form of investment which encourages thrift and allows a sub-
scriber for a large or small amount to secure the advantages
of high grade securities, responsibility of competent manage-
ment, and strength of investment provided by diversity"* The
Trust was organized under the auspices of Harris, Forbes &
Company, Inc., Boston, Massachusetts, depositary, and three of
the five Trustees are, or have been, officers of this house.
The Bond Investment Trust is of the fund-participation
type and certificates of "beneficial interest" are issued in
denominations of $100.00 and multiples thereof. These certi-
ficates are non-assessable and may be transferred at the office
of the depositary. Up to the present time, interest has been
paid on certificates at the rate of As the Massachusetts
Income Tax on the underlying bonds is paid by the Trust, certi-
ficate holders residing in Massachusetts are exempt from pay-
ment on dividends received, although they must pay the Federal
Income Tax.
The Trustees are given broad powers. They may invest and
reinvest at their discretion "as if absolute owners of the
Trust Fund." Power is given them to borrow money at any time
and "to pledge, as collateral security for such loan, any
personal property belonging to the Trust Fund provided, however
,
*Declaration of Trust, page 1
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that no loan shall be contracted for, so that the aggregate
amount of such loans outstanding shall at such time exceed, in
the judgment of the Trustees, twenty-five per cent of the total
amount of the personal property of the Trust Fund." *
The Trustees are permitted to decide what charges and
expenses shall be made to income and what shall be regarded as
capital. They may set aside income not to be distributed in a
Surplus Fund. Trustees may assign their powers to any other
Trustee or Trustees for a period of six months, if they desire,
although it is provided in the Declaration of Trust that there
must always be at least three Trustees represented.
At the present time, the Trustees are serving without
compensation, although provision is made that this may be 5$,
but not more, of the gross income.
The underlying securities, as of April, 1929, consisted of
bonds of every description including first mortgage, first and
refunding mortgage, sinking fund, gold debentures, gold notes,
and innumberable other types. These securities represent a
great many corporations, states, cities, and governments both
at home and abroad. Host of these bonds showed a yield of 5;"
to 7 1/2$. The total par value of all investments in April
was £;2, 416, 000 , not more than 2 1/4$ of which was invested in
any one security.
*Declaration of Trust, page 3
-101-

In a letter from the Secretary & Treasurer, Robert S.
Weeks, to the writer, January 10, 1930, the statement is made,
"As all of the funds of the Bond Investment Trust are invested
in Bonds, the recent stock market break of course had no bad
effect, in fact, it had an improving effect as bond prices have
been rising for the last month or more. The Bond Investment
Trust has no appeal whatever to the speculator."
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ISECURITY NATIONAL BOND INVESTMENT TRUST
Security National Bond Investment Trust was created by
the Security National Bank of St. Louis in 1927 as a mutual
investment plan, "each investor receiving an undivided bene-
ficial interest in the fund." * The policy of the house
appears to be most conservative. Investments are restricted
to bonds and first mortgage real estate loans. The Trust
emphasizes the fact that it does not permit investment in
common or preferred stock at any time.
Safety of principal is its first consideration and a fair
return, its second. In its literature, the Trust states in
plain, straightforward language "Your return may be as low as
3 1/2$, but it may be as high as 5$ or 5 1/2$. " ** There is
no promise of anything more than the ordinary savings bank
offers.
Appeal is made to several classes of people. Those who
have large sums to invest may buy twenty shares or more at
the market value which may be over or under $50.00, the price
of the shares of the original issue. The investor who wishes
may make regular monthly payments, ranging upward from a
minimum of $50.00 per month. Subscription, however, must be
for a minimum of twenty shares, totalling $1000. The monthly
payments are made against this amount with a charge for sltlj
unpaid balances. Net earnings are distributed semi-annually
*The Security National Bond Investment Trust, pamphlet, page 1
**Loc.cit., page 8
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ci c dividends and may be applied against unpaid "balances. This
installment arrangement is held out to the investor of moderate
means, but from the foregoing regulations, it seems that invest-
ment is prohibited to the average person.
Withdrawal from the trust is simple. The shareholder
receives his share value less a small charge of one-half of one
per cent. These charges are turned over to the Trust rather
than the Bank as trustee so that the shareholders eventually
receive the benefit derived from the charge collected from those
who withdraw.
The Bank makes all the investments as trustee. It charges
for its services as trustee one-half of one per cent per annum
on the value of the fund. Although closely associated with the
Bank, Security National Bond Investment Trust claims that it
keeps all assets belonging to Trust separate from those of the
Bank. This provision is necessary in order to refute certain
objectionable practices which have been made possible through
the affiliation of an investment organization with a bank.
With no appeal of appreciation, this trust offers little
to the investor except an increase in principal due to the -
compounding of interest. Under good management it is possible
that the dividends would be somewhat higher than those of an
average bank because all earnings are distributed to the share-
holders except the small charge of the Security National Bank
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for its services. The overhead is small as the Trust benefits
from the established organization previously created as the
Bank.
This investment trust is only one of a number of similar
nature that have been developed by local banks to take care of
the surplus funds of their respective communities. Many of
these, however, have dealt in securities of all kinds rather
than specializing in bonds only.
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Common Stock Investment Trusts

INCORPORATED INVESTORS
Incorporated Investors was organized in 1925 as a "union
of investors". The corporation grew out of a number of trust
accounts managed for private individuals who later combined
these various funds. After a year's time, the public was given
an opportunity to participate.
Capital is now raised through the sale of shares, there
being but one kind issued, voting trust certificates. The
number of these outstanding has increased from 10,000 to over
671,000 shares. As soon as there is a demand, additional
shares are sold. These are "fully participating both as to
assets and earnings", but they do not give the investor the
right to vote. Instead, a voting trust, made up of five members
of the Board of Directors, has control with the intent of in-
suring continuity of management until 1940.
Capital is invested primarily in common stocks selected
from an approved, published list. Emphasis is placed on "large,
low-cost producing corporations" whose management has proven
its ability. Bonds and call loans my be invested in tempora-
rily at the discretion of the management. The usual policy of
the Trust, however, is to restrict its portfolio to about 31
different companies, investing only 5$ in any one concern. This
is similar to the practice followed by the State Street Trust
Corporation but unlike that of the Iassachusetts Investors Trust
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Which has about 232 stocks on its list.
It is the policy of the Trust to keep the management fees
at a minimum, a fixed charge of l/8r/; being deducted for this
service. This fee is based on the principal after adding to it
profits derived from stock dividends, rights, or the sale of
securities. The organizers, it is claimed, do not absorb the
major part of the profits as frequently is the case with trusts
of more complex structure.
Substantial reserves are built up, capital gains acquired
from the "increased market value of the assets of the trust,
stock dividends, stock purchase rights, and profit from the
sale of securities" are held as such and not distributed as
dividends.
According to the reports of the Trust, the number of share-
holders in the last quarter of 1929 showed a decided increase
over the preceding three months. The individual owners of
shares as of September 30, 1929 was 9,824 in comparison with
12,745 about the middle of December, 1929.
In its publication, "The Incorporated Investor", the
statement is made the Trust T s stock declined 53% during the
recent market break, while tv^enty-five of the leading American
investment trusts declined as a group 66^ on an average from
their high prices.
In January, 19 26 shares' sold for 100. The recent
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equivalent low was 145. The increase in capital value is
estimated to be from CplOO.OO in 1926 to C180.00 in December,
1929, representing an average increase of about 20'.' annually
according to the figures of the Trust.
As a rule, fund participations such as Incorporated In-
vestors are non-transferable, the only method of disposing
of them being to turn them back to the corporation issuing
them. Incorporated Investors 1 shares are, however, trans-
ferable; they are also non-assessable. The treasurer is
authorized to purchase any shares offered, paying the liquida-
ting value for them less 2$. The market value, accordingly,
hovers around the liquidating value, varying with the market
value of the securities making up the portfolio.
In August, 1929, the asked price fluctuated around 80.
On October 29, 1929, it fell to 60 1/2, while in January, 1930,
it fell around 50. An extra dividend of 10^ a share was paid
in December, 1929, and the usual dividend was paid on Janu-
ary 15, 1930.
The intent of the Trust, it is claimed, it is keep the
investor well informed at all times, but with the management
permitted to make substitutions in the portfolio, the investor
cannot follow the holdings very closely, quarterly financial
statements are distributed and a news sheet, "The Incorporated
Investor", is published by the Parker Corporation.
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INLAND DjVESTOggj INC.
Inland Investors, Inc., Cleveland, Ohio, one of the smaller
fund-participation trusts was founded in June, 1927, under the
general corporation laws of the State of Delaware. It claims,
as so many other American trusts, to be organized according to
the British plan, yet as to structure, it does not follow the
usual British practice, in that it issues but one class of stock.
Furthermore, it restricts investments, as do most American trusts,
to the stocks of corporations in the United States and Canada,
rather than following an international policy as the British
trusts do. Neither does it adhere to the usual British practice
of giving the managers a fixed salary. Instead, 5$ of the annual
net profits of the Company is paid to the Board of Directors.
However, it does adopt the British idea of ploughing back
earnings. The by-laws provide for a reserve to the extent of
one-tenth of the net profits of the preceding half year until
a fund is accumulated equal to 20$ of the paid-in capital of the
corporation. Again, as is the British custom, the by-laws per-
mit of borrowing, in this instance, to an amount "not exceeding
in the aggregate 40 cp of its assets at the time such indebtedness
is incurred." I.'any American trusts do not permit the borrowing
of money, particularly those dealing in common stocks only
because of the unstability of their income. At the present time,
however, this Company has no loans.
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The investment restrictions permit the funds of the trust
to be invested chiefly in common stocks with the provisions that
these shall be stocks of strong companies which have been in
business at least three years and are on a dividend-paying basis.
Diversification is effected in that 10% of capital and surplus
is the maximum amount of capital that may be invested in any one
corporation, and 25% is the limit for any one particular line of
industry. Also, provision is made that the trust shall not
endeavor to gain control over any other business in that the
trust is prohibited to own more than 12 1/2% of the stock of any
one corporation. As of December 31, 1928, this trust had in-
cluded in its investment list the names of a number of companies
which are not of the gilt-edge variety and which appear in prac-
tically no other lists, as for instance, The Sherwin-Williams Co.,
The Ohio Brass Company, The Kelly Island Lime and Transport Co.,
The Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company.
Dividends payable quarterly were declared during 1928 at the
annual rate of $2.20 per share. Earnings per share for the six
months ending June 29, 1929, amounted to 8.18$ on invested
capital. This was exclusive of unrealized appreciation, the
trust following the conservative and better practice of figuring
its marketable securities at cost.
At the close of business December 31, 1927, and also
December 31, 19 28, very little cash on hand was shown, '152.98
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and 098,93 respectively, most of the funds "being in call loans.
As of June 29, 1929, cash had been increased to 082,158,95 and
call loans reduced about one-half. The total assets increased
from 02,059,039,55 to 05,762,276.29 in a period of one and one-
half years. The profits earned in during the same period
increased from 052,769,99 to #484,274.44 which appears to be an
excellent record. On the other hand, the income from dividends
and interest is lumped with the profit on the sale of securities,
making it difficult to determine the amount considered as capital
gain.
According to a report issued on November 14, 1929, the net
earnings for the first ten months of the year were 08.14 per
share, or 16,'. Paper losses on its portfolio of securities cost-
ing approximately $6,000,000.00 were 076,710. The Trust invests
in stocks, for the most part, which do not cost more than ten
times their annual earnings. The yield, however, on most of
these investments is small, averaging around 5$.
The policies of the trust seem to be conservative. Since
the market recession the President of the Company has informed
stockholders that the stocks did not share in the extreme market
advances that preceded the break nor in the unusual recessions
that followed.
Although Inland Investors, Inc. publishes quarterly and annual
reports to stockholders, very little advertising is attempted.
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IRVING INVESTORS MANAGEMENT COMPARE, INC
,
Irving Investors Management Company'', Incorporated, the
recent successor to Investment Managers Company which was
organized in 1924, is a corporation formed to manage two
Investment Trust Funds, A and B, each serving a distinct
purpose. To quote from literature of the Trust:
M0ne Fund, Investment Trust Fund A
,
provides for quarterly distributions at the rate of 5$ per
annum on the amount subscribed by each investor, plus an
annual distribution of 12 X/Zfo of his proportionate part of
the net income earned in excess of such 5 cf? t the balance of
income being reinvested, thus tending to increase the value
of his participation,
"The other Fund, Investment Trust Fund 3
,
is accumulative—that is, all income realized by the Fund is
compounded through reinvestment and is thus reflected in an
increasing value for participations.
"Fund A, therefore, provides current distributions and
also a prospect of increasing principal, while Fund B offers
an opportunity to accumulate capital through reinvestment of
all income." *
Like many of the trusts of the limited management type
created under a trust indenture and issuing but a single class
of participation, certain definite investment restrictions are
stipulated. The Company claims that the indenture includes
"carefully drawn provisions designed to protect the investors
interests." These prevent borrowing in any form for the
accounts of the Fund. They stress wide diversification in
that limitations are imposed as to the proportions of the Fund
that may be invested in any one industry or in any one
*Irving Investors Management Company, pamphlet, page 2.
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Corporation, They furthermore require that all participants,
including directors or any other persons connected with the
Corporation, subscribe for shares on exactly the same terms.
As of December 31, 1928, Investment Trust Fund A
possessed underlying securities comprising 305,600 shares of
nine railroads (3,800 shares of which was preferred stock, the
remainder being common) 19,012 common shares of five different
light, heat and po?;er companies; 6,800 shares of two mining
companies; 34,100 shares of the stocks of ten other companies,
3,400 shares of these being preferred. The stock value of
these securities owned totalled, at that date, $7,518,495.68,
while the market value was $8,898,725.
Trust Fund B, the smaller Fund appealing to those who are
investing to build for the future, allows dividends to accumu-
late. As of September 30, 1929, the portfolio consisted of
4,600 shares of five railroads (2,100 cumulated preferred and
the remainder common); 3,900 shares of four food companies;
5,600 shares of three mining companies; 1,407 shares of three,
light, heat and power companies; 2,000 shares of four chemical
companies; 1,500 shares of two oil companies; 6,753 shares of
seven other corporations. The market value of these totalled
$2,199,715. in comparison with a book value of 02,013,816.67,
showing unrealized profit on securities owned as $185,898.33.
From September 30, 19 28 to the same date a year later, there
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had been considerable shifting of securities to attain greater
diversification of risk as well as safety of principal. As of
1928, no mining oil, or chemical concerns were included.
It is a practice of the Trust to keep a large part of its
funds in call loans. In fact, in the case of Trust Fund A,
at the close of business in December, 1928, call loans and
cash exceeded the value at cost of securities owned by almost
one million dollars. Trust Fund B, at the end of September,
1929, was in practically the same position regarding call loans
and cash.
Evidently the wisdom of such a policy manifested itself
at the time of the spectacular market crash of the fall of
1929. In a letter to the writer, November 4, 1929,
Mr, Douglas T. Newbold, Secretary, wrote:
"The primary object in the management of these two Trust
Funds is to protect established values rather than to seek
speculative gains. To that end, a part of each Fund is main-
tained in fixed obligations, (i.e. cash, call loans, etc.)
and a part in equities, the proportions of each of these
classifications being altered to conform to the management's
appraisal of current conditions. You will also note from out
material that the Indentures governing the respective Funds
permit of complete freedom to invest in bonds."
Like most fund participations, certificates are issued
constantly to meet the demand for them. They may be redeemed,
less stipulated charges, only by presenting them at the office
of the Corporation or by assigning them to a bank or other
agent to facilitate the collection of the proceeds. Although
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non-transferable, Series A and B are interchangeable.
Instead of being issued at no par value or for :.;100., as
are most fund participations, the certificates of the Irving
Investors Management Company, Inc., must be subscribed for
in multiples of $1,000., in the case of Trust Fund A, and for
multiples of $100., in the case of Trust Fund B. The minimum
face value of Trust Fund A certificates is $10,000, represent-
ing 10 shares at $1,000. a share, while that of Trust Fund B
is vl,000., representing 10 shares at $100. a share. As so
large an initial outlay is required, this Trust naturally
makes no appeal to the small investor. It rather offers a
medium of investment for institutions or corporations and
investors of means.
The Corporation follows a policy of wide publicity. It
issues annually and quarterly statements and, in addition,
individual statements of income to each holder of a certifi-
cate. The figures included in the latter statement are of
assistance to the investor in preparing his Federal Income
Tax returns.
The Trust aims to give the investor the protection of
the fixed type of unit trust combined with the benefits of
effective, continuous, impartial, supervision and management
of his investment. It states that compensation of the
management is from three sources only as follows:
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"(a) 1$ of the face value of Certificates when issued, to
be paid by the subscriber in addition to the amount of his
subscription,
" (b) 1/4 of Vfo quarterly on the actual value (determined
as provided in the Investment Trust Indenture) of the Invest-
ment Fund on the last day of each quarter,
"(c) Vfi on the actual value (determined as provided in
the Investment Trust Indenture) of Certificates as of the
date as of which they may be redeemed, unless redemption be
at the option of the Company." *
As the Trust is sponsored by the Irving Trust Company,
New York, which has national and international connections,
able and responsible backing offers added attraction and
protection. The President of Irving Investors Management
Company, Inc., is Edgar Lawrence, the well-known economist
and the author of "Common Stocks as Long Term Investments".
*Irving Investors Management Company, Inc., pamphlet entitled
"Investment Trust Certificates, Series A", page 3
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LASSACIiUSETTS INVESTORS TRUST
The Llassachusetts Investors Trust, a common law trust,
was organized in I.Iarch, 1924 as a "True Mutual Investment
Association." In the annual report for the year ending Decem-
ber 31, 1928, the following statements appear.
"Unlike some investment trusts, there are no bondholders
or preferred stockholders having prior rights in case of
liquidation and prior calls on earnings, nor are there any
management shares, bonus stock, options on stock, etc., as
in the case of some investment trusts* As the value of our
assets increases, the entire benefit will inure to the share-
holders."
In September, 1929, the Trusts portfolio consisted of
over one hundred forty common stocks, including those of bank
and insurance companies, railroads and equipments, public
utilities, industrial companies and miscellaneous* After pur-
chase, stocks are deposited with the State Street Trust Com-
pany as custodian and certificates which represent a part
interest in each of the securities held are issued to the inves
tors. Originally shares were issued with a par value of $50.00
but in 1928, two shares of no par stock were given in exchange
for one share of the old stock.
The management of the Trust consists of four trustees.
As they possess broad powers, they are expected to be both
conservative and far-sighted in their policies and not only
to watch the companies in which funds are invested, but to be
prepared to make changes and substitutions at the proper time
.
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They are, however, limited in the investment and reinvestment
of capital to an approved list of common stocks, although pro-
vision is made for purchasing bonds, mortgages, and other ne-
gotiable securities, both foreign and domestic, if necessary.
Five per cent of the funds of the Trust is the greatest amount
that can be invested in any one company. A further restric-
tion prohibits the trustees from using the funds of the Trust
in any undertaking involving "promotion, business management,
or underwriting". They are given no authority to borrow money
or contract debts. However, neither shareholders or trustees
are personally liable and legal action must be brought against
the Trust estate only.
Trustees are paid from the trust estate or the current in-
come thereof "at the rates generally current for such services
in Boston, Massachusetts, based upon the value and nature of
the services rendered by such Trustees."* This is an indefi-
nite arrangement depending upon the honesty of the management
to fix a fair rate of compensation.
The Trust claims that it avoids unsound practices; for
instance, it does not create fictitious values in the selling
price of its shares but bases the price on the asset value of
all the securities in its portfolio. It distinguishes between
profits derived from the sale of its holdings and regular in-
vestment income secured from cash dividends. It adheres to
*Agreement and Declaration of Trust, Article IV, Section I,
page 11
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the policy of accumulating reserves so as to be able to pay
the regular quarterly dividends in poor years as well as in
good. Dividends are based on the gross earnings of the Trust
fund, disregarding, however, capital gains which include stock
dividends and "split-ups" . The management, if it desires, may
declare special dividends from surplus as was done in 1928.
The Trust has paid dividends of about $3.00 per share.
On no par stock during 1929 these were as follows:
January 500 cash and one share stock for each
100 shares
April 450 cash
July 52^ cash and one share stock for each
100 shares
October 450 cash
On January 8, 1930, the same dividend as for July, 1929
was declared. This was of assistance in retaining public
confidence.
As of September 30, 1929, the Trust had assets valued at
$17,628,634.41 with cash paid in amounting to $11,488,371.02.
Included in these assets was $2,146,502.66 in cash and call
loans. In a letter to shareholders following the stock market
break, the following statement was made; "Massachusetts
Investors Trust is built to endure. A reading of the list
of powerful companies whose stocks are owned will convince you
that M.I.T shares, whatever 'The Market* does, are going to
increase in value and earning power from year to year."
The low of the shares of the Trust on September 50, 1929
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was 52 3/4. During the erratic market which followed, they
receded about eight points. In January, 1950, they were quoted
around 43. Since the Trust is not speculative in character,
there is every reason to believe that these shares will show a
normal advance in the future.
The Trust is now making an appeal to all classes of in-
vestors. The number of shareholders has increased from a very
few with paid in capital of $50,000. in July, 1924 to over
3200 at the present time. The M. I. T. Savings Club is an
arrangement under which a group of officers and employees in
a business may band their weekly or monthly savings together
for investment in the shares of the Trust. The four "Reinvest-
ment Associates" groups represent a plan whereby quarterly
dividends are reinvested in additional Trust shares. The
public is also offered Travel, Retirement, and Children's
Educational Funds.
Considerable advertising of a commendable type is used
by the Trust. Once a week a broadcast has been made from
WEEI, Boston, The expenses for this are paid by Slayton-
Learoyd, Inc., distributors of the M. I. T. shares.
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STATS STREET IITYESTI.ICHT CORPORATION
The State Street Investment Corporation, formed in 1924
under the laws of Massachusetts, was for two years conducted
as a private corporation "to test out various individual ideas,
and at the same time give the management an opportunity to
study the problems and difficulties encountered in the actual
operation of such a company."*
For the past two years or so, however, the Corporation
has been selling shares to the public and the number of share-
holders has increased from 3 to 280, while the number of shares
outstanding has grown from 4,000 in August, 1924 to 63,186 as
of December 31, 1928. The paid in capital, vl00,000 originally
subscribed by the officers of the Trust, at the close of 1928
stood at $6,619,820, while the net worth of the business was
almost twice that figure.
The State Street Investment Corporation favors highly con-
centrated control in the management. It has issued two classes
of common stock, Class A, the voting stock which is closely
held by the officers, and Class B, held by the public. This is
not in keeping with the theory advocated by many trusts which
feature the voting privilege for all shareholders. This Trust
believes that skilled and honest management—for which the in-
vestor pays a small fee—is better able to handle the situation
than a number of inexperienced stockholders with a great variety
*Fifth Annual Report, for the year ending December 31, 1928
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of ideas.
In direct contrast with most trusts, the State Street
Investment Corporation holds that too "broad diversification of
the portfolio should be avoided, stating that it is "a sub-
stitution of the law of averages for manager ability." In-
stead, it stresses what it terms "reasonable" and "sensible
diversification. It disapproves of profits for insiders derived
by means of giving the organizers stock or charging them less
than the shareholders. It objects to a trust basing management
charges upon total funds over which the managers exercise con-
trol, instead of basing them on actual net worth. Furthermore,
it considers it an unfair practice for a trust to charge com-
missions on the sale of its own securities.
The Trust limits its investments for the most part to the
common stocks of about twenty-six companies. In making this
selection it uses as a guide the following considerations:
(1) "The study of general conditions with a view of determin-
ing the time and type of security to be purchased; (2) A study
of the various industries with particular stress on those which
appear to offer the greatest possibilities of profitable expan-
sion over a period of years; (5) An extensive study of the most
promising individual companies."* In order to secure direct con-
tact with the management of the concerns represented in the
underlying securities of the Trust, the officers make personal
visits. It is felt that this is an important supplement to
*Fifth Annual report, page 12
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-statistical studies and analyses.
According to a chart prepared by the Trust which compares
its liquidating value with that of the Dow-Jones Company's
average, "the average annual appreciation of the liquidating
value of the State Street Investment Corporation shares has
amounted to approximately 59$ as against 28% for the Dow-Jones
average,"* After the market break the decline was 9$ as com-
pared with 17,2$ for the Dow-Jones average.
The net worth of shares outstanding increased from $70,00
at the time of organization in August, 1924 to $193.09 in
December, 1929, The liquidating value at the time of organiza-
tion was $25*00 per share. On January 2, 1929 it was $95,75
as against $87,14 for January 2, 1930, a decline, as above
stated, of approximately 9%. Shares were offered to the public
in 1924 at $25,00 per share. The recent quotations in January,
1950 were bid, 98 as against 126 in December and 133 in October,
1929 before the break.
The Trust feels that a "selected list of equities forms
the best medium of investment from the point of view of securi-
ty of principal, income return and capital appreciation", and
states that an average of 10fo can be made by following such a
policy. For the year 1928, net gain from the sale of securi-
ties less interest paid, amounted to $1,672,993,03, showing
that a considerable part of earnings wa s derived from the sale
*Fifth Annual Report, page 5
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of stocks which had appreciated. Dividends, Interest, and
other similar receipts amounted to less than 10f' of this amount.
During December, 1929, the Corporation borroY/ed approxi-
mately $5 j 000, 000 to be used with the cash on hand in purchas-
ing common stocks. These were bought at what later proved to
be higher prices than the subsequent lows. Accordingly, when
prices recovered somewhat, a considerable portion of invest-
ments were liquidated so that today (January, 1930) the Trust
has net cash equal to about 5$ of its total funds.
Owing to the market slump, the Trust will probably not be
able to make as good a record in the immediate future, at least
for some time to come, as it has in the past.
In contrast with many of the trusts, no selling campaign
has been conducted by the State Street Investment Corporation,
the intent being to let the good results attract customers.
-124-
1
STERLING SECURITIES CORPORATION
Sterling Securities Corporation, organized in April, 1928,
is an illustration of the general management type of investment
trust dealing in common stocks although by its charter, with
certain restrictions, securities in any field may be purchased.
The Insuranshares Corporation of New York is the distributing
agency and renders management services. This Trust was the
first investment company to be listed on the New York Stock
Exchange
.
As of September 30, 1929, the capitalization of the com-
pany consisted of 300,000 shares of f'3.00 dividend, cumulative
convertible, first preferred stock, par value :;;:50.00; 500,000
shares of $20.00 par-value preferred stock; 600,000 shares of
Class "Aw common stock with no par value; and 297,297 shares of
Class "B" common stock with no par value. The managers have
broad powers with certain restrictions. They can use their
discretion about investing and reinvesting funds. Investment
limitations, however, are as follows:
w (l) Not more than five per cent of the assets of the
Corporation shall be invested in any one stock or other secu-
rity, or in the securities of any one corporation, syndicate,
association, trust, firm or individual, including any subsidi-
ary corporation, syndicate, association, trust, individual,
firm or other organization issuing securities.
"(2) No part of the assets of the corporation shall be
invested in securities involving unlimited liability on the
part of the holders thereof.
-125-
I
"(3) No part of the assets of the Corporation shall be
invested in securities for the purpose of acquiring, control-
ling or carrying on the whole or any part of the business of
any corporation, syndicate, association, trust, individual,
firm or other organization, issuing such securities." *
The compensation of the management consists primarily of
its ownership of the Class "B" Stock which was purchased by
the Founders, Directors, and the Investment Committee, thereby
furnishing funds sufficient to meet all organization expenses.
The cost of statistical and research service and the maintenance
of office, according to the prospectus of the Trust, is less
than 1/2 of l?o. The present Board of Directors of this Corpora-
tion is comprised of a number of men who are well known in the
industrial and financial centers of the United States. They
represent various types of business and have valuable contacts.
The total assets of the Corporation as of September 30,
1929, were $36, 179 , 956. 34 in contrast with the original capital
and surplus of $16,000,000. At this time, a large portion of
the assets, practically one-half, was in cash and call loans
with the idea that the Trust might take advantage of bargains
in securities when available.
The total investments at cost were valued at $790, 303.76
as against a market value of $1,768,822.50. A considerable
part of income has been derived from the sale of securities.
Before the market break, the common stock was selling to the
public at around 50 to 55, approximately one and one -half times
*Insuranshares Corporation and its Affiliated Investment
Trust Activities, page 30
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its liquidating value of August 13. Based either on earnings
or on asset value, this was an excessive price. For January,
its high and low were 13 1/2 and 10 respectively. The cumula-
tive preferred, paying dividends of $5*00 per share, for the
same period, was 39 3/4 high, 36 3/8 low. The preference stock,
paying $1,20, hovered around 12. At the option of Sterling
Securities Corporation, the latter may be redeemed at 0^2.00
per share. Upon dissolution of the company it is entitled to
par, $20.00.
The preferred issues have more attractive possibilities,
but even at present prices, the common stock appears to be
particularly speculative, its future being grounded upon a
subsequent period of favorable market conditions. The fact
that the Trust is listed on the Exchange will prove in its
favor, and the investor will be able to secure adequate informa-
tion regarding its activities and progress.
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DISTRIBUTION ON STOCK UNDERLYING EACH UNIT
OF CORPORATE TRUST SHARES FOR SIX MONTHS ENDING
(December 51, 19 29)
Hjjl bx a Stock Pnl -i -|-_
ua sn Ua Sll L)JlV • it J.
;
',11 <j o UUb 1 O lidl
American R. & S. 5.00 odd . xy
American Tobacco 16.00 p nn AS> PA A A PAD D . OD
dupont 8.00 p nn i n nn1U » uu
Eastman 10.00 a nnD . UU PI P7 ^7 P7
International
Harvestor 5.00 r nnD . UU
Ingersoll Rand 8.00 o nno • uu l a nn-Lb . UU
National Biscuit 12.00 a nnD . uu t p nn_Lo • uu
Otis Elevator 12.00 p nno . uu on nneiU . UU
United Fruit 8.00 o nno.UU
U. S. Steel 14.00 a nnft. UU 18. UU
TToolworth 4.80 oou . JL.L oou ,y±
American Tel.&Tel .18.00 18 . 00
Consolidated Gas 7.00 n a a a
General Electric 8.00 a nnft. UU t o nn±<d , UU
Western Union 16.00 i a nn±o . UU
Westinghouse 8.00 8.00
Atchison 20.00 20.00
Illinois Central 14.00 14.00
Louisville £c Nash. 14. 00 i a. nn-L ft- . UU
New York Central 16.00 22.68 58.68
Penn 8.00 12.46 20.46
So. Pacific 12.00 12.00
Union Pacific 20.00 20.00
Standard Oil Cal. 5.00 4.85 9.85
" Ind. 5.00 1.00 6.00
N.J. 2.00 2.00 4.00
" " N.Y. 5.20 5.20
Texas Corp. 6.00 6.00
Totals 285.00 49.00 4.85 156.52 1,112.50 1,585.47
1,585.47
Interest on Reserve Fund 17 . 65
Total Earnings on Corporate Trust Shares Unit 1,605.12
Earnings per Corporate Trust Shares Unit .8016
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AMERICAN BASIC-BUSINESS SHARES
The shares issued by the American Basic-Business Corpora-
tion represent a fixed trust of the unit type with a rigid
initial list of underlying common stocks. The original series,
Fixed Trust Shares "A" and Fixed Trust Shares "B", are prac-
tically identical in method of operation. These have recently
been supplemented with Basic Industry Shares—organized in 1928
and substantially the same as the first two series—and with
Corporate Trust Shares, organized in 1929.
In determining upon its initial list of securities,
American Basic-Business Shares Corporation studied and analyzed
over eleven hundred corporations before selecting the thirty
companies represented in the original unit. For 1928, accord-
ing to the Corporation, the companies selected had remaining
for common stock 810 out of each dollar of profit. The unit,
originally totalling 132 shares, consisted of 35 shares of 8
railroads; 27 shares of oils, mostly of the Standard Oil
group; 24 shares of public utilities and quasi-utilities ; and
46 shares of 12 industrials.
The intent was to select "chosen leaders in each field",
mostly of national aspect, which had a high rating, Moody
Aa or A. Diversification was met in that the thirty different
organizations represented had more or less direct control over
approximately eight hundred other corporations, participating
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either directly or indirectly in the manufacture or distribu-
tion of some one thousand different products. Besides making
the selection with the idea of diversification in mind the
stocks were carefully balanced. As of June 30, 1929, a dollar
invested in Basic Industry Shares was divided as follows
(June 30, 1929 )
:
"22^ is invested in railroads.
7^ " " " oil producing and distributing com-
panies.
23^ " " " utilities and quasi-utilities.
480 " " " basic industrials."*
\7hen Series A was issued in August, 1927, there was de-
posited with the Trustee the 132 shares of common stock con-
stituting a unit; Ol,000. in cash as a reserve fund to equal-
ize dividends; and $255*35 in cash representing cash dividends
which had been accrued since the purchase of the stock. It
was provided by the Trust Agreement that a reserve fund equal
to $1,000, should be established for each unit, this fund to
be built up to a maximum of $1,500. but only after the payment
of the minimum semi-annual dividend. The minimum dividend of
$1.00 per share is payable 50^ each half year. If, however,
earnings are insufficient to take care of these dividends, the
reserve fund is dravm upon. Dividends in excess of $1*00 per
share are distributed only when the reserve fund is more than
§1.50 per share. The interest earned on the basic $1.00 per
Fixed Trust Share required to be maintained in the reserve fund
*A Partnership in America's Basic Industries, published by
American Basic-Business Shares Corporation, page 6.
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is used to maintain the Trust. Any excess earnings above this
are considered as distributable earnings and credited to the
holder of the shares.
In issuing Series B a maximum of &1.00 per share was set
for the reserve fund, instead of $1.50, thereby giving the
shareholder "extras" as earned. Requirements regarding divi-
dends are the sane as for Series A.
For the 2500 Basic Industry Shares, issued in October, 1928,
a reserve fund of $1,250. was established to equalize dividends.
As each Basic Industry share represents only l/2500th interest
in the deposited unit, a minimum dividend of 50^ per share was
set, payable 25^ per share semi-annually. In the case of this
Series, no interest received on the reserve fund is distributed.
At the close of 19 29, the reserve fund on the original se-
ries reached its maximum of $1.50 P©r share. A small extra
distribution was added to each dividend coupon, the latter being
used as with corporation bonds to represent dividend payments.
In the case of Fixed Trust Shares B and Basic Industry Shares,
it was necessary to withdraw four cents per share from the
reserve fund to meet the semi-annual dividend payment. American
Basic Business Shares Corporation plans to create no more addi-
tional units of the first two series and plans have been arranged
to transfer holdings to Basic Industry Shares. A trading market,
hoy/ever, will be maintained for the outstanding shares. The
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reason for substituting Basic Industry Shares is that in the
case of the first two series the reserve fund is withheld
either in whole or in part from the investor. This has proven
to be a hinderance in selling shares. With Basic Industry
Shares, all of interest is credited to the shareholders. Owing
to splitups, the underlying shares have increased from 132 in
October, 1928, to 166 in December, 1929. Three additional
splitups expected to become effective early in 1930 will
further increase this unit to a total of 191 shares.
Another series, differing in several essentials from any
of the others is Corporate Trust Shares. These represent
participation in practically the same underlying securities,
28 common stocks in this instance. These shares, it is stated,
are an adaptation of a popular French financial practice.
Instead of retaining all shares of stock received in splitups,
some of these are sold and the net proceeds are turned over to
the shareholders. This is termed "liquidating dividends" and
represents a partial return of the investor's principal, or
more strictly speaking, a liquidation of principal appreciation
owing to the fact that splitups usually are made only when the
stock has risen considerably in price.
In 1929, Corporate Trust Shares paid a dividend of §1,965.
of which 70$ was the regular coupon distribution and $1.26, an
extra dividend. This represented approximately 19^ of the par
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value. Furthermore, holders were given the right to reinvest
part of their coupon income in the Corporate Trust shares at
5$ below the current offering price.
Very elaborate data has been prepared over a sixteen-year
period to demonstrate the average market value of the under-
lying stocks, assuming the existence of the Trust over this
length of time. The method of pricing share is also demon-
strated, June 6, 1929 being used for illustrative purposes.
According to the figures prepared, charges are very reasonable,
25^ being assessed each share for issue and deposit and 5$ for
distribution and profit on sales price.
In a letter to the writer of January 11, 1930, Mr .Lawrence W.
Schmidt of the American Basic-Business Shares Corporation stated
that while during the recent market break stock decline, accord-
ing to the Dow Jones average for 1929, published in the Wall
Street Journal, was for industrials, 48$; rails, 33$; 20
utilities, 55$, Corporate Trust Shares, he stated, showed a
decline of but 33$. "This" stated the writer, "is one of the
reasons we believe that f The Investment Trust has found its
place.™ Commenting further, Mr, Schmidt stated: "We believe
the Fixed Trust of the Unit Type such as ours has definitely
found its place in the country* s financial structure and are
considering no change in the policy in the near future."
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DIVERSIFIED TRUSTEE SHARES
(A comparison with 62 listed general management trusts)
Decline
Low to From Year's
19 29 High Nov. 14, 19 29 High
Adams Express 68 3/8 18 50 3/8
Aeronautical Industries 31 1/8 7 24 1/8
Air Investors 20 1/8 3 17 1/8
Alleghany Corporation 56 1/2 17 39 1/2
American, British & Continental
American Equities
22 5/8 5 1/8 17 1/2
33 1/2 15 18 1/2
American Founders 122 7/8 66 56 7/8
American International 96 3/4 29 1/2 67 1/4
American Investors B 42 7/8 6 1/8 36 3/4
American Superpower 71 1/4
3/4
5/8
15 56 1/4
Aviation Securities 49 10 1/8 39 5/8
Blue Ridge 29 3 1/8 26 1/2
Burco, Inc. 17 3/8 7 1/2 9 7/3
Chain Store Stocks 42 1/2 9 33 1/2
Chicago Corp. 73 12 1/2 60 1/2
Continental Shares 78
7/8
33 45
Electric Investors 302 75 227 7/8
Electric Shareholding 66 3 1/8 62 7/8
Financial Investing 30 4 7/8 25 1/8
Fourth National Investors 60 7/8 20 40 7/8
General American Investors 30 1/4 8 7/8 21 3/8
Goldman Sachs Trading 121 1/4 32 89 1/4
Graymur Corp. 68 3/8 23 45 3/8
Guardian Investors 18 1/2 4 14 1/2
Raygart Corp. 82 3/8 27 7/8 54 1/2
Insull Utilities Inv. 160 26 134
Insuranshares of Del. 24 7/8 12 12 7/8
Interstate Equities 25 1/2 12 3/8 13 1/8
Investors Equity 72 1/2 12 1/2 60
Lehman Corporation 136
3/8
63 73
Mayflower Associates 101 47 54 3/8
Letal & Mining, Inc. 23 7/8 5 18 7/8
National Aviation 88 6 1/8 81 7/8
National Investors 64 3/4 10 3/8 54 3/8
Niagara Shares Corp. 74 1/4 12 62 1/4
North American Aviation 19 1/2 5 14 1/2
Qilstocks, Ltd. A
fennroad Corporation
19 1/4 8 1/8 11 1/8
30 15 1/2 14 1/2
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DIVERSIFIED TRUSTEE SHAKES
Emphasizing the importance of common stocks for permanent
or long term holding, Diversified Trustee Shares issued by the
American Trustee Share Corporation was a pioneer in the fixed
investment trust field. Four issues of shares have been made,
namely, Industrial Trust Shares (no longer offered), Diversi-
fied Trustee Shares (Original Series), and Diversified Trustee
Shares, Series B and C,
Diversified Trustee Shares, the original series, is
issued in denominations of 5, 10, 25, 50, 100, 500, 1,000, and
5,000 shares. Each share represents one-thousandth interest
in a unit consisting of the common stock of six railroads, six
public utilities, seven industrials, and five Standard Oil Com-
panies, The original unit of 141 shares, after split up or
exchange of stocks, increased to 214-5 shares by 1929,
Comprising securities from thirty different companies,
Series B is similar in structure to the Original Series except
that the underlying common stocks are not identical. The origi
nal unit has grown in about two years from 128 to 154 shares.
Series C, issued in September, 1929, represents one
four-thousandth interest in a unit of 250 shares of common
stock of fifty companies. The underlying securities are, for
the most part, a combination of those represented in the
Original Series and in Series B, This Series may be issued
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, without limit. Investments are diversified as follows: rails,
22$; public utilities, 24$; industrials, 46$; oils and mines,
In all three Series, the common stock represented is rated
Aa or A by Moody. Over 95$ of the stocks are listed on the New
York Stock Exchange while the remainder are quoted on the Curb.
Substitution is prohibited, although in order to take care of
exchanges due to merger, consolidation, reorganization, sale,
or similar transactions made by the corporations represented,
the Trustee is authorized to exchange deposited stock for new
securities when necessary.
Following the practice of most fixed trusts, management is
reduced to a minimum. The advantages of its absence are claimed
in that expense is lessened and that shares may therefor be
sold on a much more economical basis.
In the Original Series and Series B, dividends are held to
include all cash income received by the Trustee from the under-
lying stocks. Proceeds from the sale of stock dividends, sub-
scription rights, securities, and other property is all dis-
tributed as dividends. With Series C, however, stock dividends
and shares received in split ups must be retained and added to
the unit with the exception of fractional shares or extra shares
in addition to multiples of five which cannot be conveniently
included. The latter are sold and the income is added to the
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dividends. The advantage to be gained by this procedure is
set forth in the prospectus of the Trust as follows: *
"The results of such an investment as is afforded in
Diversified Trustee Shares, Series C, appear from an eight-
year analysis of the market value and income of a Unit, based
on the assumption that shares received in split-ups and stock
dividends had been retained to the extent provided in the
Agreement under which these Shares are issued. Such a Unit
would have had a market value of $34,276 on December 31, 1921,
as against $218,356 on December 31, 1920. Income on the Unit,
assuming that shares or fractions remaining over after the
division by five of the number of shares received with re-
spect to a Unit, together with rights, had been sold and the
proceeds included in dividends, would have totalled $37,035,
or an average of 13.51$ annually on the original investment.
Such income, based on the yield in each year determined with
respect to the market value as of the end of the same year,
would have averaged 7.97$.
"The importance of retaining shares received in split-ups
and stock dividends, as provided in Diversified Trustee Shares,
Series C, is indicated by the fact that had all such shares
been sold and the proceeds included in dividends, the market
value of a Unit as of December 31, 1928, would have boen only
$42,892. Income over the eight-year period would have totalled
v51,569. As against an increase of $14,534 in total income,
the investor would have sacrificed a gain of $175,464 in the
value of his investment."
This idea is the opposite of the plan now being employed
by the American-Basi c Shares Corporation and the Colonial
Investors Shares. Both of these Trusts are planning to put
less into reserve in order to distribute more earnings to
shareholders. It is questionable, however, whether this is a
wise policy.
The December issue of "The Diversified Shareholder", dis-
tributed monthly by the brokers, Throckmorton & Co . f contains
*This discussion assumes that shares had been in existence
since 1921,
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an article to the effect that while the average decline for the
trusts of the general management type was 69$, Trustee Shares,
Series C, showed a decline of but 32$. This, it was claimed,
was far better than expectations and proved the stability of
the fixed type. The tabulated list of the sixty-two companies
included in the analysis is given herewith.
On January 6, 1930, quotations for the various Series
were as follows: Original Series, 25 1/4; Series B, 18 3/4;
Series C, 8 1/2. According to the prospectus, the offering
price of the shares is derived from day to day "by figuring
the aggregate market values of the deposited stocks at odd
lot prices together with broker's commissions, accumulated
dividends and a nominal charge not exceeding 6 1/2$ of the sale
price, which charge includes all expenses covering the deposit
of stock, issue and sale of certificates and Trustee's fees
with respect thereto in perpetuity."
In December, 1929, dividends at the following rates were
declared on the Original Series, 56.1300 regular and 50.1960
extras; Series C, 15.1230 regular and 11.3280 extra. Dividends
on Series B were paid in October.
The Trust does considerable research work and publishes
a great deal of literature. Charts are prepared and intensive
analyses made of the underlying securities. In this way, not
only Diversified Trustee Shares, but many of the other trusts
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grouse the interest of the investor. There is a certain
amount of selling appeal created through the distribution of
this kind of data. Those who make superficial surveys are
more easily persuaded. The experienced investor, however,
probably considers these as negligible in making his inter-
pretations.
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COLONIAL INVESTORS SHARES
Organized in January, 1928, Colonial Investors Shares is
a common stock investment trust of the limited management type.
It consists of units made up of 250 shares each, certificates
being issued by the Union Trust Company of I.aryland, Trustee,
in denominations of 5, 10, 25, 50 and 100 shares. Underlying
each unit are the common stocks of 41 different corporations,
(7 railroads, 5 oils, 9 public utilities, 20 industrials) all
listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The management is per-
mitted to change the primary list and "to sell one or any of the
underlying stocks whenever it may be deemed necessary or advis-
able to do so in order to avert a capital loss, or a cessation
or substantial decrease in dividends, or to protect a capital
gain. The Indenture further provides that the Trustee shall, at
the direction of the Colonial Investors Corporation, reinvest all
or any part of the proceeds of such a sale only in one or more of
the following securities:
w(a) Common stocks listed herein as "Alternate" stocks.
"(b) Stocks already held by the Trustee as one of the components
of the original Trust.
"(c) Bonds, certificates and/or short term notes of the United
States Government.
"(d) Certificates of deposit of banks or trust companies having
an aggregate paid-in capital, surplus and undivided profits of
not less than Five Million Dollars ($5,000,000) and situated in
Baltimore, Maryland, or New York City, New York. However, not
more than 5^ in one bank or 15^ in all shall be reinvested in
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such certificates of deposit,"*
Provision is made that any one of the 167 different common
stocks may be included in the Trust and that 15 must be included.
However, since organization but one change was made prior to the
recent market break.
The stock was issued orginally at 19 1/8, On September 10,
1929, it sold for 36 1/2, while during January, 1930, it has
fluctuated around 25, The offering price, according to the
prospectus of the Trust, "is based on the daily current price of
the deposited stocks held by the Trustee, at odd lot prices and
brokerage commissions plus the proportionate aggregate amount of
accumulated dividends and other property held by the Trustee."
To cover management and other expenses of distribution and issue,
a service charge is made of 8$. Furthermore, three cents per
share per annum is deducted from income before distribution of
dividends for Trustee's expenses. These charges are frankly
stated, it appears, in contrast with many trusts which evade
this issue.
Regular dividends of fifty cents per share have been paid
semi-annually to shareholders, with an extra dividend of twenty
cents per share on August 15, 1929. In determining the income
for distribution, proceeds from the sale of stock dividends and
rights, as well as cash dividends received on the underlying
stocks are included.
*Prospectus of the Trust, page 3
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The usual convertible privileges are extended to share-
holders, and the Colonial Bond & Share Corporation, the fiscal
agent and manager, stands ready to purchase blocks of less than
250 shares, a handling charge of $1.00 per share being deducted.
In studing the prospectuses of any of the various trusts,
the investor must not be influenced by figures showing past per-
formances of the underlying securities, naturally from 1924 to
the fall of 1929, remarkable appreciations in common stocks can
be shown. Many stocks reached peaks that they are not likely to
attain again, at least for some time to come. Trusts organized
toward the latter part of the bull market paid unusual prices for
their underlying securities, even though they may have been able
to buy at the low for the year. How much increase, on an average,
some of the gilt-edged securities can show in the next few years
is for the future to reveal.
Perhaps the limited management feature of Colonial Investors
Shares will prove beneficial and, later, probably a number of
shifts will be made from the primary list to the alternate list
in order to take advantage of stocks with greater future prospects.
Just at present it would be rather far fetched to try to tempt the
investor with such statements made previous to the market break,
as, for instance, that §5,000 invested in Colonial Investors
Shares would amount to $15,550 in 1934.
The following excerpts from a letter to the writer, dated
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January 21, 1930 by the President of the Colonial Bond & Share
Corporation, fiscal agents for Colonial Investors Shares, give
an insight into the purposes and policies of this Trust and the
unit type in general,
"In 1927, when our Trust was organized, the chief reliance
of the purchasers of Investment Trusts seemed to be placed upon
the House which was sponsoring the issue.
"Knowing little or nothing about the Management Type of
Trust, the only safeguard possible, apparently, was to know that
the underwriter had issued many fine securities in the past and
might be expected to do so in the future.
"We felt at that time, as we do now, that even the best of
Houses can make mistakes and that to choose a Trust blindly, be-
cause of faith in one element of the picture, was most unwise.
The position which we took then was not the popular one. As a
result, we had a lot of difficulty in disposing of our Shares,
but in the past two years sentiment has greatly changed and we
find it far easier today to sell our Shares, even in the de-
pressed stock market than in the very best days of Trust stock
sale.
T,The record of our Trust, as well as those of the fixed
type, where a portfolio is published regularly and is known to
every Investor, proved, beyond doubt, that this was a vital fac-
tor in maintaining prices of these shares. For example, the
average decline of our type of Trust was over 25% less than that
of the average well-known management trust
.
"We do not contemplate any great change in our Trust. The
only one planned, at this time, is to pay slightly higher divi-
dends this year than last and to put a smaller portion of the
earnings into the Reserve Fund. Y/e are doing this because we
believe the general public is, for the moment, more interested
in the cash returns on their investments than in the chances
for great appreciation in the value of their stock.
"I might say here that our ability to regulate the dividend
and to otherwise vary, slightly, the character of our Trust, to
meet more precisely the general market conditions, is one of the
great advantages of the Unit type of Trust like ours over the
Fixed type of Trust. We lose no advantage of the Fixed type and
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gain many advantages of the Management type. This is accom-
plished without losing sight of the public's desire to know
exactly what we are doing, at all times, and their need of
determining the actual cash value of their certificates daily,
which can be done, in our case, by reference to the morning news-
paper and a check with the market prices of our stocks,"
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CHAPTER V
RECENT TRENDS

The enthusiastic manner in which the American public ac-
cepted the investment trust idea has resulted in a great in-
crease in the number and varieties of these organizations as
well as in their total capitalization. Similar to the English
experience of 1890 when a trust mania was in full swing abroad,
the American trusts have followed "fast upon each other's heels".
The figures given by different sources as to the number
of investment trusts vary, due to the fact that sufficient care
is not exercised in distinguishing them from holding, trading,
and security companies. Barron's for July, 1928 states that
there were at that time 207 trusts in the United States and
Canada with 44 of the special or fixed type.
Carl Williams in an article in the Magazine of Wall Street
for September 81, 1929 gives the following estimates. In 1924,
he writes, there were probably not more than 15 such trusts in
existence, possessing assets of possibly about 14 millions of
dollars. In 1925, there were perhaps 48 companies with 150
millions as compared with 150 companies having 700 millions in
1927. Today, Mr. Williams estimates that there are over 400
such companies operating with resources in excess of two billion
dollars.
The first quarter of 1929 was the period of greatest ac-
tivity in the formation of new trusts. In the second quarter
vLondon Economist, April 6, 1889
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there was a decided falling off in the issuance of all types
of securities including those of the investment trusts. To
quote from Barron's of July 15, 1929:
"Against investment-company offerings in the first three
months approximately $750,000,000 in shares and bonds, the
next three months produced less than one-third of that amount.
There was none of the huge aggregates of new capital raised as
in the instances of Tri-Continental Corporation, Chicago Corpo-
ration, Alleghany Corporation and others the first three months.
Thirty-three investment trusts and companies loosely character-
ized as such offered stocks of one type or another, units, allot-
ment certificates, participating certificates and debentures in
the second quarter, in addition to which there were flotations
of certificates for four fixed trusts based on Standard Oil
Company shares. In the first quarter there were 51 offerings.
The second quarter total was #238,246,000 of which $30,000,000
consisted of bonds and $208,246,000 of stocks. In the first
three months the total was §745,056,750, of which ^184,000,000
was bonds and $596,056,750 shares."
Although the custom of the first trusts organized in this
country was to follow in some respects at least the British
plan of capital structure, later trusts have developed accord-
ing to their own patterns. While most British trusts issue bonds
and preferred stock as well as common stock to raise and increase
their capital, many of the American trusts have capital repre-
sented by common shares alone. The figures quoted above from
Barron's illustrate the tendency toward a capital structure con-
sisting of common stock only, the second quarter showing roughly
only \2?/o of the offerings in the form of bonds while the first
quarter showed nearer 25%. Probably the bonds, for the most part,
were in the form of convertible debentures. Moreover, some com-
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panies have issued preferred shares, sometimes callable,
often made attractive by a conversion or profit-sharing provision.
Possibly the latter have been issued with the idea that in the
case of declining interest rates this preferred stock could be
recalled, while long term bonds would have to be carried at high
rates of interest.
As a number of trusts have recently placed most of their
funds in common stocks owing to their effort to take advantage
of the bull market of the past few years, it is but natural that
since they are dependent upon a variable income they deem it
unwise to issue bonds and preferred stocks and be obliged to
meet fixed charges, A number of financial writers contend that
the capital structure of the American trusts is in keeping with
American security markets and the temperament of the American
people. They express the opinion that these trusts weathered
the recent break in the market without the tragic results that
the early British trusts suffered at the time of the Baring
crisis primarily because they had no large amounts of fixed
obligations to meet.
The continued bull market from 1924 to the latter part of
1929 gave the investment trust movement an impetus and caused it
to develop along lines which were not conceived in its early
stages. Even the most conservative trusts turned increasingly
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large parts of their funds into common stocks. The Investment
Bankers' Association of America at its convention in
October, 1929 reported regarding investment trusts that
"investment has been chiefly in common stocks in the ratio of
12 or more to one against bonds; and the stocks of the big
holding companies have been particularly attractive."
All kinds of literature and advertising have appeared on
every hand to demonstrate to the investor the advantages of
common stocks. Studies made by Kenneth a. Van Strum in his book
"Investing in Purchasing Power" and by Mgar L. Smith in
"Common Stocks as Long Term Investments" are frequently used to
prove how, over a period of years, the average income from a
group of diversified common stocks would net an excellent return.
Both of these writers are quoted to illustrate the manner in
which the man of no "investment intelligence" might have averaged
as much as 51.3;& annually on his original investment merely by
selecting ten diversified common stocks by "rule of thumb" and
holding them over the first quarter of the present century.
Professor Fisher's theory is used to explain how common stocks
offset the possible loss in the purchasing power of the dollar.
While it is admitted that some stocks may show a temporary reces-
sion, the figures of ildgar Smith prove valuable in arguing the
point that the "time hazard" is small. This well-known economist
has prepared statistical data which presents an analysis of a
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period covering eighty-five years (1837-1922 exclusive of
1878-1883) and sets forth the theory that over a period of
time diversified conmon stocks, bought as a group and held as a
group, will show a profit, the only hazard being that of time
which, in this study, proved to be four years.
Naturally the prospectuses and offering circulars of the
investment trusts are particularly optimistic in their statements
The economic conditions in this country have been unusually favor
able to common stocks, but the stocks of many organizations have
not met satisfactorily all the tests of a desirable investment.
The concerns which have achieved success have been those which
have ploughed back earnings. The investor must bear in mind that
common stocks are not a definite promise to pay dividends and
that the earnings of most companies, particularly the industrials
fluctuate widely from year to year. Moreover, there have been
numerous cases of the complete collapse of an industry as, for
instance, the American Bicycle Company.
The selective market of 1929 and the spectacular rise in the
price of certain securities have been attributed in part to the
investment trust. Although there was a great inflation in the
prices of the stocks of the investment trusts as there was in
those of the "blue chip" securities, the public seemed willing
to purchase almost any investment during the so-called rising
market which, however, was in reality a "hidden bear"''' market .
Cleveland Trust Bulletin, November lb, 1929
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It was, in fact, estimated that from 40% to 50/o of the active
shares listed on the New York Exchange showed minus rather than
plus signs during 1929. Some of the less conservative invest-
ment trusts were selling their stock at prices which were ten
to fifteen times above the actual, basic values of the securities
underlying them. R. V. McNeel, director of the McNeel's finan-
cial Service, declared, "There will be no end to buying of choice
stocks so long as it is possible to buy them, issue investment
trust stocks against them and sell these to the public at two
to three times the market values of securities purchased."
He stated that on this basis many investors were paying $800.
for General Electric; $600. for American Telephone, ^400. a share
for Consolidated Gas of New York.*
A great difference of opinion was expressed regarding the
effect of the investment trusts on the rising market which pre-
ceded October, 1929. Many agreed with kcNeel that these trusts,
concentrating on a comparatively small number of the best issues
and taking them off the market in large blocks, were the cause
of the increase in price of these stocks rather than any real
growth in the earning pov/er or any fundamental change in the
companies they represented. As a great many of these investment
trusts were organized during 1928 and 1929, it is probably true
that they took stocks out of the market and to some extent
increased the scarcity value of the "blue chip" issues.
*Boston Herald, August 26, 1929
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In many instances, however, particularly in the summer and early
fall of 1929, investment trusts issuing new securities to raise
additional capital did not hasten to invest in stocks and "bonds,
but put their newly raised capital into the call loan market
where the rates were particularly attractive. For instance, the
prospectus of the Pacific Investment Corporation as of
December 31, 1928, stated: "In a period of great market uncer-
tainty such as 1928 has been, this policy has the merit of fair-
ly well assuring safety of principal and reasonably satisfactory
income. It has involved casting aside what have seemed like
brilliant profit opportunities in the interest of safety.
The percentage of the total fund employed in each class of
investment is as follows:
Cash and Call Loans 46.8,0
Domestic Bonds 9.1%
Foreign Bonds 4.7%
Preferred Stocks 18.5%
Common Stocks 20.9%
100.0%
Largest investment in any
one security 1.3%'
Possibly, as a number of trusts later claimed, they sensed the
approaching storm and were better prepared for the emergency
because of their liquid funds. The November 25, 1929 issue of
"The Investment Trust Review", published by Steelman & Birkins
,
40 Broad Street, New York, states that in a survey made just
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previous to the market break twenty companies showed a call
and loan position of 31 l/Q/o and that in some instances, cash
and call loans exceeded 50u/o of the total resources.
The Cleveland Trust Company Business Bulletin for
November 15 emphasizes the same line of thought. It explains
that the sudden appearance of the increase in brokers loans in
the early fall of 192S1 was due to the investing public selling
its stocks to buy the issues of the investment trusts while the
latter lent these funds to brokers in order to await lower
market prices of stocks. Although not holding the trusts
responsible for the market break, the Bulletin states that they
probably were an indirect cause due to the investor shifting
from the stocks of corporations to those of the investment trust
and thereby weakening the market in general because, in many
cases, stocks of all kinds were sold in order to buy the new
issues of the trusts. Then, after the break, according to the
Bulletin, when the declines were greatest, the trusts bought
securities and there was a corresponding decline in brokers
loans.
V/hile unquestionably some trusts were able to pursue a
course siailar to that described above and were ideally
situated so that they could protect themselves against adverse
market conditions, numbers found themselves in a precarious
position. Previous to the break many experts had contended
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that in the event of a reaction the investment trusts would
prove a stablizing factor in the market, that they would, in
fact, make the market panic-proof. Skilled management was
expected to take the place of mob psychology. In the event
of trouble, it was anticipated the investment trusts would step
in and with the huge sums of capital at their command, buy the
stocks as they moved downward.
It was true that some trusts did follow this idea. During
the earlier part of the reaction a number of the large invest-
ment trusts reported that they were not liquidating but were
buying and adding to their portfolios. President seagrave of
the American founders Corporation in an address to the share-
holders at their meeting on November 12, 1929 stated, "Having a
constant policy of maintaining liquid assets and cash, American
Founders Corporation and its four affiliates were found in a
strong cash position at the time of the decline and were also
able, to the extent desired, to withdraw funds from abroad by
the sale of certain foreign securities, so that they were able
to make substantial purchases of certain undervalued American
common stocks at advantageous prices." Incorporated Investors,
in its publication 5", informed its shareholders that the manage-
ment had been able "to buy into the market at these reduced
levels, thus lowering the co3t of the securities held."
*"The Incorporated Investor", published by the Parker Corpor-
ation in the interest of Incorporated Investor Shareholder s-
Vol. II, No. 10
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On the whole, however, there was apparently no concerted
action on the part of the trusts either at the top or at the
"bottom of the market, ./hile a number cut down their holdings
before the break and, as previously stated, placed their
realized profits with other capital raised through the sale
of new issues on call, many of them found themselves with small
reserves and had no available funds with which to take advan-
tage of the drop in security prices.
liven if the various trusts had been able and willing to
act concertedly and follow the same tactics, it is doubtful
if they could have exerted any marked influence. It is estima-
ted that the total cash resources of all the trusts was some-
where between y500,000,000. and ^750, 000, 000. tlth the total
listing of the stocks and bonds of the tfew York stock Exchange
valued at *90 ,000 ,000 ,000. and with a market decline in the
recent break of approximately y32 ,000 ,000 ,000. , it is obvious
that the trusts did not possess the powers that many believed
them to have.
The iiew York Times, October 27, 19 £9
,
suggested, never-
theless, that "If the trusts were to pool their resources,
however, in the manner which the country's leading bankers
adopted in Thursday's crisis, it is believed that they might
stabilize pivotal issues and check an avalanche of selling.
such a development might be a possibility in the future."
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Says Theodore M. Knappen in the Magazine of Wall street
for November 30, 1929*, "it is by no means certain that they
(the investment trusts) met the culmination and collapse of the
bull market with much greater wisdom and coolness than the
individual." Those trusts which supported their own shares and
repurchased the stock outstanding in so far as possible, were
able to maintain prices more in keeping with the true values
than those which left their stock unsupported. The trusts which
were ably managed and particularly the older trusts which had
created a surplus and reserves over a period of several years
fared best. Most of the trusts lost at least from 40>a to 50%
of their previous high levels. The majority, nevertheless,
suffered no more than many of the industrials and public utility
stocks. The following shows the fluctuations of ten represent-
ative trusts with capital of over $10,000,000.
Range November 22,1929
Stock** High Low Bid Asked
American British &
Continental Corp. 2E 5/8 5 l/8 7 l/4 8
American European
Securities Co. 98 l/2 23 35 36
American International
Corporation 96 3/4 29 l/2 43 43 l/8
General Public Service
Corporation 98 20 34 l/4 34 l/2
Llayflower Associates 101 378 46 l/8 60 51
National Bond & Share 96 1/2 25" 40
Reybarn Corporation 59 25 25 30
Selected Industries 31 3/8 4 8 3/4 9
Tri-Continental
Allied 104 l/2 45 l/8 54 3/4 55
* Page 184
**Figures taken from "The Investment Trust Review, Nov. 25, 1929
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After the break many of the trusts found themselves with
"unrealized losses" instead of "unrealized profits". Notwith-
standing the fact that most of the trusts had widely diversified
their holdings, the value of their portfolios was considerably
diminished. This may mean only "paper loss", but, in many in-
stances, it will probably be some time before the market values
recover sufficiently to equal even the original cost.
The real issue is did the investment trusts do better than
the individual investor could have done for himself? Many dif-
ferent opinions have been expressed as to the manner in which
the trusts met their first test, but, at best, these are but
generalizations. Most authorities seem to agree that on the
whole the trusts compared favorably with the average investor
and that they excelled the average marginal trader. Yet this
can scarcely be considered a satisfactory showing when the
primary objective of the trust is to surpass the individual
investor and give him a high degree of safety coupled with a
return in excess of what he could secure by placing his money in
the savings bank. It is with good reason expected that the
securities issued by a trust will hold fairly firm and not fluc-
tuate widely, that they will be truly an investment rather than
a speculation. The criticism made during the recent break that
the securities of the trusts fell off markedly is met by the
trusts with the statement that this was an abnormal recession and
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that the values of the very best securities fell off along with
the speculative issues. They claim that the stocks of the
investment trusts were forced down to lows which were unjusti-
fied when measured in terms of the book values and earning
power of the trusts.
One fact, at least, seems to be decidedly in favor of the
investment trusts and that is none were wiped out during the
break. The only trust that has failed recently is the Bankers
Capital Corporation of Connecticut, a member of the Bankers
financial Trust Group. Its failure was not due directly to
market conditions but rather to unwise policies on the part of
the management. The big profits reported as earned by the
corporation were not actually realized. Instead, large divi-
dends were declared on so-called "earnings" which included
unrealized profits computed on the sale of stock made to one of
its subsidiaries.
Undoubtedly, as time passes, a number of trusts will find
it to their advantage to liquidate. Others will be obliged to
join forces with stronger, more successful organizations, jj^rom
their inception, many trusts have featured interlocking direc-
torates and other forms of control such as that invested in the
management corporation or in the banking houses by which they
were sponsored.
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One of the outstanding examples of a combine already-
organized is that of the Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation which
was incorporated in December, 1928 with a capital of
$102,500,000. Within nine months (December, 1928 to September,
1929) this company has issued three units of more than
$100,000,000. and doubled the market value of its shares. Each
of the three units sold at a market valuation of between
$300,000,000. and $300,000,000. By merging with the Financial
and Industrial Securities Corporation, the Company's assets
became $235,000,000. On July 24, 1929, the Shenandoah Corpora-
tion, a financial investment trust of the general management
type, was formed as a subsidiary of Goldman Sachs and the
Central States .Electric Corporation. It included in its original
assets 238,096 shares of Goldman Sachs Trading.
To aid in organizing a subsidiary of its own, namely the
Blue Ridge Corporation, the Shenandoah sold a considerable
quantity of its common and preference stock to Goldman Sachs
Trading. The Shenandoah took 6,250,000 shares of Blue Ridge
common at §10. a share, the remaining share, one million, being
offered to the public for §20. In transactions of inter-company
purchases it is customary for the parent company and the new unit
to sell one to the other at prices below the offering price to
the public or the current market quotations.
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This interlocking has resulted in "big paper profits to all
three corporations. It has also made the Goldman Sachs group
of investment trusts the largest in the world, the aggregate
market value of their capital securities exceeding one billion
dollars.*
A principle hitherto never applied to investment company
financing, although it has been used commonly by holding com-
panies, was adopted by the Blue Ridge Corporation at the time
of offering its stock to the public* Units of Blue Ridge com-
mon and preferred stock were offered in exchange for any of
the stocks of twenty-one corporations, recognized leaders, on
the basis of their market value at that time. The Blue Ridge
shares were valued at their offering price which was somewhat
below the market price. The purpose of making this offer was
announced as being with the intent of accumulating good invest-
ment holdings without necessitating the going into the market
in competition with other buyers, and not with the idea of
acquiring control of the several companies whose stocks were
being exchanged.
Two days after the offer was made the company closed it
without explanation. Probably the reason was that speculators
as well as the permanent investors which the company was seeking
were taking advantage of the offer. The management has signi-
fied that investors may still tender their holdings to the
*Boston Herald, July 24, 1929
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Blue Ridge Corporation subject to a private offering of ex-
change. During the recent recession in the stock market,
however, Blue Ridge Corporation could have been purchased for
§3.00 per share so, for the present, there would be no desire
on the part of the public to wish to make the exchange.
The Goldman Sachs Trading Corporation, listed on the
New York Curb, fluctuated from a high of 121 l/4 to a low of
32.*
Whether the type of organization that so closely resembles
a holding company can be considered as an investment trust,
even though it holds itself forth as being such, is a matter of
question. In the future a sharp differentiation will probably
be made between holding and trading corporations and other
ventures which are not strictly of an investment character.
Other mergers are now being planned. Negotiations have
been arranged to merge the Tri-Continental Corporation and the
Tri-Continental Allied Company, Inc., affiliated investment
companies, into a single corporation to be known as Tri-
Continental Corporation. Financial Investing Co. of New York,
Ltd. and the Domestic & Overseas Investing Co. , Ltd. are
planning to merge v/ith Federated Capital Corporation under the
name of the Atlantic Midland Corporation. The latter' s port-
folio will consist of the bonds of approximately one hundred
fifteen different companies and of the stocks of over one
*See Appendix, page 12a
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hundred companies. To how great an extent these alliances can
be carried successfully is a problem for the future.
In Great Britain, grouping among trusts is the rule, but
it is difficult to make comparisons because conditions here are
not parallel to those abroad and the primary objective there is
not control as proves so often to be the case in America.
Advantages are claimed for merging in that (1) more ex-
perienced and efficient management can be retained and that
these managers can establish better "connections" and "con-
tacts"; (2) overhead expenses are lessened; (3) a broader re-
sale market can be secured. There are, nevertheless, disad-
vantages in that (1) although control is in the hands of a few,
high-salaried, capable executives, this does not necessarily
mean that they can keep in close touch with all developments;
they must, necessarily, rely to a certain extent on less capable
subordinates; (2) although expenses may be lessened by avoiding
duplication of effort they are, on the other hand, increased
because of the tendency of the large organizations to do things
on a big scale, for instance, to maintain expensive headquarters
and to advertise extensively.
Another objection as pointed out recently by Theodore M«
Knappen in an article on investment trusts is that of "funnel-
izing of control" into the hands of a few."1 His theory is that
the original investor is likely to lose his independence because
^Magazine of '.Vail Street, November 50
,
1929, page 185
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the "investment trust interposes an impassable barrier between
the ultimate investor and the direction of corporations. " He
suggests the possibility of monopolization of investing power
in a few hands possessing but a small minority of actual owner-
ship and capturing an excessive part of the profits. Probably,
however, before this comes to pass, restrictive legislation will
prevent dangerous merging and interlocking and forbid abusive
practices which have already arisen or might arise.
Various states have already adopted regulations, and there
has been considerable controversy as to which is better, public
regulation or self-regulation by the trusts from within.
In 1927, the Attorney-General of the State of New York,
Mr. Ottinger, began investigations of the investment trusts
which culminated in a "Survey", and later, a "Supplemental
Survey". Several months later a bill, based on the results of
the study of the Attorney-General and his aides, was proposed
for legislation. The idea was that the Banking Department of
the State of New York should determine whether or not those
wishing to form investment trusts within the State should be
given the privilege of operating and that this Department
should also supervise their activities. After a great deal
of revision, the bill passed the State Senate but was rejected
by the Assembly.
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Although the report was accepted by many business men and
financial leaders, others, particularly financial writers,
poured a flood of criticism upon the Attorney-general.
Carl Randau, New York Telegram financial writer, in the issue
of the Telegram for February 8, 1927, condemned the Attorney-
General for using his office to promote the interests of the
management type of trust to the detriment of the fixed type.
He remarked furthermore, "Many of the bankers and legal experts
of ./all Street still hesitate after years of investigation to
express definite opinions on what should be the proper activ-
ities of investment trusts, nor have they been able to agree
on definitions. The representatives of the state, however, dis-
played no such hesitancy."
An editorial from the Boston News Bureau, reprinted in the
Wall Street Journal of November 30, 1927, stated, "Hr. Ottinger •
s
proposals have been read with interest by Boston bankers. Brief-
ly, he would have legislation placing investment trusts under
supervision of the State banking department, liberalizing the
tax laws with regard to such institutions, requiring investment
trusts to deposit a minimum forfeit in New York State of
United States Government bonds with the state, and limiting the
power of investment trusts to issue bonds."
"All this sounds like a set of regulations for a banking
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institution. Emphatically the investment trust is not a bank."
The New York Journal of Commerce of November 30, 19S7 was
even more outspoken stating, "The incomplete and half-baked
character of the recommendations recently made in the attorney
generals investigation and the apparent lack of understanding
of investment trust principles which prevails in many quarters
show that the principles of investment trust management, whether
understood by experts or not, have at all events not been suf-
ficiently worked out to find acceptance on a general basis.
Legislators find it hard enough to legislate carefully when
there is pretty general acceptance of fundamental ideas in a
given field."
While legislation was pending in New York, California and
Utah passed laws stipulating requirements with which the trusts
were obliged to comply before selling securities within these
states. While in a number of other states rules of one sort or
another were imposed, for the most part trusts were classified
as falling within the "blue-sky" laws. The most recent step
taken in the matter of regulation has been made by the State of
New Hampshire. Following are the rules in detail regarding
reports. *
1. Period of filing Jan.l and July 1. Compilation of
company affairs shall relate to its business for the previous
six months. If the department date of filing conflicts with
issuer's established system of auditing accounts relative to
*Set forth in letter from Insurance Commissioner John E.Sullivan
as published in United States Daily, Vol. IV, No. 207
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date of filing, such will be made optional with company by-
affording sufficient notice of semi-annual reports to the
department.
2. Schedule of all securities held in portfolio of
company.
3. Boole value and market value.
4. Exchange of securities. Gain and loss in exchange of
securities.
5. Interest and dividend income.
6. Appreciation or depreciation of securities held in
portfolio.
7. Income and disbursements.
8. Assets and liabilities.
Since the market break most writers on the subject believe
that guidance of some kind is desirable. The tendency seems
decidedly toward publicity. The bankers feel that this publicity
will prevent objectionable practices. At the same time, the
investor, protected by the state against fraud, will be provided
with sufficient facts and information to enable him to use his
own discretion.
At the convention of the Investment Bankers Association of
America in October, 1929, Mr. Charles D. Dickey, Brown Brothers
& Co., Philadelphia, in his report expressed the hope that no
attempt would be made to curb the trusts because of inflation
of prices which, he claimed, were the inevitable consequences
of a speculative period. He stated, "It is to be hoped that
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such inaccuracies (he referred to exaggerated statements
regarding the part investment trusts were playing in the
stock market and to the reported concern of Congress that
fifty per cent of the investments of the trust were in foreign
securities) and the urge to act will not influence either
state or federal authorities to hasten the enactment of restric-
tive legislation. We have many examples of the evils of over
regulation by the government in other fields and it is difficult
to see how the one important factor in this field, namely, the
management, can be obtained by regulation."*
In order to increase public confidence, it is very possible
that the trusts themselves may be the means of bringing about
regulations. Llany trusts are publishing full annual statements
and some are submitting quarterly reports to shareholders.
There is a marked trend toward revealing portfolio holdings.
In the case of the management type of trusts these holdings
may, of course, be shifted constantly, so perhaps the investor
will not profit much from such disclosures.
If the recently granted privilege is availed of by the
investment trusts, one of the greatest influences for promoting
uniform practices among these companies will be the requirements
for admission to listing on the New York Stock Exchange. However,
only a few trusts have joined the group of those whose securities
are traded in on the "big board". Among these are American
*Boston Herald, October 17, 1929
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International Corp.; American European Securities Company;
Continental Shares, Inc.; General Public Service Corp.;
Insuranshares Certificates, Inc.; Standard Investing Corpora-
tion; Sterling Securities Corp.; United founders Corporation;
United States and foreign Securities Corp.
Requirements for listing cover such matters as (1) summary
of all important provisionsin the charter, articles of incor-
poration, by-laws, etc; (2) management, method of computing
compensation for same, including options, warrants and other
forms of indirect compensation; (3) aggregate value of capital,
surplus and funded debt; (4) costs of organization and selling
expenses of each class of security; (5) charging by the managers
of the trusts of only "customary commissions on listed securities
and reasonable commissions on unlisted securities"; (6) right to
vote and its application to all classes of stocks together with
provision that non-voting stocks shall not be listed unless
"substantially preferred as to both dividends and assets"; (7)
statements of earnings and of surplus, together with a balance
sheet to be published annually; (8) earnings, and what they are
to include; (9) method of treating profits from syndicate parti-
cipations; (10) statement showing a list of the holdings of the
trusts, the price at which securities were purchased, with a
proviso that up to 10% of the invested capital may be grouped
under "miscellaneous securities".*
"'For complete requirements see .Barron's June 17, 1929
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Trusts that are honestly and ably managed will undoubtedly
feel it worth while to meet these requirements. The expression
of opinion at the last meeting of the Investment Bankers Associa
tion of America was that the matter had been approached in a
most excellent way by the iixchange and that all bankers interest
ed in investment trusts should strongly urge that they apply for
listing. It was felt, furthermore, that the fact a trust was
granted the privilege was a strong recommendation in its favor.
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CHAPTER VI
FUTURE OF SPECIALIZING TRUSTS : DEDUCTIONS

In the future there will probably be few outright
failures among the investment trusts. Instead, as has been
suggested, a number will withdraw or consolidate, leaving
the field to the stronger and more capably managed. This
does not necessarily mean that only the large trusts will sur-
vive. It is the opinion of the writer that some of the smaller
trusts which are well organized and conservatively managed will
be able to show fully as good results, and, in some cases, even
better returns to the investor than the companies of extra-
ordinary size.
Standardized practices will gradually develop, and the
abuses of management will tend to disappear. Abnormal fees
absorbed by managers will be eliminated owing to competition
between the trusts themselves and to the increase in publicity
which will teach the investor to be more discriminating.
Various trusts, particularly the smaller, will probably not
retain their own management corporations and research bureaus.
To avoid duplication of expense and effort, they will turn
more and more to the services of the investment trust consul-
tants such as Edgar Iliggins, Incorporated, or the Fiscal Bond
& Share Corporation, or other organizations formed expressly
for the purpose of supervising investment trusts. As time
passes it will be possible to secure more expert managers. Many
of the executives who are now at the head of the various
-169-

investment trusts will be strengthened by their experiences.
Many trusts will alter their policies as a result of the
troublous times which they are now attempting "to weather".
Those following the best practices will not buy stocks or bonds
in the future merely because there has been a decline in price.
Neither will they endeavor to take advantage of minor fluctua-
tions and swings. Rather they will consider the possibilities
for the long pull and the character and the nature of the par-
ticular company issuing the securities. Income, not the expecta
tion of immediate market profits, will be the basis for select-
ing securities. Capital gains will be treated as such and will
be reinvested and compounded rather than distributed as divi-
dends in order to show unusual earnings.
Most writers feel strongly that there will continue to be a
gradual decrease in the number of fixed and semi-fixed trusts in
favor of the management type. Although there are probably not
more than fifteen or twenty trusts of the rigid type now in
existence, there is no reason why those which are already well-
established should not continue to make an appeal as they have
previously done to a certain group of investors who are not
speculatively inclined. Those trusts organized at the beginning
of the bull market had the advantage of buying at greatly.de-
pressed prices. Diversification in "gilt-edged" securities
-170-

will always afford certain advantages, although undoubtedly
the fixed type of trust will not, in the near future at any rate,
show such unusual yields nor distribute such large dividends.
Among the fixed and semi-fixed trusts there will probably
be an increasing tendency to develop new provisions so that the
non-discretionary characteristics will gradually disappear in
favor of less restricted management. For instance, North Ameri-
can Trust Shares has this "elimination" feature. The prospec-
tus of the Trust reads: "Non-income producing stocks may be
eliminated at the discretion of the Depositor upon the failure
of any of the above corporations (8 railroads, 5 oils, 12 indus-
trials, 3 utilities) to pay a usual dividend, unless a dividend
is paid before the stock is sold. Should any of the above cor-
porations fail to pay any dividend for a period of one hundred
days after its failure to pay a usual dividend, the Trustee
shall sell the stock." The American Securities Shares in its
prospectus states that the Trustees may buy and sell shares at
their discretion from an original group of stocks consisting
of over one hundred companies and that stocks may be disposed
of whenthe occasion arises.
Most newly organized trusts will adopt the corporate struc-
ture because, as a corporation, appeal may be made to three
classes of investors. Those desiring safety who are satisfied
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with low yields will buy bonds. Those wishing a somewhat higher
fixed return and the security of a prior claim on assets will
take preferred stock. The more speculatively inclined will pur-
chase common stock anticipating extraordinary future yields.
There is, moreover, the possibility of attracting some investors
by selling as a unit a preferred share together with two or three
common shares. This is done in the case of the Securities
Company of New Hampshire, one of the older trusts, which v/as in-
corporated in 1922 with a capitalization consisting of first
preferred callable, second preferred, and common stock.
Already one of the companies created under a declaration of
trust, Insuranshares Trusts, has terminated as of December 31 f 1929.
In a letter to the writer, the following statement was given:
"The advantage of a corporate structure which permits the list-
ing of its capital issues is so superior to a trust structure,
that as above indicated we are incorporating the Trust Certifi-
cates. "
Regarding those trusts which specialize in common stocks
and are organized as common law trusts or take the form of a
corporation issuing but one class of shares, there seems to
be no reason why these should not continue to have a favorable
development. Most of these mutual types of trusts fared ex-
ceptionally well during the recent decline, possibly because
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among them are some of the older, conservatively managed trusts.
Although these trusts have avoided bonds and invested prac-
tically all of their funds in stocks, there is a tendency to
include the former in their portfolio since the market break,
Irving Investors Management Company, Inc. is calling attention
to the fact that the provisions of its indenture permit of
"complete freedom to invest in bonds."* Incorporated Investors
in its prospectus stresses that "supervision is constant and
changes are made v/hen necessary to maintain the policy of buy-
ing and holding the best." In literature recently distributed,
the statement is made that while common stocks will always com-
prise the greater part of the investments of Incorporated In-
vestors and "they will always comprise the total of the per-
manent investments", money may be put into call loans or short-
term bonds may be purchased or money may be kept in the form of
cash when it is deemed advisable'^**
ij'rom all indications, it seems that these managed fund
participations will hold in public favor and may even increase
in numbers after a period of time has elapsed.
There will be no extensive investment in bonds by most of
the investment trusts, except possibly for a temporary period.
.furthermore there will be but few bond trusts created, even
though there continue to be violent fluctuations in common stocks.
Hot a great deal is to be gained by wide diversification of bonds.
^Letter to the writer, November 4, 1929
Pamphlet, "Profit s— through scientific investing", published
by The Parker Corporation, page 16.
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The amount of return is not likely to be attractive enough to ap-
peal to many and would not prove much better, if any, than could
be secured by the individual investor acting independently. By
consulting his banker or broker, the investor can obtain as good
advice and as much supervision in making his choice as the invest-
ment trust could afford him. After the selection is once made,
there is no necessity for the close supervision that there is
with common stocks. Prom the point of view of the organizers,
there is not sufficient incentive to deal exclusively in bonds
as the profits are small and the compensation in turn would be
correspondingly so.
Those trusts which specialize in the securities of particu-
lar industries will be likely to remove various restrictions,
thus depending more on the trading ability of the managers, tfor
instance, a letter to the shareholders of Metal & Mining Shares,
Incorporated, dated September 17, 1929, reads, "The increase in
earnings, as reflected in the figures for the months of July and
August, are, of course, primarily attributable to the removal in
July of the restrictions on investments which previously had
somewhat handicapped the rapid shifting of our investments when
such shift was necessary." On December 16, 1929, in a letter to
the writer, Mr. Binns of the Statistical Department of the
P. H. .Thiting & Co., Inc. remarked, "Metal and Mining Shares, Inc.
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does not specialize exclusively in the common stock of metal
and mining companies," He referred to the fact that during
the recent market break the company was investing in bonds,
having previously liquidated nearly 55^ of its holdings in
July, August, and September, 1929.
The task of management of these specializing trusts which
deal primarily in the stocks of one type of industry will be-
come even more exacting and the research work even more exten-
sive. Changes in the portfolio must be made without hesitation
when the need arises and unsatisfactory issues must be disposed
of and replaced with more promising ones. Naturally greater
risk is involved in investing in this type of trust owing to
the lack of broad diversification and the fact that the under-
lying securities are likely to rise and fall together, thus
making earnings unstable.
As both banks and insurance companies have developed over
a period of years substantially in excess of the increase in
the population, there is no reason to predict anything but a
prosperous future for well managed trusts dealing in the se-
curities of the best types of these institutions. Great care,
however, must be exercised by the investor to select a trust
which has the right kind of underlying securities.
Regarding banks, it must be remembered that there are a
great many of all kinds. During the last few years banking
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conditions nave changed considerably. There has been an in-
creasing tendency towards consolidations and mergers. Some of
the leaders in this field are urging legislation to permit branch
banking. According to Arthur lf« Leinbach writing in the 1.1aga-
zine of Wall Street for November 30, 1929, one per cent of the
banks control over ten billion dollars v:orth of the banking re-
sources, approximately three-quarters of the nation's bank de-
posits. The number of bank failures, particularly in the agri-
cultural and rural districts is alarming. Banks have become
underwriters and have entered the field of security distribu-
tion, in several instances withdrawing from the Federal Reserve
System and taking out state charters. I.any banks have formed
their own subsidiaries; for instance, the Chase National Bank
has the Chase Securities Corporation, the First National Bank
of New York, the National City Company.
It is difficult to determine the conditions or the earning
power of these bank which have affiliates. In many cases the
latter earn much more than the banks themselves. Before the
market break, bank stocks were purchased primarily with a view
to appreciation. Even in the face of great developments, there
is a question if bank stocks--the prices of which have been
cut in halves in many cases--are not now much too high.
The investment trust dealing in bank stocks must be par-
ticularly capable of analyzing the condition of the various banks
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and must be thoroughly conversant with not only the management
but its policies.
The stocks of insurance companies present attractive pos-
sibilities, particularly the older companies which have great
diversification of risks. At the present time (January, 1930),
insurance stocks average but slightly higher than they did in
1928. Skillfully managed investment trusts dealing in this type
of security should offer the shareholder or the stockholder a
moderate, stable return on his investment.
Peculiarly no trusts, specializing or otherwise, have
originated as the result of the cooperation of a group of small
investors acting in their own interest. Perhaps the Alexander
Fund, an agency created in 1907 by the founder, W. Wallace
Alexander, with four participants and $1200.00 in investments
comes nearest to this idea. The Amalgamated Investors, Inc.,
owned and controlled by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of
America, is another organization which was formed to serve the
individual investor. The recently organized "Dollar Share"
investment trust offers the "wage earners and others of limited
resources the opportunity to participate in the nation f s pros-
perity." One of the functions of the investment trust, accord-
ing to many of the prospectus, is to assist the small, inex-
perienced investor. As yet, however, it appears that most
trusts have been more useful to the wealthy man looking for an
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investment for his surplus funds than to the man of moderate
means. In the future, probably more attention will be given
to the small investor.
During the recent bull market, many trusts were organized
with little regard for the investor. Many of them were simply
money-making schemes for their promoters. When options are
granted to buy stocks at a low price after the company has
proven a success and when founders' shares are given the or-
ganizers, the benefits of management are negative. Trusts
following such practices should be able to prove to the public
that the organizers are not reaping an unreasonable share.
In a study made by Carl Williams as published in the
Magazine of Wall Street for September 21, 1929, out of 41
representative trusts with assets over ten millions of dollars,
13 granted organizers compensation in the form of options, while
37 companies gave the managers common stock ranging approxi-
mately from 10$ to 80% on the amount issued.* In the future,
in order to meet the competition of the "blind pools", there
will be an increasing tendency for honestly sponsored houses
to reveal to the public the abuses of such practices where
organizers put an excessive price on their own ability. The
fixed trust and the fund-participation type has an advantage
in that such abuses are eliminated by the very nature of the
financial set-up. The promoters and organizers, usually the
*Figures derived by the writer (chart set forth on page 911,
Magazine of Wall Street, September 21, 1929)
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managers, receive no bonus stock or options.
Which type of trust or trusts is best suited to the re-
quirements of the American investor yet remains to be deter-
mined. Specializing investment trusts dealing primarily in
one class of security and featuring--though not exclusively
—
fixed and limited management practices, will unquestionably
be far outstripped in numbers and in size by trusts of the
general management type dealing in all kinds of investments.
Present indications are that the specializing type of
trust withstood the test period of the latter part of 1929
fully as well as the general management type. In neither
case, however, did these institutions meet the break as success-
fully as they should have in that their securities did not hold
firm. To fulfill the functions for which they are supposed to
exist, the investment trusts should show better averages in a
market depression than other types of investments. This they
failed to do.
Arguments, reasonable and otherwise, were offered to off-
set unfavorable criticism, namely, "an abnormal market re-
cession"; "poor technical position of investment trusts"; "too
many undigested securities on the market". One investment
trust sponsor claimed—and undoubtedly justly—that the banks,
brokerage houses and others, not knowing the real value of
investment trust stocks and holding them as collateral, forced
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their sale before the better known stocks. This, he contended,
gave a "black eye" to the investment trust securities.
The recent, spectacular market crash will undoubtedly
h-.ve a positive effect in helping to weed out the undesirables
and bring improper practices to the front. Those trusts which
survive will be of real economic service. With the increasing
tendency toward widespread publicity, the investor will have,
in the case of the properly conducted trusts, a medium which
offers expert assistance and which will net him a greater re-
turn on his investment than he could secure independently.
To quote from an article by Daniel Hamilton as to the
possibilities of the investment trust for the investor:
"It is true that investment trusts have become the medium
of a promotion era which has rarely been surpassed in our his-
tory. It may be possible to look back to the present period
from some vantage point twenty years in the future and say with
truth that the investment trust promotion era yielded the high-
est percentage of return to its original investors and the
greatest proportion of successes of any promotion era in Ameri-
can history up to this time. And it may even prove true that
some of the investment trusts of today will return to their
sponsors no less spectacular profits than General Motors has re-
turned to its original investors,"*
For the present, however, even though investment trust
securities are selling at prices greatly under their liquidating
value, it will be well for the man of moderate means who can-
not afford to speculate to place his funds elsewhere. A num-
ber of well-established concerns are worthy of consideration,
but, for the most part, few have been in existence long enough
*Barron T s, October 15, 1928, page 8
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to guarantee their stability or their income-producing possi-
bilities. The wealthy man with surplus funds to invest may
well include in his investment program the issues of one or two
of the best investment trusts.
The report of the New York State Joint Legislative Commit-
tee on Banks, February, 1930, regarding its investigation as to
the regulating of investment trusts, was particularly pleasing
to investment trust sponsors and bankers as it was believed
that no need for special legislation existed. According to
Senator Cheney, Chairman of the Committee, "nothing inherently
unsound in the the theory of investment trusts" was discovered.
To quote from the report:
"We are of the opinion that the unwarranted prices paid
during the past year by the public for securities of investment
trusts and similar companies were simply a phase of a great
speculative market. YIe do not believe that such bursts of
speculative frenzy can be stopped by legislation. Judgment can-
not be legislated into the investors* minds. Legislation cannot
make the unintelligent investor discriminatory." "The evil
has largely cured itself. Instead of shares selling at prices
greatly in excess of values measured by assets held, there have
been many instances where companies have assets well in excess
of the value at which their shares are selling."*
Naturally the various heads of the investment trusts and
those associated with these men predict a steady growth for the
movement. L3r. George Putnam, president of Incorporated Inves-
tors, issued the first of February, 1930 said, "We are just
beginning to be a nation of investors and the investment trust
*The New York Times, February 2, 1930, page 16
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has already proved that it fills a real need. As we accumu-
late more wealth, the investment trust will fill an even
greater need than it does today." Hr« Putnam suggested the
advisability of requiring a repurchase clause in the invest-
ment trust charter with the intent of assuring to the share-
holders the right to sell their shares at or near the true
asset value of the stock*
An opinion less likely to be prejudiced, but one which
was equally favorable, was made about the same time by
Mr, Ray Vance, president of the Associated Society of Con-
sulting Economists. His remarks were as follows.
"Management of American investment companies, commonly
called investment trusts, have recently been subjected to
a test, which in my opinion will not soon be duplicated, if
ever. While some of these companies have been in existence
four or five years, the majority were formed during the last
eighteen months. The manner in which they have come through
the recent trying times is a tribute to the generally high
character and ability of the management personnel in this
field. That losses were less than had been expected, and
considerably less in proportion than to individual investors,
has emphasized again the value of fundamentals of investment
company operation." *
In conclusion, unquestionably the trusts will have a
steady growth and will endure in America as they have in
Great Britain. Although the trend will be toward the general
trust dealing in all kinds of securities, there will still
continue to be a place for the specializing trust. A number
,
of excellent trusts exist in the latter field which, catering
*The New York Times, February 2, 1930, page 16
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as they do to individual tastes and fancies, will attract
at least as many as formerly from among the great army of
American investors. After they have passed through the
pioneering stage, trusts of all kinds will emerge as a per-
manent part of our financial structure.
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APPENDIX

Definitions

"What is an investment trust? A broad definition
might be worded as follows: The investment trust is an
agency by which the combined funds of many investors,
both in large and in small amounts, are utilized to pur-
chase such a wide variety of securites that safety of
principal is attained in diversification, while no con-
trol, or directive responsibilities, result from invest-
ment. Furthermore the investment portfolio is so man-
aged that a good average yield is sought on share and
borrowed capital, at the same time that close supervision
of the portfolio permits a turnover policy aiming at the
realization of capital gains, and the avoidance of capi-
tal losses.
According to the above definition, the typical in-
vestment trust will show the following characteristics:
1. It raises capital by issuing stock, generally
both preferred and common; and it frequently exercises
its borrowing powers by creating bond indebtedness, and
occasionally in other ways.
2. The funds so obtained it invests and reinvests
in a wide variety of securites, distributing risk over
many industries, countries, and types of issues.
3. It appeals to the cautious investor by offering
bonds and stocks participation in reasonable denominations
and it aims to protect his interests, whatever the nature
of his holdings, by skillful management of the investment
portfolio.
In addition to offering the greater security which
results from intelligent, diversification, the typical
investment trust holds out to its common stockholders the
owned, and from the profits made by buying either stocks
or bonds which their investigations show to be selling be-
low intrinsic value."
"Investment: A New Profession" Henry S. Sturgis
"Investment trustsmay be defined as financial
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institutions organized for the purpose of enabling the in-
dividual investor to obtain the advantages of wide diver-
sification. The principal business of the trust is the
investment of funds in a diversified list of stocks and
bonds. The capital obligations of the trust representing
participation in the assets held, therefore, offer to the
small investor an investment diversification otherwise
impossible. Investment trusts may be distinguished from
holding companies, in that the la Iter are usually formed
for the purpose of acquiring managerial control over one
or more operating companies, while the former purchase
securities solely as investments. Furthermore, the bonds
issued by investment trusts must be distinguished from the
collateral trust bonds sometimes issued by holding companies.
The issuance of the latter is but incidental to the main
business of the holding company, while the issuance of bonds
by the investment trust is often an essential part of its
expectation of considerable enhancement in earning power
of their shares. This primarily arises from (a) a higher
average yield than can be safely obtained without a volume
of capital permitting considerable spreading of risk;
(b) the reinvestment of borrowed funds at higher return
than the cost of these funds to the borrowing investment
trust; and (c) the balance of capital gains (generally used
to strengthen reserves) which a well-conducted trust should
show as the outcome of its managerial alertness."
"Investment Trust Organization and Lknagement" (page 5)
Leland Rex Robinson
"Investment Trusts have existed in England and Scot-
land for some fifty years, and have had an excellent record.
In brief, these organizations raise money through the sale
of their o?m securities to the general public. The funds
so raised are then invested under the guidance of a staff
of experts in the most careful and scientific manner possi-
ble. These trusts are much like banks except that they deal
entirely in securities rather than in liquid capital. They
buy stocks or bonds in any part of the world after a most
careful investigation. Their purchases are predicated upon
a study which gives them reason to believe that the return
being paid, or confidently to be expected, will be something
store than enough to compensate for the risk being taken,
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They expect to make a business profit in their investments
as well as to receive an income. The income received comes
from the interest and dividends collected on the securities
business, and constitutes an important source of capital
with wnich it conducts its operations."
"Investment Principles and Practices" (page 540)
Ralph Eastman Badger, Ph.D.
"An investment trust may be defined as an organization
for the collective investment of funds of numerous individuals
in numerous securities."
"American Investment Trusts" (page 20) John Francis
Fowler , Jr
.
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FOREIGN & COLONIAL GOVERN! :ENT TRUSTS t 18G8
(Exhibit D—according to extended remarks of Mr, L'cFadden
in Congressional Record—House-page 3909—February 29,1928)
The best early enunciation of the principle involved in
the investment trust company is contained in the prospectus
of the Foreign and Colonial Government Trust, issued in 1868:
"The object of this trust is to give the investor of
moderate means the same advantages as the large capitalist
in diminishing the risk of investing in foreign and colonial
government stocks, by spreading the investment over a number
of different stocks and reserving a portion of the extra
interest as a sinking fund to pay off the original capital.
"A capitalist who at any time within the last 20 or
30 years had invested, say, ±,1,000,000 in 10 or 12 such stocks
selected with ordinary prudence, would, on the above plan,
not only have received a high rate of interest, but by this
time having received back his original capital by the action
of the drawings and sinking fund, and held the greater part
of his stocks for nothing.
"Some parties, believing that it would be a convenience
to the public if such a mode of investment were made generally
accessible, have made arrangements by which well-selected
Government stocks, to the value of £1,000,000 sterling, will
be placed in the names of the following trustees, viz:
"The Right Hon. Lord Westbury.
"The Lord Eustace Cecil, I,. P.
"G.M.TT.Sanford, Esq. K.P.
"George Wodehouse Currie, Esq., II. P.
"Philip Rose, Esq."
The trustees had decided that a certain group of divi-
dend-paying foreign and colonial stocks should be selected
for purchase with the funds of the trust- namely, Austrian,
Australian, Argentine, Brazilian, Canadian, Chilean, Danubian,
Egyptian, Italian, Nova Scotian, Peruvian, Portguese, Russian,
Spanish, Turkish, and United States bonds- no more than
£1,000,000 being invested in the stock of any one government.
The average rate of interest on the investment in these stocks
was given as 8 per cent, while profits were expected from the
repayment at par of a large number of them, purchased
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considerably below that figure. The certificates of £100
each were to bear 6 per cent interest and to be issued at
85. This, as a matter of fact, was an investment trust in
the modern sense of the term. Designed for the benefit of
the middle-class investor in the later sixties, it was
destined, as we shall see, to be the model of another trust,
issued under practically the same auspices, nearly 50 years
later, for the purpose of attracting a democratic clientele
by a direct appeal to the "people".
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THE FINANCIAL TRUSTS—
*
INVESTMENT BY PROXY" AND ITS EXTENSION
(Exhibit D—according to extended remarks of Mr. I cFadden in
Congressional Record—House-page 39 08- -February 29, 1928)
In spite of the large sums lavished in financing the
"new" nationalities and in equipping the ephemeral joint-
stock ventures of 1826, as well as the innumerable railway
projects which followed them, it remains true that down to
the accession of Queen Victoria a huge proportion of invest-
ment was on mortgage. The reason, as Sergeant Onslow told
Parliament in 1825, was that land was "the best and readiest
security which could be offered for money". The solicitor
general said at the same time, that none out of every ten
estates in the kingdom were loaded with mortgages—one of
the results of the terrific taxation necessitated by the
Napoleonic wars. A multitude of small investors clung to
the funds. Baring said in 1830 that out of the holders of
the 274,823 stock accounts then on the books of the Bank of
England, 250,000 did not receive a greater half-yearly
dividend than E100, and the number of half-yearly dividends
of £500 did not exceed 2,000. Of course, when the early
Victorian public completely lost its head, as it did in the
railway mania, the investing class was temporarily recruited
from all sections of the community. The Government return
of railway shareholders, issued in 1846, shows that there were
upwards of 20,000 subscribers to the lines and branches seeking
authorization in one session alone. These recruits included
attorneys* clerks, college scouts, butchers, coachmen, dairy-
men, beer sellers, butlers, footmen, and mail guards. But,
broadly, the proposition remains true that these classes did
not enter the arena of investment for many years after the
railway craze.
When the mortgage began to go out of favor investment
in stocks and shares of the industrial type, as well as the
best class of foreign bond, was still a privilege restricted
to the wealthy. A typical list of shareholders of the mid-
Victoria period will be found to include practically only
representatives of the wealthy, landed, and professional
classes. Their holdings, moreover, were all in large blocks.
Middle-class respectable people, especially, believed
that all money invested outside the pale of government
securities was embarked in speculation. They had yet to
learn the meaning and solidity of a first-class industrial
debenture with a huge margin behind it. The best that could
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be said of the nervous middle class in the sixties was that
it was beginning to lose its nervousness.
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INVESTI.ENT RESTRICTIONS OF THE FINANCIAL INVESTING COI.TPANY
OF mm YORK, LTD.
(A General Nanagement Trust)
The management of the Company is governed by the follow-
ing restrictions, which are imposed in Article VI of the
By-laws
:
STANDARDS OF VALUE
1. The Company cannot purchase "investment securities"
(as defined in the By-laws) that originate in any country
whose financial history shows instability or lack of recogni-
tion of private property rights;
2. nor securities of issuing organizations that have
not been established at least three years;
3. nor securities on which it is impossible to obtain
information;
4. nor securities that are not fully paid, non-assessable
or that entail either double or unlimited liability.
5. The Company cannot engage in the practice known as
"selling short", or in any other practice incompatible with
the bona fide investment and re-investment of its assets.
6. There are other detailed provisions with reference to
established book values, earning power, dividend records,
etc., of securities eligible to be purchases.
STANDARDS OF DIVERSIFICATION
7. Not more than 1$ of the investment assets of the
Company (as defined in the By-laws) may be invested in any
one security;
8. not more than 75$ in securities originated in the
United States; nor more than 15$ in any other country;
9. not more than 30$ in securities issued by financial
institutions; nor more than 30$ in railroad, land or marine
transporation securities; nor more than 30$ in public
utilities; nor more than 30$ in industrials; nor more than
50$ in securities of governments, states or municipalities;
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nor more than 20% in any other kind of interprise or
business
.
RaqjIRSD SALES
10, Should any security owned by the Company become
ineligible for purchase at any time, such security, if
already owned, must be sold within six months thereafter.
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STIPULATIONS GOVERNING INVESTMENTS, DOI.IESTIC AND OVERSEAS
INVESTING CO., LTD
.
(An Investment Trust of the British General Management Type)
STANDARDS OF VALUE
Investment can be made only in countries which have demon-
strated their financial stability and recognition of private
property rights; the issuing corporation or country must have
been established at least three years; complete and trustworthy
information must be available.
Bonds, notes, etc. purchased for investment must be
secured as follows:
(1) by marketable collateral of at least 110$; or
(2) mortgaged property of at least 150$; or
(3) by assets of the issuer of at least 200$.
Preferred stocks must have
(1) an unbroken 5-year dividend record, or
(2) a book value of at least 250$ of the purchase price.
Common stocks must have
(1) a 5-year dividend record equal to at least 4$ per
annum of the purchase price, or
(2) a book value of at least 250$ thereof
Should a security already held become ineligible for pur-
chase, such holdings must be sold as soon as possible without
sacrifice, or in any event within six months.
STANDARDS OF DIVERSIFICATION
The purchase of investment securities shall be subject to
the following diversification restrictions:
(a) Not to exceed Fifteen Per Cent (15$) in the aggregate
securities originating in any foreign nation or
country; and
(b) Not to exceed Thirty Per Cent (30$) in the securities
issued by banks, insurance and other financial in-
stitutions; and
(c) Not to exceed Thirty Per Cent (30$) in securities
issued by railroad, land and marine transportation
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companies ;and
>
(d) Not to exceed Thirty Per Cent (30^o) in securities
issued by public utility companies; and
(e) Not to exceed Thirty Per Cent (30£j in securities
issued by industrial companies; and
(f) Not to exceed Fifty Per Cent (50;j) in securities
issued by governments, states, municipalities or
other political subdivisions thereof; and
(g) Not to exceed Twenty Per Cent {20fj) in securities
issued by organizations engaged in any other kind
of enterprise or business.
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GOLDMAN SACHS TRADING CORPORATION
Since this thesis was written, Shenandoah and Blue Ridge
have both retired some of their outstanding preferred stock.
The former trust acquired 899,780 shares, partly through open
market transactions and partly from the sponsors of the com-
pany. Blue Ridge acquired 74,200 shares. In both cases, the
net asset value of the outstanding shares of common stock was
increased; Shenandoah, :|p5.00 a share, and Blue Ridge, ;0.16
a share. The idea of these trusts purchasing their own se-
curities was not highly regarded by the Stock Exchange, it
was rumored. Some, however, contended that it was a legitimate
practice as long as the purchases were made at prices below the
liquidating value of the stocks.
At the close of 19 29, the net worth of the Goldman Sachs
Trading Corporation was equivalent to $40*94 on its outstand-
ing capital stock of 5,691,310 shares. This included the
shares issued as a stock dividend January 2, 1930. The income
account of the corporation and its subsidiaries showed realized
cash profits of $30,979,778. for the period, not including any
value for stock dividends received.
Peculiarly, "these realized profits are before adjustments
arising from the re-valuation of assets occasioned by the gen-
eral decline in security values and have been applied against
capital surplus. No compensation is due or will be made to the
managers for this period. *
*Boston Herald, January 9, 1930
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TEN TESTS FOR AN DjVESTMEjNIT TRUST
(From a radio talk by Smith, Scott
& Co., Inc. over WBZ and WBZA)
1. What does the trust own?
2. What is the property of the trust actually worth per
share of the trust?
3. What do the shares of the trust sell for?
4 # Who gets the difference—and why?
5. Are there any favored stockholders, any holders of
options?
6. How is the price of the shares of the trust fixed?
7. What is the management's rate of compensation?
8. Does the management make money selling securities to
the trust?
9 # Are capital gains treated as income or put into capital
reserve?
10. Has the shareholder the right to compel liquidation of
his shares by the trust itself?
-15a-
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